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PREFACE 
Andrew Rowan, Director 
Tufts Center for Animals and Public Policy 
This publication is the result of several different but related initiatives 
that have been combined to produce a single book which will, we hope, 
advance our understanding of the debate about animal protection and 
conservation within zoos and captive wildlife programs. 
The publication consists of the proceedings of a workshop, sponsored by 
the Gilman Foundation, and held in April of 1994 at the White Oak Con­
servation Center in Florida. About thirty participants were invited from 
zoos, animal protection groups and academic institutions to discuss 
concepts such as wild, captive and tame; animal well-being in the wild 
and in zoos; and protecting individuals versus conserving populations. 
In order to maximize the time engaged in discussion, several individuals 
were identified to prepare target articles which were distributed to all 
participants before the meeting. These articles form the main chapters 
in this book. Other participants were asked to lead off the discussion of 
each target article during the workshop. These comments make up the 
first part of the discussion following each article. The remainder of the 
discussion is an edited version of the audiotaped workshop. 
At the end of the second day, the participants at the workshop agreed to 
complete a short survey that assessed their attitudes to various captive 
and wild animal management options. The survey was developed by 
Andrew Rowan with the assistance of Jennifer Lewis and John Robinson. 
The actual survey and the results are reproduced at the end of the work­
shop proceedings. 
We have also included two appendices. The first, by Jennifer Lewis, 
was commissioned by the Tufts Center for Animals and Public Policy to 
examine animal protection criticism of zoos and aquaria, to evaluate 
the response of zoos and aquaria to such external as well as internal 
criticism, and to draw up a list of reccommendations for possible future 
action on captive animal and conservation issues. Originally, the Tufts 
Center for Animals and Public Policy had planned to organize a set of 
smaller scale discussions between zoo and animal protection officials. 
However, for a variety of reasons, we determined that such small group 
discussions would probably not be constructive so we chose to promote 
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further discussion by inserting our own analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the arguments of both parties into the debate. 
Finally, we included a short commentary by John Robinson, one of the 
participants at the White Oak workshop, as the final appendix. 
In sum, this project has led us to conclude that the differences between 
zoo and animal protection workers are relatively small and do not jus­
tify the level of public disharmony between the two sides. The leading 
organizations in both camps are concerned both with providing appro­
priate care for individual animals as well as the conservation of wild 
populations. The most significant difference was the level of trust in 
human management. The zoo professionals accepted the necessity of 
human management whereas the animal protection contingent was more 
suspicious of the beneficial effects of human agency in wildlife conser­
vation. There are also issues about the relative importance of educa­
tion, conservation and public entertainment in captive programs and 
about initiatives to deal with the many substandard captive animal 
programs in the United States. 
Many issues, not least the problem of mutual trust, must be addressed if 
zoos and animal protection organizations are to develop a constructive 
working relationship. Animal conservation and protection would ben­
efit if they did. 
V 
OPENING REMARKS 
James Smith, Director 
The Gilman Foundation 
The Gilman Foundation has been in existence as a legal entity since 
1981, but has been operating with a professional staff for only two years. 
We are a young foundation that is just beginning to define its program 
and to create a relationship with the White Oak Conservation Center. 
The Foundation and the Conservation Center are parallel entities con­
verging on tracks that will hopefully allow the trains to merge rather 
than collide. 
This sort of conference is very important for both the Foundation and 
the Conservation Center, for it goes to the heart of what we are trying to 
do in New York; to bring together people who can help both organiza­
tions reflect upon some of the larger world that pertain to this very sig­
nificant program. 
This is the seventh meeting in which we have surveyed the intellectual 
landscape while considering the future of our program. Such functions 
also serve as a way to meet other individuals involved with similar 
issues. Our goal is to plan future endeavors to alert us to conference 
prospects and research projects as well as to test our physical facilities 
and our capacity to organize in the real world. 
We are very pleased that these physical facilities and setting allow us 
to bring together people of very different backgrounds in the hopes of 
finding common ground, rethinking preconceptions and exchanging ideas 
in informal ways. Over the past two years these meetings have brought 
together the environmental ministers of fourteen of the fifteen former 
Soviet Republics and seven other European countries in order to discuss 
environmental cooperation. We brought together people with very dif­
ferent perspectives on the protection of tropical rain forests and found 
some modest common ground, and have generated discussion concern­
ing the international HIV/AIDS epidemic in a long-term project of which 
we are very pleased to be a part. 
As one walks the halls of this facility representative posters and photo­
graphs can be observed, parts of our cultural program. This cultural 
program in conjunction with conservation are two arms of our Foun-
vi 
dation in New York, the other being conservation, arms which we feel 
are intertwined. We are very concerned with cultural issues and the 
conservation of cultural institutions and hope that this conference will 
provide us with some welcome advice on the conceptualization of this 
linkage. 
WHAT DO "WILD" AND "CAPTIVE" MEAN FOR 
LARGE UNGULATES AND CARNIVORES NOW AND 
INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 
Michael Hutchins 
Director of Conservation and Science 
American Zoo and Aquarium Association 
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The terms "wild" and "captive" have stimulated considerable 
debate among academicians, animal protectionists and conserva­
tionists. Some argue that animals have a right to freedom and that 
there is a "moral predis-position" against holding them in zoos 
(Jamieson, 1985; 1995; Varner and Monroe, 1991). Others argue that 
modern zoos .and their living collections are becoming increasing 
important to wildlife conservation and science, and that the collective 
benefits so derived may override this predisposition (Hutchins and 
Wemmer, 1991; Conway, 1995; Hutchins et al, 1995; Norton, 1995). The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the concepts of "wild" and "cap­
tive" and their meaning for large ungulates and carnivores today and 
into the twenty-first century. However, it might first be useful to 
examine these terms and their definitions. Websters New Collegiate 
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existence"; "not tame or domesticated"; or "loose from restraint or 
regulation." In contrast, "captive" is defined as: "taken and held as if a 
prisoner"; "kept within bounds"; or "held or controlled by an­
other." From a human perspective, the connotations associated 
with each of these terms are powerful and undoubtedly affect our 
perceptions when applied to non-human animals. Debates between 
pro- and anti-zoo advocates are likely to continue. However, as I 
explain here, the distinction between the terms "captive" and 
"wild" is becoming increasingly blurred. The lives of zoo-held 
animals are managed by human caretakers, sometimes intensively. 
Never-the-less, newer zoo exhibits are relatively large and, with the 
exception of predators, parasites, and diseases, often replicate many 
critical aspects of an animal's natural environment (Swain, 1989; Tarpy, 
1994; Maple et. al. 1995). At the same time, so-called "wild" animals 
are increasingly impacted by the activities of humans, thus often 
necessitating active management of their habitats and populations 
(Younghusband and Myers, 1986; Diamond, 1992; Hutchins and 
Fascione, 1993; Conway 1995). 
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ANIMAL WELFARE AND CONSERVATION REALITIES 
In an ideal world, wild animals would have the freedom to live (and 
die) as they have for countless generations. The adaptations of ani­
mals have evolved in response to various environmental pressures 
and it is reasonable to assume that the best place for wild animals is 
in their natural habitat. However, this is not an ideal world and the 
activities of humans are rapidly pushing many species to the brink of 
extinction (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981; Wilson, 1992; Conway, 1995). 
Thus, before considering the relative merits of captivity versus "the 
wild" and the philosophical viewpoints of animal welfare/rights 
advocates and conservationists, it is important to understand the many 
complex issues involved in modern wildlife conservation. An example 
is provided by the Javan rhino in Ujung Kulon National Park on 
the island of Java in Indonesia (Rusuli, 1991). Located on the western 
tip of the island, this isolated emerald peninsula is a grim reminder of 
the many challenges facing wildlife today. The fact that Ujung Kulon 
exists at all is remarkable. The island of Java is one of the most 
densely populated on earth, with more than 90 million people packed 
into an area roughly equivalent in size to New York state. The need to 
grow enough food to support this mass of humanity led the local 
people to convert over 99% of the island's forests into farmland. As its 
forest habitat receded, so did populations of the rhino, and it is esti­
mated that less than 65 survive on Java today-all in Ujung Kulon 
(Sadjudin, 1992). 
Recognizing the importance of this unique species and habitat, the 
Indonesian government declared Ujung Kulon a national park in 
1980 (MacKinnon, 1991). However, the creation of a protected area, 
in itself, is generally not enough to ensure the long-term existence of 
wildlife or the habitats on which they depend. Despite the best efforts 
of the Indonesian government, rhino poaching still occurs in the park 
(Tilson, pers. comm.). In Asia, rhino horn is prized for its presumed 
medicinal value, and for local people, the economic incentive to kill 
rhinos is great (Cohn, 1988). Simply put, to many a rhino is worth 
more dead than it is alive. When one also considers that park bound­
aries are not well marked or adequately patrolled, that nearby villages 
have exploding birth rates, and that the local people live in poverty, 
it is clearly a recipe for disaster (Lant and Rusuli, 1991). Obviously, 
many social and economic factors are working against the Javan 
rhino, but conservationists must also contend with biological reali-
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ties. The fact that the rhino population is so small and isolated is a 
major cause for concern (Macquire et al., 1987; Sadjudin, 1992). Before 
humans fragmented their habitat, the animals lived in a larger, more 
continuous population. When a particular area became over-popu­
lated, competition forced individuals to move to other areas, thus 
ensuring frequent genetic interchange. However, when animal popula­
tions become small and isolated, as occurs in fragmented habitats, 
there is a greater chance that inbreeding and genetic drift will occur. 
The subsequent loss of genetic diversity can have devastating effects 
on both individuals and populations, eventually leading to extinction 
(Soule, 1987). 
The relatively small size of the park (39,000 hectares) may also 
prevent the rhino population from expanding (Macquire et al., 1987). 
The number of animals that an area can support, also known as its 
"carrying capacity", is dependent on many factors, including the 
amount of space and food available. Their small population size also 
makes the animals more vulnerable to a variety of catastrophic events, 
both natural or human-caused (Ewens et al., 1987). A disease epidemic 
could wipe out the entire population in the course of a few months, as 
could a major fire. 
All this leads to one inescapable conclusion: the Javan rhino is in 
serious trouble and without human intervention the probability of 
extinction is high. Unfortunately, this case is not unique; similar sce­
narios are being played out in a thousand parks and reserves around 
the world and with scores of different species of large ungulates 
and carnivores (Groombridge, 1993). One critical realization is that 
there are very few habitats left that are unaffected by humans. In 
short, there is no "wild", at least not in the classical sense, and some 
conservationists, have argued that unprecedented levels of human 
intervention will be necessary if many species are to persist (Duffy and 
Watt, 1971; Temple, 1977; Younghusband and Myers, 1986; Hutchins 
and Fascione, 1993). Intervention will take many forms, including: 
mediating conflicts between humans and animals, controlling indig­
enous animal populations, translocating animals or their genes to 
maintain genetic diversity in fragmented populations, controlling 
disease, manipulating or restoring habitats, and when necessary and 
appropriate, captive breeding for reintroduction. I will consider each 
of these in turn: 
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MEDIATING CONFLICTS BETWEEN ANIMALS AND HUMANS 
Shrinking wildlife habitats, poor land use practices and growing 
human populations have led to an increase in direct and indirect 
conflicts between humans and wildlife (Newark et al, 1994). For 
example, conservationists face this type of challenge in their attempts 
to preserve the endangered Bengal tiger, Asiatic lion and African and 
Asian elephants (Sukamar, 1991; Saberwal et al., 1994; Parker and 
Graham, 1989). India is one of the world's most populated countries, 
and encounters between large carvivores and people occur fre­
quently in areas surrounding national parks and equivalent reserves 
(Ward, 1994). Tigers and lions do not generally pose much danger to 
humans when their habitats remain intact and the animals have suffi­
cient food to eat. However, if populations of these large cats become 
too large or prey populations drop, they may leave park boundries and 
come into contact with humans (McDougal, 1991; Sabrwal et al., 
1994). Near the Gir Forest in India where the world's last remain­
ing population of 300 Asiatic lions exists, there were about 150 
maulings from 1988-1992, some of which resulted in deaths (Ward, 
1992). Similarly, there have been problems with "man-eating" tigers 
in the Sundarbans Delta on the India-Bangladesh border. Over 600 
people were killed in a 10-year period from 1975-1985 (MacDougal, 
1991). In an attempt to mediate this situation, park managers in 
the Sunderbans devised wooden effigies of human figures which are 
innoculated with human scent. The figures are then wrapped in electri­
fied wire and placed along the paths that tigers travel; when a cat 
attacks the figure, it receives a severe shock. Park managers are hope­
ful that this and other innovative techniques will provide an effec­
tive deterrent (Jackson, 1991). 
Besides presenting an imminent danger to humans, wildlife can 
also compete with, prey on or transmit diseases to domestic animals, 
and destroy agricultural crops. Attempts to mediate such conflicts 
are an important aspect of wildlife conservation, because if the con­
flicts persist, it is the animals that typically lose (Parker and Graham, 
1989). For example, populations of large herbivores, such as African 
elephants, can do extensive damage to crops when they leave the 
confines of national parks or equivalent reserves (Thouless, 1994). As 
a result, many parks, such as Kruger National Park in South Africa, 
have erected fences to keep wildlife and humans apart (Ricciuti, 
1993). Fences also have the added advantage of keeping the animals 
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When ecosystems become altered, it often becomes impossible for 
predators and prey to maintain their dynamic equilibrium. In the 
absence of large predators or the opportunity for normal migratory 
movements, populations of antelope, deer, elephants and other large 
herbivores can spiral out of control (Caughley, 1981). The ecological 
effects of such population "eruptions" can be devastating and are a 
growing problem for conservation biologists (Garrott et al., 1993). 
Overgrazing and trampling can cause extensive damage to vegetation, 
as well as permanently alter an entire ecosystem. Small or closed 
systems that occur as a result of fencing or habitat fragmentation are 
especially vulnerable to these destabilizing effects. Fenced reserves, 
no matter how large, are essentially "mega-zoos" which will require 
intensive management in order to sustain the wildlife contained 
within. In these restricted environments, populations of large herbi­
vores must be constantly monitored and controlled, either through 
culling, translocation, or contraception (Younghusband and Myers, 
1986; Diamond, 1992; Hutchins and Wemmer, 1987). Culling of el­
ephants is a common practice in some African national parks 
and, although regrettable, is an absolute necessity if the delicate 
balance of nature is to be maintained (Pienaar, 1969). With their 
movements now restricted by park boundaries, these large herbi­
vores overgraze the vegetation and, by destroying trees, convert 
woodland habitats into grasslands or semi-deserts (Swanepoel, 
1993). If allowed to become overpopulated, large ungulates can 
eventually alter their habitat to the point that it becomes uninhabit­
able for many species, including their own (Novellie et al., 
1991). One consequence of overpopulation and habitat degradation 
is often slow and painful death by starvation (Ricuitti, 1993). 
MAINTAINING GENETIC DIVERSITY 
Inbreeding, or the mating of close relatives, results in a rapid loss of 
genetic variability. This factor alone can lead to population extinctions 
(Soule, 1987). On an individual level, highly inbred animals tend to 
be more susceptible to disease or have higher rates of infant mor­
tality (Ralls and Ballou, 1982). On a population level, inbreeding and 
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the consequent loss of genetic diversity can also have devastating long­
term effects on the gene pool. Genetic variability is the raw material 
on which natural selection occurs, and when a gene pool becomes 
diluted, populations can lose their ability to adapt to changing 
environments (Soule, 1987). 
When a population becomes too small and isolated to maintain 
genetic diversity, then animals may have to be moved to introduce 
new variation. The need for translocations (of individuals or their 
genetic material) will increase as wildlife habitats become more frag­
mented, thus preventing normal migratory movements and genetic 
interchange from occurring (Wilcox and Murphy, 1985; Hutchins and 
Fascione, 1993). Recognizing this threat, biologists who design 
parks and reserves are giving more thought to including "wildlife 
corridors" so that movement between reserves, and therefore genetic 
interchange, can occur (Noss, 1991). In many cases, however, extensive 
intervention will still be necessary, especially when wildlife habitats 
are fenced to prevent human-animal conflicts. If animals are unable 
to move between populations on their own, it may be necessary to 
translocate them by artificial means (Hutchins and Fascione, 1993). 
However, the effectiveness of such techniques is often dependent on 
the biology and behavior of the species in question. Translocation of 
Asian elephants, for example, has not always been successful due to 
the animals' strong homing tendencies (Lahiri-Choudhury, 1993). 
The need for translocations may be reduced through the develop­
ment of modern biotechnology (Wildt, 1989). In the future, it may be 
possible to transport a male mammal's sperm or a frozen embryo 
rather than the whole animal. Techniques such as artificial insemi­
nation, or in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer may someday 
be used introduce new genetic variation into an isolated population 
without having to release live animals. This would not only reduce 
the risk of exposing the host population to new diseases, it would also 
help to avoid social conflicts. While the use of frozen sperm and 
embryos may seem like science fiction, the techniques have been used 
successfully with a few endangered species, including tigers and wild 
cattle (Wiese and Hutchins, 1994). 
CONTROLLING DISEASE 
Disease is a major factor controlling wild animal populations and 
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has significant implications for wildlife conservation. Many evolving 
conservation strategies, such as translocation and reintroduction, 
involve the movement of animals from one location to another. When 
such movement occurs, there is always a risk of disease transmis­
sion (Ballou, 1993). In some cases, the susceptibility of animals to 
disease can be increased by the stress of relocation. The transmis­
sion of disease from wildlife to domestic animals can also be ex­
pected to affect conservation programs (Meltzer, 1993). For example, 
when the bison of Yellowstone National Park become overpopulated, 
they often invade adjacent ranches in winter. Local ranchers are 
fearful of these incursions because the bison carry brucellosis, a 
potentially fatal disease that can be transmitted to cattle ( Meffe and 
Carroll, 1994). In an attempt to appease their neighbors, the National 
Park Service controls bison populations through shooting. The 
hunt is highly controversial, but what would be the economic and 
political consequences of inaction for the bison and the park? 
Unfortunately, our current knowledge of wildlife diseases is 
poor. Much more research is needed on the etiology, diagnosis and 
treatment of various pathogens (Hutchins et al., 1991). When 
animals are moved to facilitate conservation, they will need be 
tested for evidence of certain diseases prior to their release 
(Woodford and Kock, 1991). The health of domestic animals will also 
need to be monitored in order to prevent the introduction of exotic 
diseases into indigenous wildlife populations. Knowing when or if 
to treat wild animals is often difficult (Rolson, 1992). In some 
cases, it may be better to let a naturally-occurring disease run its 
course. Those animals that do survive will have an immunity to the 
disease and are less likely to be affected in the future. However, exotic 
diseases are another matter. Immunologically naive animals are par­
ticularly vulnerable to new or exotic diseases to which they 
have not been exposed, and immediate veterinary intervention may be 
necessary, especially in small, isolated populations (Meltzer, 1993). 
HABITAT MANIPULATION AND RESTORATION 
The continued existence of wildlife is dependent on there being 
sufficient habitat available to provide food, shelter and other necessi­
ties of life. Unfortunately, throughout much of the world, natural 
habitats have been or are being altered or destroyed at an alarming rate 
(Erhlich and Ehrlich, 1981; Wilson, 1992). In some cases, however, 
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wildlife can still persist or even thrive if habitats are manipulated to 
enhance certain features. 
A potential beneficiary of habitat manipulation is the endangered 
giant panda. This highly specialized carnivore subsists primarily on a 
diet of bamboo. About every 40 years, however, a bamboo species 
flowers and dies off. Under natural conditions, the animals would 
simply migrate in search of live bamboo or switch their preference to 
another bamboo species (Schaller, et al. , 1985). However, habitat 
destruction has confined the remaining panda populations to small 
islands of habitat. If these patches do not contain more than one 
variety of bamboo, the pandas could starve during a bamboo die-off. 
Some conservationists have suggested that the status of bamboo 
stands be monitored in panda habitat, and that if only one species of 
bamboo exists, then other species should be planted (Reid et al., 1989). 
CAPTIV E BREEDING FOR REINTRODUCTION 
It has become popular among certain circles to question the value of 
captive breeding and reintroduction programs for endangered ani­
mals ( e.g. Varner and Monroe, 1991; World Society for the Protec­
tion of Animals and Born Free Foundation, 1994). By themselves, 
they certainiy shouid not be viewed as panaceas for the endangered 
species problem (Hutchins and Wemmer, 1991; Wiese et al., 1994; 
Hutchins et al., 1995). The techniques are expensive (Kleiman et al., 
1991), and there are simply too many species at risk for this approach 
to work in all cases (Ginsberg, 1993; Hutchins et al., 1995). Does this 
mean that captive breeding programs should be abandoned? 
Absolutely not. First, it should be recognized that there are many 
more immediate ways that zoos and their living collections can con­
tribute to conservation beyond captive breeding for reintroduction, 
including public education, scientific research, the development of 
relevant technologies, professional training and technology trans­
fer, and fund raising to support in situ conservation (Hutchins and 
Wiese, 1991; Hutchins et. al, 1995; Wiese et al., 1994; Wiese and 
Hutchins, 1994; Hutchins and Conway, in press). Second, when a 
species' population is reduced to a level where it is no longer 
genetially viable or demographically stable, then captive breeding 
for reintroduction may offer the only chance for recovery (Hutchins 
and Wemmer, 1991; Stuart, 1991; Hutchins et al., 1995; Wiese and 
Hutchins, 1994; Conway, 1995). There are several documented sue-
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
9 
cesses, particularly when the reintroduction projects have been based 
on good science (Beck et al., 1994). Two of the best known examples 
involving large ungulates and carnivores are the Arabian oryx and 
red wolf. Populations of the oryx and wolf were severely reduced 
due to over-hunting and both species eventually became extinct in 
the wild. Fortunately, successful captive breeding programs by zoos 
have made it possible to reestablish these animals in nature 
(Stanley-Price, 1989; Smith, 1990). 
Recognizing the necessity of captive breeding programs in carefully 
selected cases should not lessen our resolve ( or take presidence over 
our efforts) to preserve as many large tracts of existing natural habitat 
as possible. There is no reason that both cannot be done simulta­
neously (Hutchins and Wemmer, 1991). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this essay, I have argued that human intervention will be neces­
sary in order to preserve viable populations of large ungulates and 
carnivores now and into the twenty-first century. This is especially 
true in areas where wildlife habitats or populations have become 
smaller or fragmented as a result of human activities. Some decisions, 
such as culling or the capture of wild animals to create captive popu­
lations, will be controversial. In fact, I am uneasy about the prospect 
of manipulating nature and recognize that such attempts have not 
always been successful. However, difficult decisions must be made if 
many populations, species and ecosystems are to survive (Hutchins 
and Wemmer, 1987). Those that accuse wildlife conservationists of 
"playing God" must realize that this is the only responsible course of 
action; in the absence of divine intervention, it is up to us to find 
solutions. Because our knowledge of organisms and ecosystems is 
imperfect, there is no doubt that we will make mistakes. Such deci­
sions may profit from the evolving science of risk analysis and man­
agement (Morgan, 1993). 
If "free-ranging" animal populations must be managed inten­
sively, then can we still call them "wild"? Perhaps not, although there 
are clearly different levels of human impact and intervention. In fact, 
British journalist Colin Willock predicted this situation over 30 years 
ago. After travelling through many of Uganda's national parks, he 
wrote: "I'm afraid that I believe that it is inevitable that the world's last 
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great collections of large animals will end up inside the isolated, 
defended islands we call parks or reserves. Outside such places 
there is not going to be much left. The areas of these parks may be vast, 
but this doesn't alter the fact that national parks are really just enor­
mous zoos" (Willcock, 1964). 
There are those who still hold onto the myth of wild Africa, Asia, 
and South America. Consequently, some individuals also believe 
that the best way to preserve wildlife is to simply "leave it alone" 
(Regan, 1983; Willers, 1992). However, I believe that this perception is 
based largely on the mistaken impression that there still is a "wild" out 
there, and I further stress that we must have "conservation without 
illusion" (Adams and McShane, 1992). Indeed, the decision to do 
nothing is a choice that also has many consequences. Given the reali­
ties under which conservation must occur now and into the future, to 
stand by and do nothing would be irresponsible. A policy of "benign 
neglect" can only lead to more extinctions (Soule et al., 1979). 
Certainly there is enough information from national parks in the 
United States to suggest that the long-term effects of habitat fragmen­
tation are real and that in the absence of management intervention, 
many species will disappear (Conway, 1995; Diamond, 1992). A 1987 
survey indicated that 14 national parks in western North America 
had, since their establishment, lost a total of 42 species of mammals 
from within their respective boundaries. Even the largest of our parks 
are apparently not immune. For example, the three million acre 
Everglades-Big Cypress Swamp park complex in Florida has lost 12 
species of native birds and mammals in the last 200 years, including 
the red wolf, monk seal and ivory-billed woodpecker. The endan­
gered Florida panther, wood stork, and many other species may not 
be far behind. I also disagree with those who argue that we can 
save species simply by preserving their habitats (e.g., Winckler, 1992). 
The preservation of wildlife habitat is essential for conservation and 
there certainly is need for more integrated conservation strategies 
(Scott et al., 1987). But, by itself, it will not be enough. The current 
threats to wildlife are simply too pervasive. For example, there is 
ample rhino habitat in Africa, but the animals continue to lose ground, 
primarily as a result of poaching (Ricciuti, 1992). If large ungulates 
and carnivores are to survive, then we must, develop the knowl­
edge and technology to intervene when it becomes necessary to 
save individual species, to maintain the balance of nature in heavily 
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Does our terminology need to change to fit the times? Perhaps. 
Given the political, economic and biological realities facing wildlife 
today, it might be more accurate for certain zoo-held animal popula­
tions to be called "protected," or "secure" rather than "captive." 
Indeed, the intent behind such programs is not to treat animals "as if 
they were prisoners," but rather to protect and preserve some repre­
sentatives of their species (and their genetic material) from an increas­
ingly hostile world and to utilize such populations and materials in the 
service of wildlife and ecosystem conservation. Environmental phi­
losopher, Bryan Norton, recently argued that "it is mainly the con­
text, not the content, of our interactions with animals that determines 
our moral obligations to them" (Norton, 1995). Consequently, he 
views captive wild animals as "animal altruists," helping to perpetu­
ate their species and natural habitats. One problem with wildlife and 
ecosystem conservation is that success cannot be measured in brief 
time intervals. We may not know for a hundred years or more whether 
or not we have been successful. In the meantime, it is important to 
recognize that we must try. Debates over the rights of individual 
animals versus populations, species or ecosystems, and over the 
relative merits of captivity versus the wild will become purely aca­
demic if we do not find ways to slow down and eventually stop the 
growing loss of biological diversity. 
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HUTCHINS - DISCUSSION 
Clifton: There are two different approaches you can take to interven­
tion, one of which is the North American model of active intervention 
which creates an economic constituency. An alternative approach is a 
form of management which includes such things as changing a par­
ticular crop or reintroducing a plant species that will have a particular 
desired effect. For example, it was recently discovered that Queen 
Anne's lace is a very powerful contraceptive in rodents. If you want to 
control the wild rodent population, you provide lots of Queen Anne's 
lace. There is no need for poisons or the introduction of a predator that 
doesn't naturally belong in the habitat. 
Robinson: This discussion introduces the problem of specificity. In 
which cases is management necessary? I am not going to argue that 
we don't need management, for I believe we do. Another issue we 
need to consider is the concept of "wild" versus "tame." I think it is 
clear that there are and have always been human influences in the 
wilderness, that no captive management situation is totally controlled. 
However, I do not think habitat degradation is necessarily an argu­
ment for the lack of distinction between wilderness and captivity. For 
example, a forest can be degraded, and indeed ultimately converted 
into a field, but that does not mean that the forest, not even if badly 
degraded does not exist. It is worthwhile to try to maintain some 
concept of wilderness and wild animals and to try to define that over 
the course of the next couple of days. 
Hutchins: I totally agree. I was not meaning to imply that we should 
degrade our concept of what we call the "wild." I was implying that 
this is a continuum and we are managing animals in the wild, we are 
regulating their movements, feeding and watering them, etc. It is a 
controlled situation in many cases. I think there is a difference be­
tween a zoo and a national park, and certainly the latter is what we are 
trying to preserve. But I think this clouds the issue. The fact is that 
this kind of management is going to have to occur, but there are differ­
ences and degrees between what we call the "wild" and what we call 
"captivity." 
Lewis: The "wild," if it ever really existed, may become an ideal that 
we work toward in every national preserve, biosphere preserve, etc. I 
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realized a long time ago there is no wildlife population on earth that 
has not been touched by humans. I would also argue, however, for the 
least intervention possible and for the interventions that have the least 
impact in any given situation. There should be some kind of standard 
set up by people who do this kind of work. That would be the most 
valuable way to go about it. There are going to be situations where 
serious or high-level intervention will be necessary, the gray wolf 
being a good example of such a situation. We ought to start with the 
lowest level of intervention possible, and then increase it if necessary. 
Hutchins: As a general rule I think that is probably a good idea. On 
the other hand I would hate to see us develop strict guidelines. I think 
conservation strategies must be extremely flexible. The intervention 
techniques will vary according to the problem and as a result of the 
species and the biological characteristics that are involved. Flexibility 
is very important. If the population goes below a certain level perhaps 
we should think of intervening and developing captive populations. 
However, decisions regarding colonial species would be subject to 
problems. There may be one half million or a million penguins in an 
area, but they may be in only two or three colonies. If an oil spill hits 
one or two of those colonies they will be destroyed. Different situa­
tions result in different approaches. 
Bekoff: It is important not to downplay the necessity of the creation of 
an operational position. Hutchins stated that there is no wild, yet 
asserted that we can maintain great genetic variability in captivity 
when compared to "out of nature." I question that if there is no wild, 
what are we preserving? Do we need to come back to the issue that 
there is no wild? We could be compulsive and say there has been no 
wild from the time humans first made their appearance, but we are, or 
were at one time, a part of the wildlife process. It seems that people 
use a scale, thinking that something is less wild when humans enter 
the scene. I think the point made earlier about coming up with some 
definition is crucial. What are we preserving? Something less wild? 
When do we get off that slope? One of the things I have found impres­
sive this morning is that this conference has rekindled the idea that 
although these animals are in captivity they are still doing what their 
counterparts are doing in their natural habitats, out in the "wild" . 
Hutchins: Norton was actually thinking about captive animals as 
"wild animals in captivity," which is a separate ethical category. They 
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are not domesticated and that is a big difference. I ran into this issue 
when I was studying free-living mountain goats in a national park. 
Those animals had never been hunted and were habituated to humans. 
I continually had people ask why I was studying them in such an 
environment since they were tame. They are not tame. They do not 
take food from people. Yes, I could sit in the middle of a group of 
them and observe them closely, as Jane Goodall did with chimpanzees, 
but although they are habituated to people, these are not tame animals. 
They are not domesticated. 
I think we are preserving the potential for future evolution, which 
brings us to some really interesting philosophical discussions. It 
makes us consider the relevance of a time scale. How long are we 
going to preserve these things? I have been thinking recently about the 
measurement of success for conservation. How do you measure the 
success of a conservation program, and under what time scale? One 
hundred years, two hundred years, one thousand years? 
Pacelle : You were basically arguing that it is our duty as conservation­
ists to intervene because the situation is so severe. You suggest a 
polarity, that there are some who believe in intervention and some who 
do not. I do not really see that as a legitimate framing of the issue. 
There is certainly considerable debate about the means of intervention, 
but I think most people accept intervention as necessary in many of 
these situations. It is common parlance in state fish and game agencies 
to say that the management of wildlife population is not simply a issue 
of the biological carrying capacity, but rather a question of the cultural 
carrying capacity. The cultural carrying capacity rarely reaches the 
number of animals people can tolerate and the types of behaviors in 
which they engage. That is really the salient question for the twenty­
first century. I do not, however, think that we should look at the cul­
tural carrying capacity in a similar manner that we look at the biologi­
cal carrying capacity, which may be a type of scientific notion. 
The cultural carrying capacity is something that can be raised or low­
ered, for example bison in Yellowstone national park are met with a 
sort of "hands-off" policy. The park does not engage in any culling or 
killing of the animals. These are free-roaming creatures, therefore 
boundaries are nonexistent. We have ranchers on national forests who 
have, in my opinion, an entirely irrational fear of the threat of 
Brucellous to domestic cattle. There has never been a documented case 
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
22 
of Brucellous transmission between bison and cattle, and some suggest 
that such a transmission is impossible. Yet the political powers that be 
create the situation and create this notion that we have some great 
need to manage these animals. I think what we really need to do is 
educate people, to increase the cultural carrying capacity. If we cannot 
tolerate twenty-five hundred bison in the Yellowstone ecosystem, what 
are we preserving? And is it not absolutely preposterous that we talk 
about this sort of mismanagement of wildlife? I think that more and 
more of the animal protection and animal rights community accept the 
idea of intervention, but the intervention must be humane. We have 
to analyze some of these problems and not just think that animals are 
things for us to move around as chess pieces for frivolous or gratuitous 
social or economic needs. 
Hutchins: I do not think economic needs are frivolous, especially in 
developing countries where people's livelihoods are at stake. We have 
a lot of food here and have certain perspectives that are based on the 
very easy lifestyle which we live. We think differently here than others 
do elsewhere. There are, perhaps, better examples than the bison 
where disease transmission is a reality. I tend to agree with your issue 
about the cultural carrying capacity, although I think the cultural 
carrying capacity and the biological carrying capacity are interrelated 
because the number of peopie reduce the biological carrying capacity 
of animals. 
Bostock: I am interested in questioning the concept of "wild" that has 
been raised. I agree with Hutchins about the evolution of wildness; it 
is a very long timescale that we are never going to be here to see. 
There is a paradox here, for the wild is a system of managing itself. We 
have got to intervene when necessary, but we are intervening in order 
to make that intervention unnecessary. It is the same as a parent look­
ing after a child, doing what they can in order for that child to become 
independent. 
Clifton: I like the concept that trying to preserve a species is trying to 
preserve the possibility of future evolution. However, in order for 
evolution to take place there has to be a challenge to which a popula­
tion responds. When you keep a population in an essentially 
advantaged situation that challenge is not there. As we develop ge­
netic technology it is inevitable that there are going to be human 
conduced forms of evolution, hybridization, gene transplants, etc. We 
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have got to let those animals go at some point, allow them to find their 
own niche and establish themselves. We are almost at that that point 
experimentally with some introduced, genetically manipulated charac­
teristics of plants. There has been a tremendous scientific, political and 
legal battle. We are talking about a handful of large species, almost all 
the mammals, and we are not even noticing, for instance, squirrels or 
park bench pigeons. Most of the species are not in any trouble and are 
actually finding ways to co-exist, to survive perfectly well without us. 
It is when we notice them that their problems begin. 
Hutchins: Regarding genetic manipulation, that is not the way that 
many technologies are being used. They are being used to preserve 
genetic diversity so that natural selection can occur as animals are put 
back out in nature. 
Clifton: If that is the way it is being done within the wildlife conserva­
tion community, what is being done in the agricultural community? 
Hutchins: That is different. That is domestication. Artificial selection, 
one of the hallmarks of domestication, is trying to manipulate the 
genetic material of an animal to do something you desire. That is the 
exact opposite of what we are trying to do with our genetic manage­
ment programs, which are intended to preserve as much variation as 
possible so that the potential for future evolution is preserved. 
Serpell: Some of our problem in defining what is wild and what is 
tame rests on the level of definition for which we are searching. Re­
gardless of genetic factors, there are certainly animals, including the 
sparrows in the park, which are not directly controlled by humans. To 
my mind that is one definition of wildlife and it is one of the defini­
tions quoted by Hutchins from Webster's. Conversely, all captive or 
domestic animals, even if they are given considerable freedom, are to 
some extent restrained or controlled, and I think it is very important 
that such a dichotomy continue to exist. 
One of the reasons for its importance has to do with the public per­
ception of wildlife and the pressure that comes from the public to 
conserve wildlife. If we lose sight of these creatures as wild things in 
wild places that are not controlled, we will lose the public pressure to 
conserve these very things. There will no longer be pressure to pre­
serve because the thing people want to maintain is not the tiger in the 
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cage, but the tiger in its wild, raw state . 
Hutchins: You bring up a very important point and I agree with you 
one hundred percent. That is one reason why zoo philosophies are 
changing rapidly. The concept of wild has got to be in the public mind 
in order for there to be some political momentum to pressure for wild 
areas and wildlife . We should not be looking to preserve animals just 
in captivity. That is not and should not be our goal. 
Norton: When it becomes reproductive control you are moving into 
the realms of domestication. There is a gray area there, the barrier 
between wild and domestic that is a permeable one. There comes a 
point where an animal is so controlled that it will not ever return from 
being a totally domesticated species and could never survive in ab­
sence of that human dimension. 
Hutchins: You are mixing up the difference between "captive" and 
"tame," which some consider to be quite different. Wild animals in 
general are not tame. 
Robinson: It may be useful to speak of control of individual behavior 
as a characteristic of captive animals, and human control of popula­
tions or habitats as being a wild situation. 
Norton: Yes .  The point I'm trying to get across is that there are ani­
mals out there making decisions about their lives which are entirely 
independent from any human intervention. Conversely, there are · 
animals living in a state where they may not be able to make those 
decisions or choices because humans have made those decisions for 
them. That is an important distinction. 
I would like to go back to this revision of the wilderness idea in a very 
general sense. It seems to me that there are really two intellectual 
changes taking place, and I feel it is important to keep them separate . 
One change that has taken place deepens our understanding of human 
and wild animals . It is our discovery that indigenous populations 
interacted with their landscape and with animals for a very long time. 
This should have been obvious from the beginning. As we learn that 
those human and non-human populations have evolved together we 
need to correct our conception of wilderness by recognizing that his­
torically there really was not a wilderness in the sense of total separa-
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The second revision taking place is incursions caused by highly tech­
nological societies, and there would be at least two important subparts 
to this revision. One would be, for example, acid rain, which is going 
to change habitats no matter how much we try to protect those areas. 
The second one, extremely important in third world countries, is social 
disruption as a result of rapid economic developments. Such develop­
ments are often very centralized, causing people to migrate into tropi­
cal forests, places they do not really want to go but have no alterna­
tives. 
As we revise the idea of wilderness and recognize that we are on a 
continuum we need to remember that there are two revisions going on 
simultaneously that are quite different. We need bring those two ideas 
back together again so that we are more critical of the different ways 
humans interact with nature. We should be looking for ways to live 
and co-evolve with other species, for that is the only realistic option 
open. This might mean putting very strong constraints on some of the 
things we do as a technological society. 
Jamieson: One of the key issues here is what it is we are really trying 
to accomplish. Part of why our answers tend to be contradictory is 
that often in our rhetoric we suggest that certain things are necessary 
for the good of the animals, and in some cases that is true. But to a 
great extent what is at stake is our ideals of preservation. We place a 
very important value on preservation of species. The concept of pres­
ervation is a cite for values that conflict, that contradict each other. The 
problem there is that humans can be a selection constraint on evolu­
tion, so the potential for future evolution is in no way inconsistent with 
bioengineering or the very strong selection pressures being exercised 
by humans. Another thing I think a lot of us are interested in preserv­
ing is some idea of wildness, where that implies some independence of 
human control, and there we have a fairly direct contradiction between 
two things that we might think we are trying to do when we are pre­
serving animals. Insofar as it really is true that we cannot preserve 
wildness, I think that the ideal of preservation becomes less urgent 
than it would otherwise be. 
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Hutchins: That is a very interesting point, although I think again that 
we are talking about a continuum and that makes it even more com­
plex. There is a continuum of wildness and we want to go as far as we 
can along that continuum, but realities may be preventing us from 
reaching the ultimate end. That is where we presently find ourselves. 
We would like to reach the end of the continuum but the biological, 
political and economic realities in which conservation must occur, 
especially if we are going to double the human population in the next 
few decades, are going to put a limit on our ability to reach the end of 
that continuum. 
Pokras: One of the questions I have concerns the establishment of 
guidelines for various types of conservation programs. It seems to me 
that many of the guidelines are soft, causing problems of scale. That is 
one of the problems in defining wild as well. Wild for a chickadee is 
very different from wild for an elephant or rattlesnake. The natural 
history of the species has to guide us on what it is we are looking at. 
Part of the problem is the eyes through which we look. When I see a 
Great Horned owl around South Station in Boston, it does not look 
wild to me. But how does it look to the owl's eyes? He is feeding on 
rats and nesting in abnormal places, but that is still a wild animal. I 
think we have a confusion between wild, what the animal feels and the 
wildness, which is a very different concept. 
Hutchins: I agree with what you said completely and I think that a 
Great Horned Owl living on the edge of a building is a wild animal. I 
also believe that generalizations are dangerous for conservationists 
and that flexibility is critical. That is why I have such a difficult time 
with some ethical paradigms that do not allow flexibility, for I do not 
see how we will be able to respond to some of these issues and attempt 
to preserve species or ecosystems without it. 
Jamieson: We have multiple ethical paradigms. One is a relatively 
inflexible or absolutist paradigm. The kind of ethical theory that I 
favor gets accused of being excessively flexible, a more consequential­
ist paradigm. I would argue that in this area we need to worry about 
not being excessively absolutist with the ideal of preservation, that 
sometimes in these types of discussions when we talk about what 
action is necessary it sounds as if we are setting up the ideal of preser­
vation as the ultimate value to which every other consideration must 
be sacrificed. I think we need to be flexible about that value. 
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Grandy: I have a number of disparate points I'd like to make. We are 
using contraceptives on truly wild animals and controlling their popu­
lation. I agree that this does not add true domesticity to them. The 
wild ponies which are having their population controlled through 
reversible contraception are as wild as they ever were and hopefully 
will continue to be so without stripping off their habitat. 
Nonetheless, I want to associate myself with the concept of "wild" that 
Jamieson put forth in his paper. Clearly all of us understand that the 
decreases in habitats around the country are requiring more and more 
intensive kinds of hands-on management systems. We may not all feel 
comfortable with that, but at some level recognize the necessity for it. 
However, I am concerned where taking that generalization too far may 
lead us. Use of the least invasive kinds of technology is clearly desir­
able, and the corollary response to it raises some fundamental ques­
tions about where we go. The response is that we as managers want 
more and more flexibility. Flexibility is an open invitation to abuse 
unless flexibility is limited by guidelines which reflect limits, priorities 
and societal norms. Even White Oak raises fundamental questions. 
White Oak is all of the best things that the zoo environment can be, all 
of the best values it can have and all of the best things it can do for 
animals. Nonetheless, we all know that there are one thousand or 
more places around the world where that standard is not even consid­
ered, much less approached, so I am concerned with where too firm a 
grasp of this generalization of the need for intensive management 
takes us, as well as the permissiveness associated with it. 
Finally, I want to close with something that struck me as I read 
Hutchins' paper regarding the timescale of what we are dealing with. 
There is a lot of talk about habitat destruction and what that means. 
Tsavo Park in Kenya has been monitored for the last thirty years. 
Thirty years ago everyone said the park had been destroyed, that it 
was an ecological desert; it had been trashed by elephants. There is 
now a film that shows the park coming back, regenerating itself over 
this thirty year time span. What I am relating to here is the timescale in 
which we define damage and the apparent recuperative capacities of 
the ecosystems and habitats that we are dealing with. 
Bekoff: In regards to what Pacelle said, I'm not sure that I agree that in 
vitro contraception is more humane than any other source of interven­
tion. I think this notion comes about because we are not able to see 
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something "bad" result, but we are having a major intervention on a 
life when we change its reproductive habit. 
There is also the importance of understanding evolution. We tend to 
throw the word evolution or selection around very loosely. I find 
Hutchins' point of looking backward for understanding of evolution a 
dangerous practice. The environments in which many animals 
evolved were very different than they are today. We may get some 
information about their evolution but I am not sure how much that is 
going to help us in understanding the sorts of habitats we need to 
provide for the animals so that they can evolve as they did in the past. 
No one has mentioned being concerned with the reproductive habits of 
the animals in regards to a time scale. How fast do they reproduce? 
How much genetic diversity is there in these populations? The time 
scale for evolution is different for each species and we need to be 
sensitive to these differences in reproductive habits. 
I hear a lot about what we should do, how we should do it and how 
fast we should do it. I have not heard the question why we should do 
it. Is there a limit to how much biodiversity we should try to main­
tain? Maybe we are trying to do too much and need to concentrate our 
efforts in certain areas, come up with some consensus. There is a 
process of selection going on, and I wonder if perhaps we need to 
narrow our goals. We will not all agree about what species should be 
saved or which are "disposable," but I wonder if in trying to do too 
much we are really doing nothing. 
Kaufmann: In many ways what we are talking about is what "wild" 
and "captive" mean to us as individuals. We repeatedly talk about 
"we" in conservation. Who is this "we?" At the same time we are 
seeing an increase in population. We have become more and more 
aware that we have to work with indigenous populations and be 
politically correct. I think there are two races going on. One has to do 
with preserving the animals, the genetic material, the individual ani­
mal. But what must happen at the same time is that the "we" must 
become enlarged so that it is not seen as merely zoos or animal rights 
groups. The general public in our own country has a poor understand­
ing of conservation, of animals. Honesty must also include the notion 
that we are doing something that we are not sure is going to work, but 
we are doing our best. 
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Hutchins: Inflexible values or philosophies do not allow us to take 
risks. Conservationists are going to have to take a lot of risks which 
will sometimes be successful and sometimes not. The problem is that 
if you are being constantly scrutinized or criticized you are not going 
to take those kinds of risks. This is a good reason for more unity 
within this community. If the fingerpointing and inter-agency infight­
ing continues no one is going to take risks, a situation that does not 
create a good climate for learning about or doing conservation. 
Lewis: Although I am representing an animal protection group and I 
think contraception is a viable alternative in many circumstances, it is 
true that it does have its impacts. All you have to do is look at the 
history of oral contraception in human women to understand that. If 
that is not being looked at, it needs to be. Zoo people have a long 
history of using contraceptives on captive animals and there have been 
some negative impacts. 
In regards to timescales, I think Grandy was trying to make the point 
that we may be thinking in timescales that are too short in terms of 
survival of populations. We see elephants stripping bark off trees and 
deem it an emergency. I am not claiming that elephants never destroy 
their own habit, but saying that our knowledge is imperfect. If Tsavo 
is regenerating itself then maybe we need to think in longer scales 
when responding to those types of issues. 
I think most animal protection people who are knowledgeable about 
conservation and wildlive issues understand the necessity of preserv­
ing populations. Some of the misunderstandings occur when one 
hears a statement claiming that an individual animal may have no 
importance. It is hard for our hackles not to go up because we are so 
connected to the idea that these animals are sentient and can suffer and 
that it is our responsibility to treat them with the maximum respect 
and least intervention possible. 
Hutchins: I would not disagree with that, in fact I struggle within 
myself with the competing interests of the individual versus the popu­
lation. There are real conflicts that can occur and difficult decisions 
that must be made. To discount these difficult decisions is a problem. 
I think that they are made every day in an animal shelters when an 
animal is put to sleep. I think that those of us involved in conservation 
are often faced with the lesser of two evils. 
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As far as longer time scales are concerned, I agree that we have an 
imperfect knowledge of how these cycles occur. However I also raise 
the point that this issue of humaneness is interesting when talking 
about natural cycles and scales. In the absence of human intervention, 
animal populations will control themselves and they will do it through 
starvation, less humane than shooting if you consider the relative pain 
involved. We need to follow the statements of animal protectionists to 
their logical conclusions and see what their impacts are. 
Robinson: Regarding Beckoff's question of why do we do it, I think 
our definition of wilderness as "the absence of control or restraint" is 
culturally important because it re-approximates our ideals of paradise. 
I think that is one of the reasons that we are grappling with that ques­
tion. There is also that wonderful internal contradiction that paradise 
is populated by all of these tame, captive animals, the lion lies down 
with the lamb. There is another concept of paradise out there and 
maybe this discussion is really about that. 
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WILD/CAPTIVE AND OTHER SUSPECT DUALISMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Dale Jamieson 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Dualisms have had a hard time in recent years. Philosophers used to 
think that facts and values were distinct, and that philosophy and 
science were radically different enterprises. While scientists employed 
empirical methods to discover the way the world happens to be, the 
job of philosophers was to use conceptual analysis to reveal how the 
world necessarily is. In the wake of the revolution unleashed by Quine 
in the early 1950s, philosophers either had to learn some science, find 
another job, or fight an irredentist action on behalf of conceptual analy­
sis that is mainly of interest only to a few other philosophers ( see the 
essays reprinted in Quine 1961; for discussion see Burge 1992). 
The loss of these comfortable dualisms has upset the complacency of 
scientists as well as philosophers. Ethics cannot be ignored when the 
NIH requires ethics modules as part of all new training grants, when 
human and animal research must be approved by university commit­
tees, and when both the general public and "opinion leaders" feel free 
to comment on a wide range of issues that a generation ago might have 
been regarded as purely scientific. 
DUALISMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
The attack on these dualisms had also made itself felt on various politi­
cal and social movements, including the environmental movement. 
Classical environmentalism (CE), the dominant view of the American 
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, seemed to suppose 
that there was an all or nothing distinction between clean and polluted 
air, that wilderness is wild nature untrammeled by humans, and that 
wild animals are those who live lives that are completely independent 
of humans. For the CEs the distinction between the natural and the 
human was fundamental. Beaver dams are natural but Glen Canyon is 
not. Nature is stable and self-regulating: change, lack of balance, and 
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disequilibrium are the effects of human intrusion. The ultimate goals 
of the environmental movement is to protect nature from human 
beings, and human beings from themselves. 
In recent years the New Environmentalists (NEs), many of whom are 
scientists or economists, have denigrated CE as a naive or outmoded 
view. With that special wrath that siblings and sectarian Marxists 
reserve for their next of kin, some NEs seem to see CEs as the enemy of 
the environment. By holding out for confused and unrealistic goals, 
CEs spurn the opportunities to make a difference that are available. 
They demand what they cannot have and, despite their good inten­
tions, nature is crushed between the CEs on one side and the "wise 
use" movement on the other. 
At least three influences that have contributed to the rise of the NE: 
One influence is the generalized cultural effects of Post-Modernism 
(PM). For better or worse PM has become the reigning intellectual 
perspective of our time and its influence is felt in a variety of different 
ways. Our current tendency to see change as constant, difference as 
dramatic, and categories as slipping, sliding, colliding and melting into 
each other is an expression of PM; so is our suspicious of ideals and 
our tendency to see logic and rhetoric as continuous or even the same 
thing. In some circles arguments and armies are evaluated on the same 
basis: how effective they are in changing people's behavior. PM hovers 
in the background of all contemporary cultural work and conditions 
the responses even of those who claim to have no idea of what it is ( for 
further discussion see Jamieson 1991). 
A second influence that has contributed to NE is the rise of environ­
mental history and the new ecology. It has become common to say that 
the kind of wilderness envisioned by the CEs hardly ever existed 
anywhere at any time in which there have been human inhabitants. 
Stories are told about how the ecologies that we now associate with 
wilderness were created by aboriginal populations acting on the land 
in Australia, North America, and Great Britain. Not only do CEs have 
a false conception of wilderness, but on this view they also have an 
ethnocentric one ( see Callicott and Guha, both reprinted in Gruen and 
Jamieson 1994). Their conception of wilderness could only arise in a 
highly developed society that is out of touch with its origins and mis­
understands the way that billions of people continue to relate to their 
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environments. While environmental history shows us the ubiquity of 
human interaction with the land, the new ecology emphasizes the 
tumultuous and even catastrophic natural history of the Earth. The 
greatest extinction episodes in the history of life preceded the evolu­
tion of humans. Nature, independent of humans, is often out of bal­
ance and equilibrium. 
A third influence is the tendency to see environmental risks as inevita­
bly increasing. The problem for environmentalists is not to reduce 
risk, for that appears to be out of the question, but to manage and 
distribute risk in an acceptable way. The air will be polluted - the 
question is how polluted, in what respects, where, and who will suffer 
the costs. Most nonhuman life will take even more of a beating in the 
next century that it has in this century. Since we can't prevent these 
negative environmental changes, the challenge is how to mange them 
so that they will be less unacceptable that otherwise would be the case. 
WILD AND CAPTIVE 
One distinction that the NEs are tempted to collapse is that between 
wild and captive animals. The distinction is often overdrawn in the 
first place and ·will become even more blurred in the future. It has 
been argued that cheetahs who live in the wild passed through an 
evolutionary tunnel that probably had nothing to do with people. This 
reduced their genetic diversity to such an extent that, from the point of 
view of population genetics, they are similar in many respects to popu­
lations of captive animals. In the future, NEs argue, the distinction 
between wild and captive animals will collapse even further as parks 
and preserves increasingly come to resemble zoos and zoos increas­
ingly come to resemble parks and preserves. 
What will drive this pressure towards the further blurring of wild and 
captive animals are concerns about species survival. For many species, 
either bringing them into zoos or managing populations in their natu­
ral habitats are the only hopes for their survival. The very idea that 
these animals could be left alone with some "hands-off" management 
policy is regarded as a dangerous delusion. People are involved in 
changing global land-use patterns, destroying ozone and perhaps even 
changing climate. Almost no form of life is unaffected by human 
action (see McKibben 1989). Animals living under these new global 
conditions are not wild in the CE sense of the term, despite the "born-
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free" mythology that is reinforced by television nature shows. More­
over management of captive animals is getting better all the time. 
Sometimes it is even argued that intensive management practices can 
preserve more of the "wild" traits of some populations than less ag­
gressive policies. On this view freedom and captivity are no longer 
mutually exclusive. 
THE DESCRIPTIVE AND THE NORiviATIVE 
The NE critique of various dualisms in environmental philosophy is 
not just an intellectual exercise. Various specific policy prescriptions 
are supposed to follow from this critique: for example, that we should 
aim for optimal (rather than zero) pollution; wilderness should be 
intensely managed; wildlife must "pay its own way." Once we see that 
pressure on wild populations will only increase, that extinction is the 
only practical alternative to intensive management and captive breed­
ing, and that the difference between wild and captive animals is over­
stated anyway, then we should give up our opposition to zoos and our 
sentimental attachments to individuals animals and embrace high­
tech, intensive management schemes directed towards preserving 
species. Zoos should be turned loose to bring in more animals from 
the wild. Captive breeding should be accelerated even if this means 
"euthanizing" zoos animals who are not part of such programs. 
But slow down. While this story is attractive to many people its con­
clusions require further argument. CE need not give up their substan­
tive views simply because some old distinctions have been called into 
question. Even if it is true that we are in an age in which distinctions 
are disappearing, nothing much normative immediately follows from 
this. iviaybe the NEs are right, and wild and captive animals aren't 
different from each other as many of us might think. If so, we've 
learned something. But further argument is needed to show that we 
should act in some way or another. 
DUALISMS AGAIN 
It might be objected that I have reintroduced one of the dualisms that 
NEs would reject - the distinction between the descriptive and the 
normative It is worth asking how thoroughgoing the NE critique of 
dualism is. In deed, some might argue that rather than rejecting dual-
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isms NEs have assimilated one side of various distinctions to the other. 
Rather than rejecting the very distinction between wild and captive 
animals it could be argued that NEs want to treat all animals as captive 
animals. But even if that is an excessively harsh charge, the distinction 
between the descriptive and the normative is worth hanging on to. 
Excepting perhaps certain forms of supervenient naturalism, all moral 
theories hold that reasonable people can agree about the facts yet 
disagree about the values (for discussion of supervenient naturalism 
see Brink 1989). 
However the main point I want to make is that if the NE case against 
dualisms is successful it should lead us to understand the distinction 
that the CEs make in a different way, but it should not lead us to reject 
these distinctions altogether. In the light of the NE critique we should 
view such dualisms as expressing pragmatic distinctions, perhaps 
useful for certain purposes but not for others, matters of degree rather 
than metaphysical differences of kind, in most cases with important 
human perceptual dimensions. No case had been made for supposing 
that such distinctions are unintelligible, pointless, or useless. It would 
be just as rash and unmotivated to give up these distinctions in the 
face of the NE critique as it would be to conclude that there is no 
distinction between the bald and the hirsute on the ground that even 
the bald have a little hair and even the hirsute have some bald spots 
(however small). 
We can see how the CE dualisms can be reconstructed by considering 
the case of wilderness. For the sake of argument suppose that the CEs 
define wilderness as natural areas that are radically distinct from 
humans and the effects of their actions. Now let's suppose, as NEs 
have argued, that there are no such areas - that sometime during 
human history all areas have been affected by human action, that even 
now climate change, ozone depletion, and let contrails are everywhere. 
What should we conclude from this critique? 
What we should not conclude is that wilderness does not exist, and 
therefore we should abolish the Wilderness Act and disband the wil­
derness system. What we should conclude instead is that the distinc­
tion between wilderness and nonwilderness is a matter of degree. 
That a particular way of drawing the distinction between wilderness 
and nonwilderness fails does not show that there is no point in draw­
ing such a distinction or that we fail to pick out something that is 
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important to use when we talk about wilderness. 
Consider a case in point. In reflecting on his childhood, John Ruskin 
remarks that the pure childish love of nature . . .  in myself . . .  has always 
been quite exclusively confined to wild, that is to say, wholly natural 
places, and especially to scenery animated by streams, or by the sea. 
The sense of the freedom, spontaneous unpolluted power of nature 
was essential in it (Ruskin 1991:22) . 
Suppose that an NE points out to Ruskin that what he thought had 
been a "wholly natural place" had been inhabited Neolithic hunters. 
Does this mean that Ruskin had failed to refer when using these 
words, or that his experience of the "pure childish love of nature" was 
in some sense ungrounded, to be extinguished insofar as he is fully 
rational? Of course not. All that is important (holding some other 
factors fixed) for securing reference or grounding the experience is 
being able to draw a significant distinction between what is natural 
and what is not. This distinction need not reflect an essential differ­
ence in kind that is part of the fabric of the world. What is important 
for Ruskin and for us is that there is a distinction in experience or 
conception. 
What does this mean for the distinction between the wild and captive? 
Even if this distinction is a matter of degree rather than kind, it can still 
be significant. Even if it is a human distinction that is conventional to 
some extent it may still properly play an important role in our moral 
thinking. Whatever moral force this distinction may have is not 
blunted by the NE critique. 
THE RETURN OF THE NORMATIV E  
What I have been suggesting is that the NE critique may teach us 
something about distinctions and how they work, but that it has no 
immediate implication about what our policies should be. Questions 
such as whether we should try to preserve areas of the Earth that are as 
free of human influence as possible, and if so what priority these 
attempts should have, nor not answered by pointing our that there are 
no parts of the Earth that are entirely free of the consequences of hu­
man action. Nor does it following from the fact (if it is one) that the 
distinction between wild and captive animals is a fuzzy pragmatic one 
that we are justified in depriving some animals of freedom in order to 
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lead us to understand these questions in a somewhat different way, 
there is little reason to think that we should change our answers to 
them. 
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The winding road leads back to the moral considerations involved 
keeping animals in captivity. Elsewhere I have discussed these consid­
erations in detail (in Gruen and Jamieson 1994, and in press). W hat I 
have argued is that there is a moral presumption against keeping 
animals in captivity, and although zoos do provide benefits in the areas 
of entertainment, research, education and preservation, they are not 
significant enough to overcome this presumption. Moreover I have 
argued that the idea that by keeping animals in captivity zoos can 
preserve wild nature is a cruel hoax. If we continue to keep animals in 
captivity, we should conform to the highest standards of treatment and 
respect; there should be no question of killing some animals in order to 
make room for others who would also be unjustly confined. This is the 
least that morality demands. These conclusions, contrary to what 
some may think, do not turn on any particular analysis of wild and 
captive. For those who want to reject these conclusions there is o 
substitute for doing the hard work of confronting the moral arguments 
that I have given. 
REFERENCES 
Brink, D. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Burge, T. 1992. Philosophy of Language and Mind 1950-1990. The 
Philosophical Review 101:13-51. 
Gruen, L. and Jamieson, D. 1994. Reflecting on Nature. Environmental 
Philosophy. Oxford University Press: New York. 
Jamieson, D. in press. Zoos Revisited. In M. Hutchins, T. Maple and 
B. Norton (eds.), Ethics and Conservation. Washington: The American 
Association for the Advancement of Science. 
Jamieson, D. 1991. The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory. University of 
Colorado Law Review 62:577-595. 
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
38 
McKibben, B. 1989. The End of Nature .  Doubleday: New York. 
Quine, W.V.O. 1961. From a Logical Point of View. Harper: New York. 
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
39 
JAMIESON - DISCUSSION 
Norton: There is much that I agree with in Jamieson's presentation, in 
particular the notion that there is a moral presumption in favor of 
keeping wild animals wild. This idea puts a premium on the type of 
moral soul- searching that will be necessary to justify invasive proce­
dures. There is a great deal of disagreement about how successful 
captive breeding and reintroduction programs have been and will be 
in the future. Success, or lack of it, affects the strength and kind of 
moral justification necessary. The problem is clearly set: Is there a 
moral justification? It is not productive to relate the idea of the welfare 
of the species, to the concept of rights of species. The traditional 
conception of rights is so closely linked to individuality in the history 
of philosophy that the attempt to extend that concept to apply to 
species does not work. 
It seems to me that intergenerational human obligation is really the 
heart of the matter and cannot be passed over or treated as unimpor­
tant. When I hear people talking about sustainability I do not see any 
reason to interpret sustainability as having anything to do with rights 
of species. That was simply an aberration in the history of environ­
mental ethics which unfortunately has not been fully corrected. I look 
at these things quite anthropocentrically, but that does not mean that I 
have no concern about pain and discomfort and invasive changes in 
the lives of individual animals. I see that as a separable question from 
what is our bequest, and it seems that the bequest of this generation to 
the next should include some kind of healthy, functioning ecological 
system and processes, as close as possible to a full compliment of 
species that exists and have existed. It is necessary for us to provide 
moral justification for these activities, especially when they include 
pain or disorientation of animals. I agree with the moral presumption 
of wildness. Protecting the wildness of wild animals is also part of that 
bequest. If we pass on a totally domesticated landscape the future will 
be worse off in many ways, including ways that affect values. Having 
some kind of realistic connection to an independent, functioning, self­
organizing ecological world is an essential part of human psychic and 
moral development. 
What we need to do is get away from this notion of human interests 
versus animal interests, when in actuality it is human interest against 
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human interest. We are a generation that is in the process of creating a 
holocaust in the biological world. To stand by and do nothing is totally 
morally unacceptable. This brings us back to the point that there is 
significant disagreement around this table about a factual matter; does 
this work? Can we accomplish it? There is evidence on both sides, but 
I am a strong believer in adaptive management, comprised mainly of 
two strategies. First, set some goals and choose modest efforts that 
will move one towards those goals. The second strategy is to design 
programs in such a way that the amount of information and knowl­
edge one gets is maximized. 
So the real conflict is between generations of humans. The moral 
principles are principles of sustainability and obligation to future 
generations. Those are strong enough to overcome the obligation to 
keep every wild animal wild in every situation. Which of our efforts 
are likely to work, and which will increase our knowledge base so that 
future efforts are more likely to work? If we fulfill the above two 
conditions in the choices that we make we will have made an adequate 
answer to Jamieson's challenge to provide a moral justification. 
Kaufmann: I noticed the idea of "new environmentalists" versus 
"classic environmentalists." What occurred to me is that while I might 
be able to find two or three authors that would fall into either category, 
does that create a movement? Even if there is a movement, what does 
that mean? Do all new environmentalists think or believe certain 
things? More importantly, do they all act on their beliefs? 
Jamieson: First I think it should be assumed that everyone here wants 
to preserve nature and all of its wildness. I do not, however, see this 
as just a conflict between human interests. It is the welfare and well­
being of individual animals that gets lost in the shuffle. I do not see 
this as just a factual question about what works and does not work 
because I think there are a lot of questions about what the "it" is that 
we want to work or not work. In some sense it is such a difficult · 
speculative issue about the future that it almost becomes minorly 
empirical. 
In terms of Hutchins' comments, these issues are deeply theoretical 
and philosophical. We are going out and taking action, but reflection 
on that action is necessary. We cannot be heads without bodies or 
thoughts without actions. Finally, in terms of these movements I do 
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think there is a new wave of thought and a new wave of thinking 
about environmental policy. The "old" idea is that these animals have 
the right to share the earth with us . 
Hutchins: Although I think I agree with the moral presumption 
against captivity intellectually, I want to make clear that I do not think 
this is an animal well-being issue. It goes deeper than that . I could 
argue just as strongly that conditions are bad for individual animals in 
the wild and that there is a moral presumption not to leave them there. 
I think that there is a potential alternative argument there because 
animals in the wild are subject to disease or poaching or parasites, etc. 
If these conditions in the wild are really bad, I could argue that animals 
ought to be brought into captivity purely from a humane point of view. 
There is a logical hole in your argument that because captive breeding 
may not have been a perfect strategy in certain cases in the past that it 
will not be in the future, given that programs and knowledge change. 
I agree that this strategy should not be sold as a panacea; it is not 
something that will have widespread success by itself and we ought to 
carefully select species for which we decide to pursue this strategy. 
However, there are going to be species for which this will be required. 
There also are manv alternative uses of living collections that go well 
J � -
beyond captive breeding for reintroduction. These include public 
education, raising of money for conservation, the media attention, 
political action, etc. We are moving in the direction of alternative uses 
of living collections and to provide individual justification for those 
species that we manage. 
Genetic and demographic management is a welfare issue as well as a 
conservation issue. If you are going to have captive populations and 
justify their use and utilize them in some beneficial way for conserva­
tion then you should manage them responsibly. That means genetic 
and demographic management. Without such management there is an 
individual cost to animals that are produced in inbred populations that 
could cause suffering if they are not properly managed. 
Clifton: In Quebec the whole legal structure of the society proceeds 
from the belief that the rights of the many supersede the rights of the 
individual. Overseas the rights of the individual are basically nonex­
istent. The collective entity is what reigns supreme. We have to deal 
with this reality every time we go overseas to try to save a species and 
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at the same time we have to deal with the other reality of different 
social structures which largely ignore the individual . I am suggesting 
that any philosophical discussion had better take into consideration 
the political reality of the situation we are dealing with, as well as our 
own moral conceptions . If we go into Africa or Asia and start preach­
ing our gospel, we had better be preaching in a language they are 
going to accept. 
Grandy: I do not think you can talk about species welfare unless you 
talk about the units that make up the species in terms of individuals . 
We talk about captive populations in this country, but I do not see how 
you can separate the population from the individual welfare of the 
animals that make up the group. If you want to go worldwide, you are 
talking about a few more animals but I do not think you can lose sight 
of the fact that each of those individuals is in fact a valuable unit 
within that species . It is only when we start to look at situations we 
are reading as black and white and we determine that some animals 
have a surplus population that those individuals no longer have value. 
Rowan: How would you deal with the issue of whether or not to 
interfere with a coyote that has been hit by a car on the side of the road 
at Yellowstone. 
Grandy: That is different. I am talking about the coyote that is fighting 
another in an area that has been interfered with by humans . 
Rowan: What you have then is a sliding scale. The more we intervene 
the more responsibility we have toward the animals . 
Grandy: Yes, the more we intervene the more responsibility we have. 
The extreme is where we have animals in zoos . We have to intervene 
incredibly in a situation like that. I do not know that captive breeding 
is going to or has worked. 
Rowan: Once again, you are not disputing the fact that breeding has 
taken place and that populations in captivity are increasing. The issue 
is, what is the larger goal? 
Grandy: Populations are increasing, and in some cases they are declin­
ing. But no one is addressing the issue of what we are going to do 
with these things. Hopefully we can get into that and talk about the 
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think there is a new wave of thought and a new wave of thinking 
about environmental policy. The "old" idea is that these animals have 
the right to share the earth with us. 
Hutchins: Although I think I agree with the moral presumption 
against captivity intellectually, I want to make clear that I do not think 
this is an animal well-being issue. It goes deeper than that. I could 
argue just as strongly that conditions are bad for individual animals in 
the wild and that there is a moral presumption not to leave them there. 
I think that there is a potential alternative argument there because 
animals in the wild are subject to disease or poaching or parasites, etc. 
If these conditions in the wild are really bad, I could argue that animals 
ought to be brought into captivity purely from a humane point of view. 
There is a logical hole in your argument that because captive breeding 
may not have been a perfect strategy in certain cases in the past that it 
will not be in the future, given that programs and knowledge change. 
I agree that this strategy should not be sold as a panacea; it is not 
something that will have widespread success by itself and we ought to 
carefully select species for which we decide to pursue this strategy. 
However, there are going to be species for which this will be required. 
There also are many alternative uses of living collections that go well 
beyond captive breeding for reintroduction. These include public 
education, raising of money for conservation, the media attention, 
political action, etc. We are moving in the direction of alternative uses 
of living collections and to provide individual justification for those 
species that we manage. 
Genetic and demographic management is a welfare issue as well as a 
conservation issue. If you are going to have captive populations and 
justify their use and utilize them in some beneficial way for conserva­
tion then you should manage them responsibly. That means genetic 
and demographic management. Without such management there is an 
individual cost to animals that are produced in inbred populations that 
could cause suffering if they are not properly managed. 
Clifton: In Quebec the whole legal structure of the society proceeds 
from the belief that the rights of the many supersede the rights of the 
individual. Overseas the rights of the individual are basically nonex­
istent. The collective entity is what reigns supreme. We have to deal 
with this reality every time we go overseas to try to save a species and 
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at the same time we have to deal with the other reality of different 
social structures which largely ignore the individual. I am suggesting 
that any philosophical discussion had better take into consideration 
the political reality of the situation we are dealing with, as well as our 
own moral conceptions. If we go into Africa or Asia and start preach­
ing our gospel, we had better be preaching in a language they are 
going to accept. 
Grandy: I do not think you can talk about species welfare unless you 
talk about the units that make up the species in terms of individuals. 
We talk about captive populations in this country, but I do not see how 
you can separate the population from the individual welfare of the 
animals that make up the group. If you want to go worldwide, you are 
talking about a few more animals but I do not think you can lose sight 
of the fact that each of those individuals is in fact a valuable unit 
within that species. It is only when we start to look at situations we 
are reading as black and white and we determine that some animals 
have a surplus population that those individuals no longer have value. 
Rowan: How would you deal with the issue of whether or not to 
interfere with a coyote that has been hit by a car on the side of the road 
at Yellowstone. 
Grandy: That is different. I am talking about the coyote that is fighting 
another coyote in an area that has been perished ( ?). 
Rowan: What you have then is a sliding scale. The more we intervene 
the more responsibility we have toward the animals. 
Grandy: Yes, the more we intervene the more responsibility we have. 
The extreme is where we have animals in zoos. We have to intervene 
incredibly in a situation like that. I do not know that captive breeding 
is going to or has worked. 
Rowan: Once again, you are not disputing the fact that breeding has 
taken place and that populations in captivity are increasing. The issue 
is, what is the larger goal? 
Grandy: Populations are increasing, and in some cases they are declin­
ing. But no one is addressing the issue of what we are going to do 
with these things. Hopefully we can get into that and talk about the 
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nuts and bolts of the issue. 
Hutchins: I have to take issue with that. Essentially that is why the 
AZA has set up a system, for strategic collection planning. We are 
identifying what is out there, what we think we ought to have, and the 
justification for having these particular animals. Is it public education? 
Is it captive breeding and reintroduction? Is it scientific research? 
There are some pretty horrible things that happen in nature. For ex­
ample, African hunting dogs tear an animal apart while it is still alive. 
It is a terrible thing to watch from our point of view, and from the 
individual animal's point of view it is not a good thing. I am saying 
there are some real ethical paradoxes there. Is the issue human inter­
vention and the degree of human intervention, or what the effect of a 
particular situation is on a particular individual animal? 
Rowan: That is basically what I was pressing Grandy on. The more 
you become involved in intervening with the animal, the more respon­
sibility you are going to have. You can ignore these problems if you 
are not actually involved. From the point of view of the animal it does 
not make a difference who disembowels you. 
Pacelle: Regarding Hutchins' point of suffering as the principle crite­
rion in motivating us to concern, I think that there is more to the rights 
of wildlife question than purely the humane and suffering issue. I 
think that the general community has not seen that philosophy well 
developed because it has relied principally on a couple of major texts. 
Peter Singer's work Animal Liberation dealt with the industrial uses of 
animals principally, and included chapters about factory farming and 
the use of animals in laboratories. He entirely sidestepped the ques­
tion of wildlife . Tom Regan's philosophy does not include wildlife as 
part of his central analysis. Wildness, autonomy of the individual 
animal are things that need to be put into the mix as well. 
Lewis: I wanted to return to an earlier point of Jamieson' s. I agree 
quite strongly that problems for animals are caused by human popula­
tion or other kinds of human impact and that human society in general 
has stronger desires than merely protecting wildlife or ecosystems. 
Even with all of the nature television shows, and most people we 
know get the majority of their information from television, I do not see 
that translating in any real way into political support for preserving 
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animals. I really do not see it as a national movement of any kind. In 
my experience with politicians, having lobbied both in congress and 
spent a lot of time in state legislature in Massachusetts, they give lip 
service to such issues but do not vote to give one the kind of support 
that one desires. I think this is a real critical issue for all of us for 
unless there are more pillar people who are willing to support these 
kinds of conscious efforts we are doomed to failure. 
Bostock: The use of the term "euthanasia" should be reserved for what 
it should mean: killing an animal in its own best interest. The paper 
does recognize that. This in not to say whether culling is necessary or 
not necessary, it is a question of the word used. The term "surgery" is 
used similarly with some as a euphemism for vivisection. 
In regards to the well-being question, I absolutely agree with Norton 
that the term "rights" does not make much sense applied to a species. 
We talk about the health of individuals, but we are also concerned with 
the health of communities. We are involved especially with the well­
being of individuals, in as much as individuals are conscious and are 
going to have feelings. In that sense it is only individuals that can 
enjoy well-being. We can talk about the well-being of a community or 
species but these two obviously clash. When the population gets too 
large, it suffers. This applies to humans as well. Clearly a wildebeest 
that has just been torn to pieces by hunting dogs is not in a state of 
well-being. We do know that the population of wildebeests would be 
in a bad way if there were not hunting dogs to control their numbers. 
The two together are in some sort of balance, presumably a state of 
well-being, so that is well-being of different populations or species in 
relation to one another. 
Jamieson: Clearly it would be madness to suppose that we do not talk 
about community health and population suffering and the average 
American and other purely fictional entities. When you say that the 
death of this wildebeest is to the benefit of the population, that is just a 
shortcut way of saying that this individual wildebeest is suffering but 
that there are other benefits that will improve the quality of life for 
other wildebeests. The fact that we use language in that way does not 
mean anything more than the fact that the average American has 1.8 
children, as if there is such a thing as 1.8 children. 
Cohn: The welfare of the species is, I think, shorthand for the collec-
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tive welfare of other individuals. It may also revert to the welfare of a 
process for assistance that may be perhaps separate from the welfare 
from a group of individuals. I am not certain that they are separate, 
but I can see welfare of the species referring either to a process or to 
individuals. I am not sure, for other reasons, that I see species welfare 
or rights as being overly relevant. In fact I would almost push this 
aside and agree with Norton that what is relevant is the welfare of 
future generations of humans. The question that again comes up is 
where do we intervene? Where do we have responsibility? It may also 
revert to the welfare of a process for assistance that may be separate 
from the welfare from a group of individuals. I am not certain that 
they are separate, but I can see welfare of the species referring either to 
a process or to individuals. Each of those things say to me that what 
the animals perceives is not what people feel is relevant. It is what is 
happening to us that people feel is relevant. If that is really the case, if 
that is the moral perspective that we are following, that suggests that 
the only things with rights are humans and future generations of 
humans. 
Norton: I think we have to draw some distinctions here. What I meant 
to say was that I certainly think there is a descriptive concept of an 
individual number of species doing well or doing badly. I also believe 
that there is probably a broader sense, which is the collective doing 
well, somewhat independent of the individual. It was not my point 
that no one is looking out for the welfare of the species. My point was 
a moral one. I do not know that anyone feels a moral obligation to 
the welfare of a species, independent of how it affects any individual. 
It could be a useful descriptive concept which we would then in turn 
use to say that if a species is doing badly then we are in danger of 
morally harming future human individuals by reducing their possibil­
ity of experience. My point was not that you cannot keep track of how 
species are doing. It would be only an approximate moral judgment, 
that the moral force behind that would derive from an 
intergenerational ethic, not from any moral obligation to this moral 
composite. I think it is a mistake to say that there are people out there 
who are saying that the species has a right, and that the right of the 
species should be balanced against the right of individuals. There are 
people who are concerned about the well-being of species, but that is 
probably better interpreted as an intergenerational moral foundation. 
Jamieson: I think part of what is at issue in this debate is our very 
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strong tendency to be individualists with regards to humans, and 
collectivists in relation to animals. I would like some standard for 
what makes a healthy population, but I would like to go back to what I 
think welfare is really about. The reason we care about human welfare 
is that human lives can go better or worse and we care about what 
happens to "me," as do a lot of individual animals. Whatever moral 
framework we want to apply to humans, and I think the individualist 
one is the most plausible, should be applied to animals as well. 
Hutchins: There is an inherent conceptual problem here and it has to 
do with the interrelationships that occur in ecological systems. If we 
are going to focus on individuals we need to think really hard about 
the impact of the individual on other aspects of the system and on 
other individuals. If, for example, we fail to cull elephants and they 
create a desert out of what was once a woodland, lots of other indi­
vidual animals are going to suffer in the process. Perhaps we need to 
weigh the collective costs and benefits of that, the inaction versus the 
action. I do not know how one would go about doing that because it is 
very complex. Conceptually you can think about it and keep it within 
an individual framework even though you are talking about a system. 
Jamieson: I agree. But yet for the same reason we wind up on differ­
ent sides. I think that ecological concerns can be translated individu­
ally. The real issue is not that the environment is going to hell because 
animals are eating each other, but that enormous misery is being cre­
ated because of human impact on the environment. If we are going to 
be moral individualists it is human behavior and its impact that we 
really need to think about and control. 
Robinson: Your assumption is that species' welfare in some sense is an 
aggregate of individual well-being in that population. Take an action 
that is obviously not good for a specific individual. If such an action 
produced a 15% increment for all othe other individuals and the popu­
lation as a whole benefitted, then that would be morally justifiable. Is 
that what you said? 
Jamieson: That question is deceptively simple, and I don't want to get 
into the complexities of how you would know that or measure that. 
Broadly, whether we are talking about human or non-human there can 
be cases where the sacrifices of individuals may be justified, and the 
justification is in terms of its impact on other creatures. 
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Robinson: So maybe the discussion is not so much about moral qual­
ity, but on the perception of the efficacy of certain actions. 
Jamieson: That is part of it, but there is still a lot of mystification in our 
thinking that centers around the fact that we are individualists about 
human reflectives, about animals, and that if we would really think 
about animals in an individual way a lot of our policies would look 
different. 
Hutchins: You could argue just the opposite from a collective point of 
view, and if we were in another culture we might. I think that the 
focus on individualism stems from the fact that we are in an individu­
alistic society. 
Bekoff: I think there is a theme to all these discussions, and that theme 
is the notion of wildness. The most recent statement was Hutchins' 
discussion of elephants. Elephants make a desert of something and 
other species die. I could say, "Big deal, that is what elephants do in 
the natural world." But that immediately gets me back to this notion 
of interference. It puts me, as a field biologist, in an incredible di­
lemma. Some of you study coyotes, and I have seen a coyote kill far 
more mice than I would like to think about. I have studied penguins 
and watched predators kill penguin chicks and eat penguin eggs. We 
should observe and learn about what is natural, what is wild. If we do 
not study what it is, how in the world can we learn what wild animals 
do? 
The notion of intervention in sickness is an interesting one. To what 
diseases do wild animals succumb? How and do they recover? How 
are diseases transmitted among wild animals? If a coyote gets sick and 
I go out and do something for him, I cannot learn about any of these 
aspects of sickness. There is nothing cool about watching a coyote kill 
a mouse, and there is no doubt that the mouse is suffering. But if I 
interfere, how can I learn about the natural or wild world? Things 
happen in the world that we do not like. We do not ascribe moral 
agency to coyotes, we do not say the coyote is bad for killing the 
mouse. There are things going on in the world that we just should not 
interfere with. There is a sense of wildness that is beautiful, that we 
should respect and admire. It is too bad that deer get killed by wolves. 
I would perhaps like the world to be different, but it is not. 
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
48 
Hutchins: I agree. I had the same feeling when I was watching a 
geographic special on lions and hyenas. There were some incredible 
scenes of the horrors of nature. A female lion selects a spot for her den, 
the spot turns out to be a cobra's den and the snake bites and kills the 
cubs. It then bites the mother lion, she walks off salivating and is 
almost killed by hyenas. As a human being, I can feel sympathy and 
empathy for that animal, but I know that as a conservationist this is 
precisely what I am trying to preserve. That is called living with para­
dox, and in many cases that is what we are having to do. We are trying 
to take all of these ideas, according to what kinds of moral precepts we 
operate on, and categorize them. I think that is something we need to 
give some thought to. 
Clifton: I want to bring the discussion back to the issue of culling. 
There is a study that Rowan did a few years back in which he studied 
the cultures of Humane Societies and discovered institutional modus 
operandi there was centered around euthanasia. This in turn created a 
lot of inertia as far as finding solutions to the feral populations. If you 
were to draw a diagram of this you would have a problem. You have 
to have a certain number of animals to have a viable population in 
captivity, but some animals outlive their usefulness in one way or 
another thereby creating a surplus. If you institutionalize the idea of 
"options" and the easiest option from a cost point of view is culling, 
what you are ultimately doing is institutionalizing culling. When you 
institutionalize something that is difficult and may be morally repug­
nant to some people you are institutionalizing with it a defense mecha­
nism, the idea that culling, like euthanasia, is a sacrament. 
Rowan: I think the problem of the issue of culling and euthanasia is in 
the use of the terms. It is, in fact, sacrifice, and that is not discussed. It 
becomes an established part of the process. It creates great distress 
and concern and we tend to ignore that it is the system. 
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Nearly all humans in the industrial world, at some time or other in 
their lives, must yearn for what they believe to be the freedom of life in 
a wilderness, "When wild in woods the noble savage ran", as Dryden 
wrote in the 17th century. But the concept of the freedom of a wilder­
ness is as much a myth as the concept of the noble savage, although 
both are still very much a part of western thought. Today, we all know 
that there is no piace in the world that is truly a wilderness, that is a 
place capable of sustaining plant and animal life, that has been un­
touched by anthropogenic influences which have been steadily increas­
ing in impact for at least the past 40,000 years. 
The Western belief that the world is divided into the "human" and the 
"natural" stems from the philosophy, first propounded by the ancient 
Greeks, notably Aristotle, that all living organisms could be placed in a 
Scale of Nature or Great Chain of Being with "primeval slime" at its 
base and "Man" at its summit. This belief, which is imbued in Chris­
tianity and in all aspects of western civilization, has led to a great 
divide with "the wild" on one side and "the tame", that is all the 
animals and plants that are exploited by humans, on the other. 
I should like to argue that human influences on all faunas and all 
biotopes are now so powerful that there are no longer any grounds for 
dividing the wild from the tame. And, as the master predator, and for 
its own survival, the human species must learn to manage the world as 
one great global ecosystem. 
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WHAT IS WILD AND WHAT IS DOMESTIC? 
It is difficult to define what is a wild and what is a domestic animals. 
We usually think of a wild animal as one that is fearful of humans and 
runs away if it can. But this fear of humans is in itself a behavioral 
pattern that has been learned from experience of human predation 
over countless generations. A "wild" animal that has had no contact 
with humans has no fear of them and is quickly exterminated, like the 
dodo. On the other hand animals in a wildlife reserve will lose their 
fear after some generations of protection from human hunting. In one 
sense it can be said that a domestic animal is just one which has lost its 
fear of humans and will breed in captivity, but it is also much more 
than this because the species of domestic animals have evolved by 
natural and artificial selection in association with human societies. 
Domestication is both a biological and a cultural process, which begins 
when a small number of animals are separated from the wild species 
and become habituated to humans. If these animals breed they form a 
founder group, which is changed over successive generations both in 
response to natural selection under the new regime of the human 
community and its environment, and by artificial selection for eco­
nomic, cultural, or aesthetic reasons (Clutton-Brock, 1992a). The rela­
tionship between human and animal is transformed from one of mu­
tual trust in which the environment and its resources are shared to 
total human control and domination ( Ingold, 1994). 
Once domestication is established new breeds are produced by further 
reproductive isolation leading to genetic drift, as in the founder popu­
lations of new subspecies in the wild. The founders of the new breed 
contain only a small fraction of the total variation of the parent species, 
and it becomes a genetically unique population, which continues to 
evolve under natural and artificial selection. 
A determining factor in the evolution by natural selection of domestic 
species is that of climate. The effects of climatic selection on domestic 
animals appears to be identical to the well-known correlations in size 
and body-shape that can be seen in subspecies of wild animals across a 
geographical dine. This can be seen, for example in breeds of horses, 
as reflected in the horse breeders' terms, "cold-blooded" for the north­
ern heavily-built horses and "hot-blooded" for the lightly-built Arabs. 
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All breeds of horses have originated from one wild species, Equus 
ferus, which ranged over the whole of Europe and Asia at the end of 
the Pleistocene, although it is probable that over this vast area there 
were several subspecies of the wild horse (Clutton-Brock, 1992b ). 
IMPRO V EMENT AS A BIOLOGICAL CALAMITY 
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Breeds of domestic animals should be considered as local ecotypes or 
demes with special adaptations to particular micro-environments. 
Breeds of domestic livestock that evolved in one biotope are as well 
adjusted to their environment as the wild species, and it is this perfect 
adaptation that has been destroyed and continues to be destroyed by 
the policies of so-called "improvement." The impetus for improve­
ment began in Europe in the 18th century when the industrial revolu­
tion made it necessary to increase the quantity and quality of meat and 
wool for the rapidly expanding urban populations. But the improvers, 
of course, knew nothing of genetics or evolution and did not realize 
that by crossbreeding animals from different localities they were de­
stroying populations that had taken thousands of years to evolve. 
Today we should know better, but the legacy of the improvers has been 
found very hard to eradicate, as can be seen from the many schemes to 
improve cattle in Africa. For example the native cattle of southern 
Ethiopia, the humped Boran, which only needed to drink every three 
days, in perfect adaptation to their semi-desert environment, have 
been "improved" by crossing with north European breeds. Similarly, 
the ancient Mashona breed from Zimbabwe has been "improved" by 
crossing with Hereford beef cattle. In the short term, this improvement 
leads to high productivity, but there is a loss of the unique genetic 
constitution of the breed that has evolved in adaptation to the local 
environment. Susceptibility to stress and to disease is increased and 
the need to protect the new, valuable but vulnerable herds led to such 
misguided policies as the game-eradication schemes of the 1960s, in 
attempts to control tsetse flies. It has to be realized that anciently­
established domestic livestock are as much a part of the biotope as the 
wildlife and if the balance in their management is upset the whole 
ecosystem will suffer. 
The influence of ancient breeds of domestic livestock is apparent in 
every part of the world, whether it be the Sahel where herds of camels 
and goats range, or the landscape of Europe which has been trans-
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formed over the last 5000 years by grazing animals. The species of 
trees allowed to grow in forests has been determined by the feeding of 
vast herds of pigs put out to pannage, hillsides have been turned to 
pasture by the grazing of millions of sheep and cattle, and moorlands 
have been created by overgrazing. 
Everywhere, domestic animals have evolved in adaptation to their 
local environment and its particular wild flora and fauna. It is there­
fore essential that any conservation or management scheme must 
consider the role of domestic animals and its is just as important to 
maintain the local breeds of livestock as it is to preserve the wildlife. It 
is with this realization that there is a growing number of societies in 
Europe and America devoted to the conservation of rare breeds of 
domestic animals. 
CULTURE IN DOMESTIC ANIMALS 
It is not only the physical adaptations of local breeds of domestic 
animal that are lost by improvement, it is also the culture, that is the 
learned behavior of the animals, which is lost. This was shown by 
Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (1990) in her remarkable account of the 
l ions of the Kal ahari oesert and their  inh>rr1rtion with thP R1 1 shmPn 
( !Kung San). In the 1950s these people turned from hunting to herding 
livestock. Their indigenous cattle had their own culture and under­
stood the danger of lions. When going out to graze, which they did 
unattended, the cattle always walked in single file, varied their direc­
tion, and returned well before sunset. However, when a foreign bull 
was introduced to the herd their learned behavior was disrupted, 
ending in a massacre of the cattle by thirty lions. The usual outcome of 
such an event would be the shooting of all the lions. 
Many people deny that there can be culture in animal societies, but this 
in great part because it is one of those terms, like consciousness, that is 
so hard to define. In this context I define culture as a way of life im­
posed over successive generations on society of humans or animals 
but its elders. Where the society includes both humans and animals 
then the humans act as elders. 
The process of taming a wild animal, whether it is a lion or a wild goat 
can be seen as changing its own culture. The animal is removed from 
the environment in which it learns from birth either to hunt or to flee 
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
on sight from any potential predator, and brought into a protected 
place where it has to learn a whole new set of social relationships as 
well as new feeding and reproductive strategies. 
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A domestic animal is a cultural artifact of human society but it also has 
its own culture, which can develop, say for a cow, either as part of the 
society of nomadic pastoralists or as a unit in a factory farm. I should 
like to argue that domestic animals live in as many different cultural 
situations as humans and that their learned behavior is just as respon­
sive. In the absence of predators, domestic animals adopt the culture 
of their human owners and so closely can they fit within it that they 
seem to have lost all links with their wild progenitors. The more social 
or gregarious in their natural behavioral patterns are these progenitors 
the more versatile will be the domesticates, with the dog being the 
extreme example of an animal with a human culture. 
The loss of their own culture can be just as disastrous for domestic 
animals as it is for wild animals that are set free after being bred in 
captivity. It is probable that after some generations of breeding in 
factory farms, pigs or cattle would lose all knowledge about the choice 
of foodstuffs in an open field. As long ago as 1950, Hediger in his 
classic book on Wild Animals in_ Captivity asserted that domestic 
animals are unnatural in that "they eat only one particular kind of 
food." But this monophagy is forced upon them and in the long run 
can only be detrimental, as has been shown by the outbreak of BSE in 
the U.K. 
FERAL ANIMALS OR NEW WILD SPECIES? 
Feral animals can be defined as those that live as a self-sustaining 
population in the wild after a history of domestication. And, whereas 
the case for the conservation of indigenous breeds of domestic animal 
is usually clear, the problems are much more complicated with feral 
animals. For a start it is often very difficult to know whether a so­
called species is truly wild or of anciently feral descent. The European 
mouflon is just such an example. This sheep (Ovis musimon) was to 
be found living wild only on the mountains of Corsica and Sardinia 
until the last century when small numbers were removed to parks and 
mountains in Europe as a game animal. It was generally believed that 
the mouflon was a relic of wild sheep that were originally widespread 
throughout Europe However we now know, from the absence of any 
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fossil records of sheep throughout Europe, including the Mediterra­
nean islands, that these sheep are not relics of wild sheep, but perhaps 
just as importantly they are relics of the very earliest domestic sheep 
that were taken to the islands, probably at least 7,000 years ago (Pop­
lin, 1979). The world record for mouflon horns according to Rowland 
Ward's Record of Big Game was shot on Sardinia by the Duke of 
Bedford in 1903. But should the horns of the mouflon be hung as 
trophies or kept in scientific collections as interesting specimens from 
very primitive domestic sheep? 
Rather the same situation can be seen with the dingo, and other feral 
dogs like the New Guinea singing dog and the native American dogs, 
but these canids are in a much worse predicament than the mouflon as 
they are very close to losing their genetic integrity through interbreed­
ing with European dogs. The dingo is a fascinating relic of the earliest 
domestic dogs of south east Asia, but it has had a very bad press from 
the Europeans in Australia, having been treated as vermin by the 
sheep farmers who have killed vast numbers with the encouragement 
of government bounties. 
It is probable that a very small number of dogs were taken to Australia, 
bv boat, thousands of vears a12:o with immi2"rant neooles , This must 
.; · J V V .1 .l 
have been before the domestication of the pig which was never taken 
to Australia as it was to New Guinea and the Pacific Islands in the 
early prehistoric period. However, it was later than 12,000 years ago, 
when Tasmania was separated from the Australian continent by the sea 
breaking through the Bass Straits, as there are no fossil records of dogs 
on Tasmania. The small founder group of dogs in Australia would 
soon have begun to breed away from human control, and later genera­
tions expanded to spread widely over the continent. 
Until the arrival of Europeans in Australia the dingo was part of the 
ecosystem inhabited by human hunters and their prey. Its extinction 
would be a great loss because the dingo has not only been a part of the 
Australian fauna for thousands of years it is also part of the living 
heritage of Aboriginal culture. 
Another canid which is not feral but is in an equally problematic situa­
tion from the conservation point of view is the red wolf. Now that 
DNA analysis has been shown that this canid, at least in its present 
form, is not a separate, endangered species of wolf but a hybrid be-
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tween the grey wolf and the coyote (as many have always believed), 
should the strenuous efforts spent on its conservation be continued 
(Paradiso & Nowak, 1971; Wayne & Jenks, 1991)? I believe that they 
should and that the red wolf can be considered to be a "new" species 
that has evolved as a result of anthropogenic interference. 
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The latest example of "natural" hybridization to be discovered is the 
offspring of the mating between a blue whale and a fin whale, which is 
presumed to have occurred because the blue whale was unable to find 
a mate (media reports in the U.K. 3 March 1994). 
Another species which may be called "new" is Przewalski's horse. The 
700 or so "wild" horses living today have a distinct, uniform appear­
ance, which differs considerably from that of their thirteen ancestors 
which were brought to Europe at the end of the last century. These 
were a "motley lot" and included at least one feral horse (Mohr, 1971; 
Clutton-Brock, 1992b). The effects of breeding the horses over the past 
90 years have produced incipient characteristics of domestication. The 
cranial capacity has been reduced, the crowns of the teeth have become 
less hypsodont and the muzzle narrower. The main and tail are fuller 
and white marks sometimes appear on the forehead. The age at which 
the horses become sexually mature has been lowered from five to r..vo 
years. 
The Przewalski horse, like the Arabian oryx and other highly endan­
gered species that survive only because they have been bred in captiv­
ity, is valued for its "wildness", yet many individuals are perfectly 
tame. This is an example of the anomaly in human thought which has 
been with us for thousands of years, since the time of the ancient 
Assyrian kings who kept lions in cages, only so that they could be let 
out to be shot with arrows. The modern justification, of course, is that 
we are not only saving a species from extinction but also, by reintro­
ducing it to the wild we are preserving its habitat. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I fully support the breeding of endangered species in captivity and in 
all reintroduction schemes. All that I would like to argue is that we 
should try not to divide the world into the wild and the tame but to 
think of its as one community of life. For at least the past 10,000 years 
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the faunal compositions of whole continents have been molded by 
human activity. Ungulates have been haunted to extinction and the 
killing of carnivores in their millions must have had a great impact on 
their behavior and on predator-prey relationships. For example, I 
believe that human persecution has transformed the wolf from a diur­
nal to a nocturnal hunter. A huge diversity of species has been moved 
around the world and the grazing of domestic livestock has altered 
environments everywhere. 
Is the wild giant ox, or aurochs (Bos primigenius), extinct or is it one of 
the most common and widespread large animals in the world? In 
terms of genetic constitution every domestic cow must carry a consid­
erable proportion of the genes of its progenitor, the aurochs. Efforts to 
"reconstitute" the aurochs by crossbreeding various unimproved 
breeds of cattle by the Heck brothers in Germany before the war, were 
moderately successful in terms of external appearance (Zeuner, 1963: 
205) . However, it is doubtful whether the full genetic complement of 
the wild ox could ever be recreated because of the genetic drift that 
occurs whenever a new breed is developed. 
Reducing the numbers of breeds by crossbreeding and improvement 
for greater, short term productivity will reduce the genetic diversity of 
the species to dangerously low levels. This could be catastrophic when 
the wild progenitor is extinct, as with cattle. It is therefore imperative 
to urge that the farm park, which aims to conserve rare or declining 
breeds of domestic animals, is as valuable as the wildlife park. Both 
the wild and the tame need strategies for conservation and both are 
necessary for the survival of ecosystems, especially those in fragile 
environments where the indigenous livestock have lived in balance 
with the wildlife for upwards of 5,000 years . 
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CLUTTON-BROCK DISCUSSION 
Serpell: I agree with a very large number of the points made, particu­
larly the notion that people tend to denigrate or downgrade domestic 
animals. This is obvious with ecologists, particularly ecologists that 
study wildlife. We also see this in concern for the welfare of animals. 
If we saw rhinos and tigers being kept the way we routinely keep farm 
animals there would be a national outcry, but we seem to be happy to 
accept this for domestic animals. Clutton-Brock makes the point that 
we tend to perceive domestic animals as in some way corrupted by 
human hands and less worthy of concern. 
She goes on to make a plea for many of our rarer and more ancient 
breed domestic animals, proposing that we stop thinking about the 
wild/ domestic dispute and instead try to think of it as a continuum, 
giving all animals an equal share in our concern. I agree that we 
should preserve locally adapted domestic genotypes. I accept her 
point that the well-intentioned but clumsy western attempts to im­
prove on what exists already in third world countries are more produc­
tive in a short-term sense but very damaging in the long-run sense. 
I depart from Clutton-Brock on the idea of wild and tame as a con­
tinuum. There is a distinction, and it is a distinction based on degrees 
of human control or coercion. The question then remains whether 
there is any morally relevant difference or distinction between wild 
and domestic animals. This in turn raises the question as to whether 
we should devote resources and energy to conserving domestic breeds. 
Having built up this argument she then contradicts it by saying that 
domestic animals are artifacts of human endeavor. If they are then we 
cannot use the same yardstick to measure their value. Some of the 
value of wild animals is a product of their wildness. So then we have 
to ask what is the value of the domestic animal? I want to get away 
from its potential value as genetic stock, that it has an anthropocentric 
value to us because we might be able to use it in some way for the 
economy, and think instead about the intrinsic value of the animal 
Lacy: It is not unclear to me what domestic is, and neither is the clarifi­
cation between domesticity and wildness. Domesticity comes about 
because we artificially breed to produce traits that are of benefit to us, 
thereby interfering with evolution. It is true that domestic breeds 
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evolved in and with their own environment, but only in a trivial sense, 
for the environment they evolved in is highly modified. We created an 
artificial environment for them in which to evolve. We control their 
evolution so that they develop traits that benefit human economy. So 
they are, in a sense, corrupted by human hands. They carry over traits 
from the wild, and if released they can recover some of that wildness 
and evolve again, adapted to their needs rather than our needs. 
Domestic animals not only have small brains, they also have slow 
reaction times, poor assimilation efficiencies of nutrients, are subordi­
nate in encounters with wild animals and are disease prone. Clutton­
Brock suggested that the preservation of domestic breeds is important 
or essential for their environment, and again I see it only in a highly 
modified way. The environment for domestic livestock might be an 
extremely artificial rather than wild environment that has low bio­
diversity and very low welfare for a great many other organisms. It is 
a way of keeping human-created and modified environments the way 
that we want them, as far from wild as we can get. 
Perhaps there is nowhere that is truly wild anymore, that all animals 
are influenced by humans, but there is still a difference between ani­
mals evolving to their needs as opposed to our needs. It is important 
to protect history for cultural or economic reasons, even humane 
reasons. It seems counterproductive to protect them from the bio­
diversity of conservation, for maintaining some of the sense of wild­
ness or natural functions of the ecosystem. 
Clutton-Brock: I dispute some of what you say. For example, cattle in 
Africa have been there for five thousand years and have evolved 
through natural selection. They have become immune to tse-tse, for 
example. Throughout Africa there have been large numbers of breeds 
of cattle that have literally evolved with the environment and with the 
wildlife. I would contend that the ecosystem does, to a certain extent, 
depend on the maintenance and grazing of this domestic cattle. I am 
simply trying to point out that domestic animals should not be ignored 
when we are trying to preserve the ecosystems. 
(?): Some of this depends on the animal we are talking about. You 
seem to be chiefly talking about food and laboratory life. When I was 
contemplating this problem l thought of dogs. The dog is a species 
that has been used as a food animal, although not originally domesti-
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cated for that function. A lot of the changes to the dog, while they 
have been beneficial to human beings, have also been beneficial to the 
dog in the context of its partnership with humans. We cannot say it is 
simply a domestic animal. To me it is still a unique species and is 
living in a partnership with humans, mutually dependent on humans. 
Yet when faced with the unfortunate decision to conserve Pekinese or 
wolves, my mind would go to the wolf. However, I have to recognize 
that the Pekinese is a unique creation. 
Hutchins: Domestic animals were essentially not totally domesticated 
for the benefit of people. In Covenant of the Wild the author argues 
strongly that domestication was originally a symbiotic relationship 
between humans and animals, almost a mutual coming together, 
especially in regards to the dog. It was not a "taking of prisoners" and 
a manipulation of their genes for human benefit but it ended up as 
mutually beneficial in many cases. Certainly manipulation took place 
in many cases later, but this is a misconception that has led us to a 
number of ethical positions that we may have to rethink. 
Pacelle: Hutchins, are you arguing that we have some kind of moral 
obligation to preserve all of the creations of domestic rearing such as 
turkeys in factory farms that cannot even breed among themselves and 
whose health problems begin from birth? 
Hutchins: What I am talking about concentrates on animals that have 
been around for thousands of years. I see that as being different in 
some extent to the type of manipulation we have done to farm animals 
over the last fifty years. The animals that Clutton-Brock describes have 
been evolving on their own, not just selected for people, by people. I 
see an important difference between the two. 
Pokras: I do not think we have any moral obligation to perpetuate 
most domestic breeds. I would not feel that the world was losing 
something substantial and meaningful if these breeds passed from 
existence, as long as the individual animals were well-treated up until 
their natural death. 
Jamieson: What this kind of exchange indicates is how unclear we are 
about what it is we value. I have heard three different conceptions in 
this discussion. One, we value variety. Two, history is valued, the 
connection of domestic breeds to our past and our cultural of evolu-
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61 
When the Spanish arrived in the new world there was a debate among 
the Jesuits about the status of the native people. One view was that 
they were animals, making it acceptable to use them as draft labor. 
The other view was that they were congenitally human and ought to 
be converted. There was a very serious theological dispute about how 
they should be treated. This raises the notion that familiarity and 
knowledge are very important for the understanding of the capabilities 
and compatibility, and therefore value of these animals. This does not 
mean you have to know each particular animal n order to value it. 
Grandy: I wanted to shift the focus of the debate to something 
Clutton-Brock mentioned earlier regarding the relevance of red deer 
and elk and what role the king played in the situation we face today 
with respect to attempts to promote the consumptive use of wildlife in 
developed countries. Things have changed overwhelmingly and that 
model cannot be applied. We have control of trade, methods of killing 
that are for more effective and far more destructive than ones we saw 
in the king's time, much less authority in the sense of government 
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countries that wherever these well-meaning attempts to promote 
consumptive utilization sustainably have been failures. 
Rowan: I would like to close the day's discussion at this point, but I 
would like to sum up a few points that have been raised today. There 
is a human need to classify, a necessity to classify animals as domestic, 
wild, tame, etc . We try to push things into neat little boxes in which 
they refuse to go. 
In terms of the Steven's comment regarding the ascetic elements of 
breeding, there is an interesting comparison between Japan, America 
and Germany. The Japanese attitude toward wildlife is ascetic, not 
moralistic, humanitarian or ecologistic . The American attitude is more 
humanitarian, more moralistic and ecologistic. Germans are very 
moralistic, very humanitarian and very ecologistic. There are these 
differences in attitudes in terms of what one values, which brings me 
to the next issue that came up constantly throughout the day, one 
which we never actually confronted directly but was talked around 
quite a bit; the issue of value, valuing the wild, the domestic and the 
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
62 
tame. 
Another issue underlying today's discussion was human agency. 
Some of us have much less regard of human agency than others in this 
room. There is a conflict that combines some of the basic ideas we 
have here. If one does not trust human agency then new knowledge is 
useless because one does not trust humanity to use it in a wise manner. 
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People from many different disciplines are interested in the notion of 
nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) well-being. Among the topics I 
consider here are included how the terms "well-being" and "welfare" 
have been used, and also how well-being or welfare is assessed. I 
favor naturalizing and individualizing the notion of well-being by 
using the species-typical lives of wild individual animals as standards 
for assessing well-being. I argue that well-being is at its highest for 
individuals who are ailowed to live their own kinds of naturai iives in 
the wild (or what remains of the wild), as far away as possible from the 
numerous and pervasive intrusions of humans. While different criteria 
for assessments of well-being may have to be used for wild individu­
als, for wild individuals who are captured and maintained in captivity, 
for those individuals born in captivity but who would have lived the 
life of a wild animal if their parents had not been taken captive, for the 
offspring from frozen zoos, and for domestic animals, naturalizing and 
individualizing well-being is consistent with attempting to prevent 
individuals in the wild and those animals in various forms of captivity 
from being (further) exploited by humans. Much concern for animal 
well-being develops only after they have been exploited. While at­
tempts to "right wrongs" may be laudable, perhaps we should step 
back and see if we are able to reduce the number of wrongs that we 
initiate or in which we partake. 
I also consider why I, a scientist interested in cognitive ethology, am 
also deeply interested in animal well-being. Naturalizing and indi­
vidualizing animal minds can be taken to mean that I favor studies of 
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animal cognition in conditions that most closely resemble those in 
which individuals have evolved or in which they currently reside in 
nature. In this section I briefly discuss the rapidly growing field of 
cognitive ethology and draw some connections between the study of 
animal minds and animal well-being. Other topics I consider include: 
(i) the importance of studying individual animals carefully and trying 
to learn as much as we possibly can about their lives to facilitate com­
ing to a fuller appreciation of what humans can do to improve their 
well-being; (ii) the use of common sense, subjectivity, anecdotes, an­
thropomorphism, sympathy, empathy, and "hard" scientific evidence 
to inform our views of well-being, and the recognition that none, taken 
alone, including science, can do the job adequately; (iii) how appeals to 
the supposed brutality of nature are used to inform (and also to misin­
form) decisions about how animals ought to be used by humans; (iv) 
the use of individual characteristics rather than group membership in 
our deliberations about well-being; and (v) the importance of giving 
careful attention to claims that there are differences among individuals 
with respect to cognitive abilities that are also morally relevant. Here I 
will discuss what may be conveniently, but not disrespectfully, called, 
"not so cognitive individuals. "  
I conclude that: (i) well-being has to do with animal feelings and that 
there are plenty of data for many animals that strongly indicate that 
they have feelings; (ii) all sorts of data, including subjective impres­
sions, need to be taken seriously because there may be as yet 
unimagined ways in which some individuals experience pain, suffer, 
and interact with their social and nonsocial worlds; (iii) it is difficult to 
argue for morally relevant differences in cognitive abilities; (iv) what­
ever connections there might be between an individual's cognitive 
abilities and the different ways in which it is thought she can be used 
can be overridden by that individual's ability to feel pain and to suffer; 
(v) individual characteristics rather than group membership should be 
used to inform our decisions about what sorts of treatment are permis­
sible; (vi) interfering in the lives of wild animals is justified only on 
rare occasions; (vii) removing individuals from the wild and maintain­
ing them in captivity are major intrusions on their lives, permitting 
captive animals to breed should only be done on rare occasions, treat­
ing domestic animals less respectfully than their wild counterparts is 
unjustified, and appeals to the supposed brutality of nature fail; (viii) 
more comparative data are needed concerning animal sentience, cogni­
tion, and behavior especially from diverse species whose lives, sensory 
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worlds, motor abilities, and nervous systems are different from those 
of animals with whom we identify most readily or with whom we are 
the most familiar; ( ix) interdisciplinary input is necessary as well as 
discussion among people representing similar areas among which 
there may be blurred boundaries; (x) there needs to be a marriage 
between applied and more theoretical endeavors; it is essential to 
bridge the gap between detached ivy tower views on animal well­
being and practical concerns; (xi) we should err on the side of animals 
whenever we are uncertain of their abilities to experience pain and to 
suffer; ( xii) although some fuzziness remains about our notion of well­
being and although it is impossible to know precisely what it might be 
to be like another individual, perhaps many may know more than they 
realize or are willing to express; and (xiii) we should all care about 
animal well-being, not only when it is convenient for us to do so. 
INTRODUCTION: SOME PERSONAL VIEWS AND THE VALUE 
AND NECESSITY OF INTERDISCIPLINARY TRESPASSING 
"At the onset of electric shock the [nai:ve] dog runs frantically 
about, defecating, urinating, and howling until it scrambles over the 
barrier and so escapes from the shock. . . .  However, in contrast to the 
na:ive dog, it soon stops running and remains silent until shock termi­
nates . . .  it seems to 'give up' and passively 'accept the shock'." 
(Seligman, Maier, and Geer, 1968, p. 256) 
"In one set of tests, the animals had been subjected to lethal 
doses of radiation and then forced by electric shock to run on a tread­
mill until they collapsed. Before dying, the unanesthetized monkeys 
suffered the predictable effects of excessive radiation, including vomit­
ing and diarrhoea. After acknowledging all this, a DNA [Defense 
Nuclear Agency] spokesman commented: 'To the best of our knowl­
edge. the animals experience no pain'." ( from Rachels, 1990, p. 132; my 
emphasis) 
"The least I can do is to speak out for the hundreds of chimpan­
zees who, right now, sit hunched, miserable and without hope, staring 
out with dead eyes from the metal prisons. They cannot speak for 
themselves." (Goodall, 1987, p. 577) 
"I study foxes because ram still awed by their extraordinary 
beauty, because they outwit me, because they keep the wind and the 
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rain on my face . . .  because it's fun." (Macdonald, 1987, p. 15) 
These quotations clearly indicate the not so astonishing fact that there 
are many different opinions on how humans view and interact with 
nonhuman animals, hereafter animals, and why they do so [ use of the 
pejorative phrase subhuman animals (e.g. Gallup, 1970, p. 87; 
Bjorkqvist and Niemela, 1992, section VI  entitled "Female Aggression 
in Subhuman Species; Kennedy, 1992, p. 17; Adler, 1993, p. 291) is 
insulting to animals and should be strongly discouraged]. Not surpris­
ingly, there are also a wide variety of views about animal well-being, 
what we should do about it, the nature of animal minds, and possible 
connections between the nature of animal minds and well-being. 
These topics will be addressed in this essay. 
The first question that I asked myself as I started writing this paper 
was "Why's a person like me doing something like this?" My reasons 
seem clear to me and I hope they will become clear to you. I, a North 
American Caucasian male, have spent many years studying wild 
animals, learning about animals from others, and teaching others 
about the behavior of diverse animals. Through these experiences I 
came to respect the lives of animals independent of my own life as a 
human beirnr : I could never oush aside mv interests in the animals' 
LJ' J. ./ 
lives simply because I thought of myself merely as another animal who 
wanted to learn more other cohabitants of this planet. My personal 
views, while certainly open for discussion and change, and they have 
indeed changed, stem from these numerous intimate encounters. But, 
although I have always been concerned with animal well-being, I have 
not always applied the same standards of conduct to my own interac­
tions with animals. However, I have changed my habits with the 
passage of time. For example, early in my graduate career, I con­
fronted a professor who strode into a course in comparative physiol­
ogy arrogantly claiming while holding a struggling rabbit in his hand 
that he would kill the rabbit using a punch named after this poor beast, 
I refused to partake in laboratory experiments in which dogs were 
killed as part of a medical school physiology course, and I stopped 
doing doctoral dissertation research at the same time because I could 
no longer kill (or as some call it, sacrifice or euthanize) cats. Nonethe­
less, I did do some studies on the development of predatory behavior 
that permitted young coyotes to kill young mice and chickens in 
staged-encounters. I would no longer do these sorts of studies. First, 
much of the same information could be collected in the field, some-
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thing that I later did. Second, there might have to be some knowledge 
that we do not obtain until there are more humane ways to do neces­
sary studies. Perhaps my ability to change will show others that they, 
too, can change. 
As I will discuss below, how individual humans view animals and 
represent them to themselves clearly informs their positions on matters 
of well-being and the nature of animal minds. I am not surprised how 
influential have been my contacts with other animals, and this influ­
ence is clearly reflected in my views on their well-being and the nature 
of their minds including: ( i) putting respect and admiration for other 
animals first and foremost; ( ii) recognizing that almost all of the meth­
ods that are used to study animals, even in the field, are intrusions on 
their lives-much research is fundamentally exploitive; ( iii) recogniz­
ing how misguided are speciesistic views concerning vague notions 
such as intelligence and cognitive or mental complexity for informing 
assessments of well-being; ( iv) focussing on the importance of indi­
viduals; (v) appreciating individual variation and the diversity of the 
lives of different individuals in the worlds within which they live; and 
(vi) using broadly based rules of fidelity and nonintervention as guid­
ing principles. 
While I realize that I am trespassing into other disciplines, and that 
some of my arguments are not fully developed in the way that philoso­
phers might like them to be-in some instances I am "talking" philoso­
phy rather than "doing" philosophy-and also that there may be 
unanticipated places where my views may lead, I think that interdisci­
plinary exchange is valuable and necessary. I want to know what 
philosophers are thinking about cognitive ethology and I think that it 
would be useful for philosophers to know what people like me are 
thinking about philosophical issues that are related to animal well­
being; I can help them see how I view similar problems from a context 
with which most of them have had little or no direct experience. For 
example, I discovered the work of Paul Taylor (1986) after I had writ­
ten about certain aspects of fidelity and nonintervention. An under­
standing of the ways in which I arrived on similar ( though not exactly 
the same) terrain may be helpful to him if he was to consider revising 
some of his ideas (for example, locating domesticated animals and 
others who are dependent upon humans more squarely in his 
biocentric ethic and using data from cognitive ethological studies for 
learning more about trust and deception; see below). Simply put, we 
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should strive to keep boundaries between disciplines semi-permeable, 
for disciplinary arrogance will delay making progress on important 
issues (Bekoff, 1994a), as might the fear of making mistakes (Orr, 1994). 
From a less personal view, I also hope to show how important 
are broad, comparative, and evolutionary perspectives on animal 
behavior, that may seem to be of greater interest to my colleagues who 
reside in various ivy towers than to those who are out there "getting 
there hands dirty." I also hope to convince you that there has to be a 
harmonious marriage between those who are interested in more theo­
retical analyses of well-being and behavior and those who are inter­
ested in more practical matters about well-being and behavior. 
ANIMAL WELL-BEING: A DIFFICULT YET USEFUL NOTION 
"There are many experiments that, for ethical reasons, cannot be 
done on humans but can be done on animals." (Crick, 1994, p. 21) 
"Obviously, using humans for such [neuroanatomical] experi­
ments is 
out of the question." (Crick, 1994, pp. 109-110) 
"Capturing an animal-from the wild state-is considerably 
more difficult to justify than keeping it in a zoo." ( Bostock, 1993, p. 
186) 
First things first: It is impossible now (and perhaps it will be forever) 
to offer a definition of well-being that applies to all animals in all 
situations (Broom, 1993; Fraser, 1993; Mason and Mendl, 1993; Moberg, 
1993; for more general discussions see Griffin, 1986; Elster and Roemer, 
1993; Frey and Morris, 1993; and O'Neill, 1993). Even the introductory 
editorial in the first volume of the journal Animal Welfare does not 
contain a definition of the term "animal welfare" or of the term "ani­
mal well-being." It may actually be because many people from differ­
ent areas such as anthropology, biology, economics, psychology, psy­
chiatry, and sociology are interested in well-being for their own (and 
sometimes common) purposes that a single (or even a few) operational 
definition(s) of the widely used term "well-being" is elusive. Reasons 
that it is difficult to come up with a broadly applicable definition of 
"animal well-being" include the force of subjective (and often 
anthropo-centric) judgements of well-being that are related to personal 
views that inform the type and strength of one's ethical concerns ( e.g. 
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
69 
Bateson, 1991; Tannenbaum, 1991; Mason and Mendl, 1993), and how 
far one is willing to go to give the animal the benefit of the doubt 
(Mason and Mendl, 1993; Bekoff, 1994b; but see Broom, 1988, 1993). 
Common sense, which varies among individuals, also plays a role in 
assessments of well-being (Fraser, 1993). But, there are no compelling 
reasons to demand explicit definitions of difficult concepts ( including 
well-being and consciousness) before studying them; using working 
definitions as a guide is allowable even by those who demand empiri­
cal verification in their scientific endeavors (e.g. Crick, 1994; see also 
Jamieson and Bekoff, 1993 and Allen and Bekoff, 1995 for general 
discussion). 
Animal well-being "versus" animal welfare: It is important to under­
stand how different people conceptualize and apply the notion of 
animal well-being. The terms "well-being" and "welfare" often are 
used synonymously (Broom, 1993; Fraser, 1993). Fraser (1993, p. 38) 
distinguishes four approaches in which the terms "well-being" and 
"welfare" are used either as synonyms or to refer to different notions. 
The lexical approach allows the two terms to be used interchangeably, 
based on dictionary definitions, while the timorous approach "uses 
'well-being' because 'welfare' sounds like a political hot potato." The 
subtle approach uses '\velfare" to refer to "the long-term good of the 
animal" and "well-being" to refer "more to the animal's short term 
state, especially how the animal feels." On this view, a painful event 
such as a vaccination may enhance an individual's welfare but reduce 
her well-being. Finally, the pragmatic approach attempts to reduce 
confusion "by using 'well-being' to refer to the state of the animal and 
'animal welfare' to refer to the broader constellation of social and 
ethical issues." Broom (1993, p. 17) also notes that well-being "has a 
stronger connotation of subjective feeling in its use. It is used to refer 
more to the individual's perception of its state than to the state itself." 
While Fraser prefers the pragmatic approach, I think that the lexical 
approach also has a lot to offer, mainly for practical reasons; many 
people simply use "well-being" and "welfare" interchangeably (see, 
for example Hurnik's, 1993, p. 28 unannounced slide between them) 
and ignore the subtleties. Furthermore, quibbling over terms might 
deflect attention away from the most important matter at hand, 
namely, the treatment to which individual animals are subjected. If 
specialists cannot agree on definitions, then those who look to these 
individuals for guidance may wrongly conclude that there is no reason 
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to be concerned with animal well-being unless it can be defined. 
Nonetheless, the pragmatic approach is valuable because it recognizes 
that the state of the animal, her well-being, counts and also that there 
are social and ethical issues involved, her welfare, that, perhaps, are 
less time-bound to the immediate present. For convenience, I will use 
the term "well-being" in the sense of the pragmatic approach, but it 
will be clear that I realize there are many broad social and ethical 
issues involved regardless of which term is used. 
By using the terms "well-being" and "welfare" differently, and by 
recognizing that there are broad and social and ethical issues that may 
be extended beyond sentient animals, there is the possibility that one 
could also be concerned with the welfare of nonsentient organisms and 
objects. This is beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example, 
Rolston, 1988; Varner, 1990, 1994a; Hettinger, 1994), but there are im­
portant connections between how the welfare of sentient and 
nonsentient organisms are viewed. For example, Varner (1990) differ­
entiates between preference interests and biological interests, where 
the former are defined in terms of "one's actual and/ or enlightened 
desires" and and the latter are defined in the form of "X is in .A!s inter­
est" or "X would be good for A" (p. 265). By marking these differences 
he discusses what he calls "the biological theory of welfare" in contrast 
to the "mental state theory of welfare," and this allows him to claim 
that "something's being a living organism makes its biological needs 
morally significant" because what defines the interests of many ani­
mals "includes interests which are defined by the biological functions 
of organs and subsystems in addition to interests which are defined by 
our actual or ideal preferences" (Gary Varner, personal communica­
tion). 
Well-being is a term that is applied using a variety of measures­
behavioral and physiological-including our own subjective assess­
ments (Barnett and Hemsworth, 1990; Bostock, 1993; Broom, 1993, 
Fraser, 1993, Mason and Mendl, 1993; Moberg, 1993). Questions about 
whether or not individuals are in good or poor states of well-being 
include are they behaving normally, do they seem to be enjoying their 
existence, are they happy, are they maintaining themselves, are they 
healthy, are they suffering from unusually high levels of disease, are 
they coping with their environment, are they reproducing, and are 
they living as long as they might be expected to? One difficulty with 
the otherwise favored interdisciplinary approach to assessments of 
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well-being is that it is impossible to assess simultaneously all possible 
pertinent measures. What constitutes good well-being and what 
constitutes poor well-being usually boils down to consensus opinions 
based on the use of varying proportions of scientific data, common 
sense, subjective impressions, and individual moral codes. 
Although there are many possible measures of well-being, my prefer­
ence is for assessments of well-being in which animal's feelings play 
the most important role (see also Duncan, 1993a,b; Finsen and Finsen, 
1994, pp. 196ff, provide an historical account of some of this literature). 
On this view, assessments of well-being demand an informed and deep 
appreciation of an individual's cognitive abilities, which might include 
their ability to sense the passage of time, to make plans, to have future 
beliefs and goals, to enjoy certain sorts of social interactions, and to 
avoid pain and suffering. An individual whose freedom of movement 
is restricted to a small area might suffer from not being able to move 
about and a predator who is not allowed to hunt for food might suffer 
from not being able to hunt, but there might be no physical pain in­
volved in either case. In his discussion of human well-being, Griffin 
(1986) argues for an informed desire account in which people take into 
account not only immediate, but also future, desires. He does not 
exclude animals from his notions of well-being (p . 325, note 19) .  Some 
values that lie at the heart of human well-being on Griffin's account 
include accomplishment, autonomy, freedom from pain and anxiety, 
enjoyment, and deep personal relationships. Certainly, the behavior of 
some animals leads to reasonable inferences that these sorts of desires 
and needs are important in their lives (see below and Finsen and 
Finsen, 1994; DeGrazia, 1995). 
Of course, how we come to terms with what animals feel and if and 
how they experience pain and suffer present very difficult matters (see 
below), but difficult does not mean impossible, and future challenges 
should be welcomed and pursued rather than pushed aside because 
they are difficult. While McGlone (1993, p. 28) ) views "as simplistic 
and inappropriate" the view that uses animals' perceptions of their 
own feelings to assess welfare, his suggestion "that an animal is in a 
state of poor welfare only when physiological systems are disturbed to 
the point that survival or (my emphasis) reproduction are impaired" 
seems to be far more simplistic, rather na:ive, and too permissive. 
Further, McGlone offers that "if welfare is compromised, we should be 
able to measure changes in health by measuring changes in reproduc-
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tive health, immune function or brain function" (p. 31) . And, "If one 
accepts the end point of suppressed physiology as the best measure, 
then there is no need to measure behavior" (p. 35) . McGlone fails to 
account for the fact that the situations to which animals can be sub­
jected before either survival or reproduction are impaired can include 
many that would certainly compromise their well-being. Many ani­
mals can survive in horrendous conditions that most would character­
ize as abusive. Furthermore, McGlone ignores the plethora of data that 
demonstrate clearly that it is possible to get a good grasp on individual 
animal's points of view about their perceptions of their worlds (see 
below) and that this information can be a reliable indicator of their 
well-being. McGlone also claims that there is little difference between 
"feeling a little poorly" and "feeling hungry (something we all nor­
mally feel from time to time)" (p. 26) but he doesn't tell us why this is 
so. Fortunately, his seems to be the only view among those who have a 
say about the treatment of nonhuman animals in which the utility of 
using behavioral criteria for assessing animal feelings and well-being is 
flatly rejected (see references above and also other essays in Baumgardt 
and Gray, 1993 and Mench and Stricklin, 1993) . 
WELL-BEING, DOMESTICATION, FIDELITY, AND CAPTIV E 
RRFEDTNC:· 
"Domestic animals are creations of man. They are living arti­
facts."  "They have been bred to docility, tractability, stupidity, and 
dependency. It is literally meaningless to suggest that they be liber­
ated." Callicott (1980/ 1989, p. 30) 
I begin with the premises that all individuals are morally important 
and that they should always receive respect in our dealings with them 
(below I will develop more fully the view that well-being should be 
naturalized and individualized) . Given the broad scope of this meet­
ing, I want to consider a question that often arises in discussions of 
well-being, namely, "Should wild animals be assigned a different, 
usually higher, moral status than domestic animals?" Those who 
maintain that domestic animals do have different claims on our moral 
responsibilities than do their wild counterparts usually present a more 
relaxed standard of conduct for domesticated animals. Callicott (1980/ 
1989, p. 30) writes that "Domestic animals are creations of man. They 
are living artifacts, but artifacts nonetheless, and they constitute yet 
another mode of the extension of the works of man into the ecosystem" 
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(see also Katz, 1993) . Callicott also believes that domestic animals 
(all?) have been bred to be stupid, but he gives no indication of what 
measures he uses and fails to realize that just because animals do 
things in ways that may seem stupid to us, this is no reason to demean 
them as they adapt to their own needs and their own worlds. [I would 
argue that there are no stupid animals, only, perhaps, narrow-minded 
humans who do not take the time to learn more about the animals who 
they call stupid. As Szentagothai (1987, p. 323) notes, "There are no 
'unintelligent' animals; only careless observations and poorly designed 
experiments." ]  
According to Howard (1993, p. 234-235) "Domestic species are geneti­
cally programmed to depend upon humans for their safe existence 
and, fortunately, they always die relatively humanely rather than 
suffering one of nature's brutal deaths" (for reply see Bekoff and 
Hettinger, 1994) . Since these animals may live longer, have a higher 
quality of life, and die less painfully than do wild animals (and would 
not have been born if not wanted), Howard (1993, p. 235) concludes 
that animal research actually "produces an improvement of life for 
some individuals of these species" and that "responsible killing of 
sentient animals can be a sacred act when done in behalf of nature's 
laws" (Howard, 1994, p. 202; for references to those who take similar 
views made without any empirical support see Bekoff and Jamieson, 
1995) . Howard obviously is confused when he equates what he takes 
to be a "law of nature," nature's (supposed) death ethic, with a moral 
law about how we should act. Howard (1994, p. 202) also claims that 
"From a humane point of view, there is no question that the lucky 
animals are those that are killed by people, whether it be by humane 
slaughter, a hunter, a car accident, or euthanasia by a humane organi­
zation or researcher." Besides the fact that many animals can suffer 
greatly before dying due to different sorts of human intervention, 
Howard's unargued assertion can easily lead to the absurd conclusion 
that if people really want to be humane, we should slaughter all wild­
life before they die one of nature's cruel deaths. Greenough (1992, p. 9) 
goes as far as to claim "In fact, it is very rare for research animals to be 
subjected to significant amounts of pain. For most animals, life in the 
laboratory is considerably more comfortable than for their counter­
parts in the wild." This is a highly dubious claim (see below for fur­
ther discussion of how appeals to the supposed brutality of nature are 
used justify how animals are treated by humans, and also Comstock, 
1988, for a discussion of where such views might lead) . Sagoff (1984, p. 
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303) claims that "Mother Nature is so cruel to her children she makes 
Frank Perdue look like a saint." Common use of the words "cruel" 
and "kind" suggests moral agency (for further discussion of cruelty to 
animals and moral agency, see Rowan, 1993). But, nature cannot be 
cruel nor kind (other than metaphorically), as she/he is not a moral 
agent ( see below). 
Colwell (1989, p. 33) does not appeal to the brutality of nature to justify 
the different treatment of domesticated animals. He maintains that 
"Our moral responsibility for the appropriate care of individual organ­
isms in agriculture, zoos, or gardens does not depend on whether they 
are wild or domesticated in origin . . .  " But, he also writes: "I contend, 
however, that the role of domesticated species as coevolved members 
of our ancestral component community . . .  places them in a biologi­
cally and ethically distinct class from 'wild' species." Colwell's view 
seems difficult to implement. For it is very difficult to reconcile our 
having the same moral responsibilities to individuals, regardless of 
their origins, who, when lumped together with other similar individu­
als, are then placed in an ethically distinct class. Why does an indi­
vidual domesticated dog, when viewed as a member of a domesticated 
species, deserve different consideration than the same individual 
domesticated dog when considered alone? Certainly, Fido does not 
suffer less if he is viewed as a member of a class of animals then if he is 
viewed as an individual. After all, domestic animals can and do expe­
rience pain and suffer, and there is no evidence that their pains or 
sufferings are very different or less than those of at least closely related 
wild relatives. I doubt that Fido suffers less (or much differently) than 
a wild wolf after he is bitten in a fight with another dog. If humans 
have special moral relationships with domesticated individuals, what 
are they? Perhaps domesticated animals actually suffer more psycho­
logically than their wild counterparts when their expectations are not 
met in their interactions with humans (Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991). As 
L. E. Johnson (1991, p. 122) notes: "Certainly it seems like a dirty 
double-cross to enter into a relationship of trust and affection with any 
creature that can enter into such a relationship, and then to be a party 
to its premeditated and premature destruction." This sort of double­
cross may undermine our own status as moral agents. 
Taylor (1986, pp. 179ff) makes a similar claim in his rule of fidelity for 
wild animals that states that we should remain faithful to the trust that 
we bring forth in them, trust that is shown by their behavior, and not 
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deceive them by misusing this trust. Some field workers, do indeed, 
believe that the animals who they study come to trust them. For ex­
ample, Jane Goodall (1994, p. 20) claims that her relationships with the 
chimpanzees she intensively studied "can best be described as one of 
mutual trust." Trust and expectations of certain types of behavior on 
the part of animals are brought forth by the ways in which humans 
have interacted with them in the past, and not, of course, by some form 
of mutual agreement. In this sense, trust might be extended to the 
community of humans and not necessarily to single individuals. 
Taylor's rule of fidelity also can be applied to our interactions with 
domesticated animals and other individuals who are not wild, and in 
fact, there may be more (or at least equally) compelling reasons to 
apply it more rigorously to companion animals and those individuals 
in captivity then to wild individuals because the former individuals 
might have considerably more contact with humans and form close 
relationships from which some form of trust would be more likely to 
develop ( see below and Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991). 
Fidelity and trust are difficult and very important notions, and there is 
a lot of work to be done in applying and extending Taylor's principle 
in ways that might be very useful to those interested in individual 
well-being. For example, possible connections between the notions of 
trust and deception are complicated. What does it mean to trust an­
other individual, is trust a necessary condition for deception, and are 
there individual (and perhaps species) differences with respect to 
possible cognitive components of trusting and being able to be de­
ceived? If trusting suggests at least being able to take something to be 
the case and being deceived involves having to discover that it is not 
the case even immediately before an event that breaches trust, then 
there might be problems in linking trust and deception. For there 
could be situations in which an individual comes to trust a human(s) 
and then is deceived without his knowing that it is happening. Is this 
a case of deception? I think so. If an individual animal does indeed 
build up a trusting relationship with a human (or humans), and if that 
human or another human then does something to harm the animal, 
something new and surprising, then the animal has been deceived 
whether she knows it or not, and this is, indeed, a double-cross. 
Discussions of moral relationships with different types of individuals 
generates a number of questions that demand close scrutiny. First, we 
need to know at what point wild individuals become domesticated 
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individuals. Domestication is an evolutionary process and usually a 
slow one. Bostock (1993, p. 186) believes that "the well -adjusted zoo 
animal is slightly domesticated," but this begs the question of when we 
have a case of domestication. It is important to emphasize that there is 
a difference between an individual who is socialized and one who is 
domesticated, although the ability to form social relationships with 
humans is in many cases important in the process of domestication. A 
wolf in captivity may be socialized, but does not become domesticated 
during his lifetime. Assuming for the moment that the ancestors of 
domestic dogs were wolves and also that some of the effects of domes­
tication can be changed over time ( e.g. that de-domestication can 
occur; for discussion see Daniels and Bekoff, 1989), we also can ask 
what characteristics of wolves were changed to justify calling wolves 
dogs, and when is enough of whatever it is to be a wolf lost in captiv­
ity so that we no longer have a wolf in captivity, but rather some com­
bination of wolf and domestic dog, say a "dolf": is a wolf in the wolf 
woods in some zoo no longer a wolf (e.g. Shapiro, 1989; Jamieson, this 
volume, considers a question that is closely associated, namely is there 
really a dualism between captive and wild animals, and notes that 
perhaps the important question is not whether these sorts of views are 
untenable, but rather what can we learn by making these distinctions)? 
And if a wolf in the wolf woods in some zoo is no longer a wolf, are we 
then being fair in telling people that they are viewing a wolf? 
It is also important to ask questions such as is being able to hunt for 
her food as well as starving necessary for a wolf to live a wolf's exist­
ence? My and others' ideal of wildness says "yes," but perhaps this is 
not to be fair to individuals. (Appeals to nature's supposed brutality 
are relevant here; see below). Comstock's (1988) response to those who 
claim that because most animal pain occurs in the wild, and because 
those interested in animal rights must always prevent animal pain they 
must implement programs including providing contraceptive care so 
that fewer individuals will suffer in the wild, adopting wild animals as 
pets, heating dens, punishing cats who eat mice, and turning parks 
into climate controlled comfort zone, captures the essence of my view. 
Comstock argues that although events in nature do harm individuals, 
wild animals have "little interest in being adopted as pets," and that 
"Even on the strictest utilitarian calculus, being restrained, caged, and 
intensively managed, would cause wild animals a greater balance of 
pain over pleasure than freezing to death under normal conditions" (p. 
178). Further, he notes it often is very difficult to get formerly wild 
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individuals to reproduce even .in the comforts of captivity. 
A related question is "Is it ever justified, and if so under what condi­
tions, to bring wild animals into captivity?" Associated with this 
question is concern for the well-being of those who have to be killed to 
feed others in captivity. Bostock (1993, p. 99) notes that killing indi­
viduals for food "is regrettable but unavoidable if carnivores are to 
kept. As they need meat, there is no additional moral problem in 
killing chickens or rats or rabbits in a zoo . . .  " While he realizes that 
we do have obligations to these individuals who are to be killed to 
serve as fuel for others, perhaps having to kill some individuals so that 
others will live is yet another reason not to maintain certain animals in 
captivity. Furthermore, there are additional moral problems, for just 
because carnivores need meat and kill other animals in the wild, this 
does not justify our killing others for them or our allowing them to kill 
other animals for food. 
The most frequently cited reason for bringing animals into captivity is 
to preserve endangered species by allowing individuals to live in a 
protected environment that will facilitate breeding and maintaining the 
species' gene pool ( for a review of some programs see Wiese et al., 
1993). It is sometimes said that the goal of these programs is the even­
tual return of these animals to the wild, to reintroduce them to areas 
where they one lived before they were exterminated (usually directly 
or indirectly by humans), or to place them in new areas where it is 
hoped they will thrive. However, in some cases, as for black rhinos, it 
appears that keeping animals in small, guarded sanctuaries is the best 
way to preserve them for return to the wild might be perilous (Berger 
and Cunningham, 1994). 
It is necessary to ask whether or not reintroduction or the perpetuation 
of endangered species should be our goal and if so, what are we doing 
to the lives of individuals who we use in these practices. Of course, 
once animals are taken into captivity or maintained in captivity, we are 
obligated to provide for their individual well-being and to maintain or 
restore suitable habitat into which they (or, as is often the case, other 
members of their species) can be reintroduced. While I am all for 
reintroduction and the the perpetuation of endangered species in some 
instances, I do not think that these should be goals that are blindly 
sought. Rather, the many serious issues, philosophical and practical, 
that are confronted must be dealt with in an informed way. Further-
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more, an appreciation and understanding of the historical aspects of 
human-animal relationships needs to be factored into policy decisions 
(e.g. Dunlap, 1988). It may turn out that in some cases it would be 
wrong to try to regain what was lost. Among the serious philosophical 
questions involved here are "Do animals have a right to liberty?" "Do 
species have interests?" "Can the well-being of individuals be sacri­
ficed in the interests of species?" Are individuals better dead than 
captive bred (Lindburg, 1994)? (For references see Bekoff and 
Jamieson, 1995, from which part of this discussion is taken.) So that we 
do not waste limited resources (e.g. time and money) that unfortu­
nately greatly influence our efforts to protect individuals who are 
endangered, we also need to have precise measures for what it means 
to be endangered and if and why the situation has arisen; these data 
are frequently hard to obtain (Hayes, 1991). 
It is noteworthy that some of the most virulent critics of captive breed­
ing programs are the scientists themselves who are devoting or have 
dedicated their lives to these efforts and who sincerely want them to 
succeed. To quote George Schaller (1993, pp. 233-234): "The realization 
that the panda has so suffered and declined in numbers while we 
chronicled its life burdens me painfully. Enthusiasm and goodwill 
count for little when the enemy is a vast bureaucracy of local officials 
who myopically use obstruction, evasion, outdated concepts, activity 
without insight, and other tragic efforts to avoid central-government 
guidelines and create ecological mismanagement on a dismaying 
scale." And, with respect to what he calls the "rent-a-panda" program, 
Schaller writes (p. 249): "The politics and greed, coupled with the 
shameful indifference to the panda's welfare that has characterized 
much of the rental business, will not vanish." Peterson (1989) also is 
skeptical of captive breeding programs, and focuses on the Species 
Survival Plan for Siberian tigers. He notes that at the time of his writ­
ing extant groups of captive Siberian tigers were "poorly distributed in 
terms of sex ratio and age structure" (p. 301), and that only a few 
individuals could actually be allowed to breed and that others might 
have to "be removed-probably killed ( or, to use the preferred expres­
sion, 'euthanized')" (p. 301). Peterson also stresses that the ultimate 
goal of most captive breeding programs, the return of endangered 
animals to the wild, will probably never be attained. 
Rabinowitz (1991) also is uncertain about many captive breeding 
programs because "They provide no comprehensive management of 
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captive populations and no follow-up programs to reintroduce the 
young to the wild" (p. 165). Furthermore, he points out that "the 
proper techniques of reintroduction are rarely used." Schaller (1993) is 
critical of attempts that entail "rescuing" pandas for purposes of pro­
tecting them and developing breeding stock. He notes the deplorable 
conditions at one research center and explains that "The panda rescue 
work, a legacy of the 1983 bamboo die-off, continued well into 1987, 
long after there was any justification for it" (p. 223). He asserts that " . 
. . if most of those that were rescued after the bamboo die-off were 
given their liberty they would perhaps replenish the forests" (p. 224). 
Here there is some tension between rescuing animals who might other­
wise have starved to death because of the lack of food, and helping 
them along so that they might be used to replenish wild populations. 
It is important not to deny the extreme importance of the goals of 
captive breeding programs whose goals go beyond mere breeding. 
Despite the logistical and financial difficulties with implementing a 
captive breeding and reintroduction program, Rabinowitz (1991, p. 
166) concludes: "No price can be put on saving even a single species 
that might otherwise have been lost. However, a half-hearted or hap­
hazard and incorrect approach is both a waste of resources and a 
source of potential harm to the animals involved" (see also Berger, 
1994). Given the fact that many experts are extremely skeptical of 
attaining the goals of captive breeding, specifically for establishing 
healthy and self-sustaining animal populations that can be successfully 
reintroduced to the wild, we need to reassess what we are doing and 
why we are doing it ( for related discussion of some problems concern­
ing the persistence of populations and other theoretical and practical 
issues, see Mangel and Tier, 1994 and Caughley, 1994, and for a discus­
sion of whether or not it is possible to restore natural environments 
that have been degraded by humans see Elliot 1994). It is not clear that 
"more is better." Personal attitudes, including human short­
sightedness and greed, inform views on this controversial subject 
(Berger, 1994). 
NATURALIZING AND INDIVIDUALIZING THE CONCEPT OF 
WELL-BEING: 
The complex of modalities which may influence pain, percep­
tion, and the differences that may occur in individual expression, mean 
that pain must be evaluated on an individual animal basis." (Rose and 
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
80 
Adams, 1989, pp. 63-64) 
" . . .  it is justified to keep animals in captivity for the ultimate 
benefit of their species-provided their short-term welfare is also at­
tended to." (Tudge, 1992, p. 29; my emphasis) 
By the phrase "naturalizing well-being" I mean that in the best of all 
possible worlds-and I recognize that this might not be the best of all 
possible worlds-well-being is at its highest for individuals who are 
allowed to live their own kinds of natural lives in the wild ( or what 
remains of the wild), as far away as possible from the numerous and 
pervasive intrusions of humans (e.g. habitat destruction, the introduc­
tion of alien species that kill off native species, and sport-hunting). 
While different criteria for assessments of well-being may have to be 
used for wild individuals, for wild individuals who are captured and 
maintained in captivity, for those individuals born in captivity but who 
would have lived the life of a wild animal if their parents had not been 
taken captive, for the offspring from frozen zoos, and for domestic 
animals, naturalizing and individualizing well-being is consistent with 
attempting to prevent individuals in the wild and those animals in 
various forms of captivity from being (further) exploited by humans. 
But regardless of the type of individual involved, it is individual char­
acteristics that count in assessments of well-being and determination of 
the treatment to which one is exposed, and not the species to which an 
individual is assigned (Rachels, 1990; Bekoff and Gruen, 1993). As 
Jamieson (1994) notes, it is misleading to talk about the well-being of a 
species; it is individual organisms who are the focus of concerns about 
well-being. For example, sex, age, reproductive status, sensory abili­
ties, motor capacities, and are among those variables that may inform 
the assessment of an individual's well-being. I realize that because 
wild animals often experience pain and suffering in their natural habi­
tats that can be decreased due to human intervention, my naturalized 
view of well-being can be at odds with positions that stress the impor­
tance of preventing harm to individuals ( for further discussion see 
below and also Comstock, 1988). But, we may bring more pain and 
suffering to individual lives by taking individuals into captivity than by 
leaving them in the wild, though there may be different sorts of pains 
and sufferings in each location. 
An emphasis on individual differences is consistent with the impor­
tance that evolutionary biologists, following Darwin, place on indi­
vidual variation and differential reproduction. But, many have not 
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learned the moral lessons that stem from Darwin's views (Rachels, 
1990). It is important that individual variation, while difficult to deal 
with, is not dispensed with as mere noise; normative, say, species-level 
biology, may have its place in some endeavors, but not, on my view, 
when questions concerning well-being are at issue. It might be that an 
individual who is used for a particular purpose, say in a research 
project, might not be representative of her species' norm. An indi­
vidual may have been chosen because they are more easily trapped, 
more tractable, more tame, less healthy, or because of age and sex 
differences in these or other characteristics. Data collected on a large 
number of individuals should aid us in establishing some range of 
what we might call species-typical behavior when and if this informa­
tion is needed. With respect to how animals are studied, one impor­
tant aspect of emphasizing individuals is that giving them names, 
perhaps based on their individual personalities ( or "animalities") will 
also allow us to develop close bonds with them, bonds that many feel 
are inevitable and bonds that can help us in our research endeavors 
( for discussion see Davis and Balfour, 1992 and Bekoff, 1994c). 
With respect to the fact that cognitive skills are often used in assess­
ments of well-being, it should not surprise anyone that strong interests 
in the importance of individual differences leads many to be wary 
about the use of cognitive skills for informing the differential treatment 
of groups, especially species, of animals. Consider, for example, the 
phenomenon of what some call "self-awareness" or "self-recognition, a 
characteristic that often is used in in discussions of well-being. Claims 
that some apes, taken together as different species are able to recognize 
themselves in mirrors, whereas other apes and monkeys are not 
(Gallup, 1982; Povinelli, 1993) are certainly premature. In fact, only a 
few individuals representing different species have been studied, only 
a few apes have actually mastered the task set before them, only a few 
monkeys have been tested, and, of great importance, there are many 
serious methodological and interpretational problems that are still 
being hotly debated by experts in the field (Rollin, 1989; Platt, Thomp­
son, and Boatright, 1991; Swartz and Evans, 1991; Mitchell, 1993a,b; 
Heyes 1994; Parker, Mitchell, and Boccia, 1994). As Heyes (1994) notes, 
the results of primate mirror experiments may not have been subjected 
to critical scrutiny because they are consistent with assumptions about 
the evolution of intelligence ( for similar discussion about imitation 
tests see Whiten and Ham, 1992). Heyes concludes (p. 917) that "If 
similar experiments had been claimed to indicate that clams and toads, 
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or even cats and monkeys, were unique among non-human animals in 
possessing a self-concept, then they may have been viewed more 
critically." Few would disagree that many more data are needed on a 
wider variety of animals, and few would disagree that we really need 
to work out just what are the possible connections between the ability 
to perform self-directed movements in a mirror and the type of treat­
ment to which an individual should be subjected. The important 
question is whether or not these differences. even if they exist. are 
morally relevant differences? 
Clearly, individualizing well-being raises a lot of important problems. 
To be sure, it places a burden on those who want to argue that there 
may be situations when it is permissible to override an individual's 
well-being for the well-being of another individual or individuals. For 
example, reintroduction programs are often grounded in our decision 
to right a wrong-individuals of certain species were treated in such a 
manner that their species became endangered, and now we decide, for 
a variety of reasons, to correct this situation by trying to reintroduce 
individuals to areas where they one lived or by transporting individu­
als to areas where they can now survive. In order to reintroduce some 
individuals, other individuals will have to make sacrifices such as 
being held in captivity. However well-intentioned are the people who 
want to do this, it is not clear to me that this is a "good" thing to do or 
if the world will be a "better" place if these sorts of programs are 
pursued and if some are successful. Certainly, one could argue that it 
is not a "good" thing to do for any single individual animal whose life 
would otherwise have continued to be typical of that of her kind. This 
is not to say that I am against reintroduction studies in all instances, 
nor that I think that the world would be "better" off if we did not try to 
help animals in some instances. (The words "good" or "bad" and 
"better" or "worse" have to be used very carefully in these delibera­
tions, and it is probably better if they are ,not used at all.) From the fact 
that I might miss having certain species in the wild, one cannot assume 
that this makes my life bad or worse for me. Certainly, if some 
individual's lives have been taken to make other individual's lives 
possible, then this reduces greatly the possible good that might come 
out of having survivors back in the wild. Human interests should not 
be the locus of concern, for first and foremost, we need to think about 
the animals involved and the worlds in which they live. 
My dog. your dog. or the last wolves: "Pets" and partiality. If my 
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position also commits me to some other views with which I would 
disagree it is because I have not fleshed out all possible extensions . 
These are very difficult issues with many unforeseen implications, the 
discussion of which requires informed interdisciplinary input 
(Shrader-Frechette and McCoy, 1993, 1994a,b; Hettinger, 1994) . For 
example, Ned Hettinger often asks me the following question, one that 
entails serious consideration of many of the issues being discussed in 
my paper and at this conference: If I am driving my car down the road 
and either have to hit and instantaneously kill the last wolf on earth or 
my companion dog, Jethro, who would I choose to kill? (He also 
presses me with the question of who should I kill and my answer 
doesn't change given my relationship with Jethro.) My answer always 
is that I would choose to kill the last wolf. Nonetheless, I often ask 
myself, am I wrong to make this choice even after thinking about it, am 
I too self-centered, what about the fact that there are many other dogs 
but there will then be no future wolves? Regardless, there also will 
never be another Jethro; he is a special friend, he is near and dear to 
me, and he means more to me than any other animal, including the last 
wolf (who if not pregnant, will never produce more wolves anyway) . 
This friendship makes it impossible for me to be impartial (see also 
Jackson, 1991 and Friedman, 1993) .  Of course, there are many ques­
tions that require further discussion beyond this essay, such as what if 
the last wolf was, indeed, pregnant, or what if there was a group of 
wolves, or what if the choice involved another domestic dog who I did 
not know. My answer remains that I would still choose to save Jethro's 
life. While, I am really not sure what I would do if Jethro was not 
involved, but rather another dog, if the dog was one who I knew, and I 
also knew that she had a caring human looking after her, then I might 
very well spare the dog. These really are difficult issues with seem­
ingly endless routes and destinations ! An extension of Taylor 's (1986, 
pp. 179ff) rule of fidelity might help us here (see above), although he is 
an impartialist. Also, consideration of the literature on friendship and 
partiality in moral decisions would be useful (e.g. Fried, 1970; Blum, 
1980; Badhwar, 1993; Friedman, 1993) for many similar questions are 
raised. 
Interference and appeals to nature's supposed brutality: Now, what 
about other types of interference in the lives of wild animals (for fur­
ther discussion see Sapontzis, 1984, 1987; Taylor, 1986, pp. 173ff; 
Rolston, 1988)? While they may be confronted with situations that 
bring them pain and suffering such as disease, predation, and aggres-
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sion, except in unusual circumstances (see below for some possible 
examples and also Taylor, 1986, pp. 173ff, 264ff)) wild animals should 
not be interfered with. According to Taylor's (1986, pp. 173ff) "rule of 
noninterference," humans have a duty "to let wild creatures live out 
their lives in freedom" (p. 174) because intrusions into "the domain of 
the natural world . . .  terminates an organism's existence as a wild 
creature" (p. 175). While it may seem that a wolf in captivity is better 
off than a wolf in the wild who is starving, starving due not to human 
interference but because of natural cycles of prey or because she is a 
subordinate individual, once even a starving wolf is brought into 
captivity she remains a wolf only in name-she is no longer a wolf in 
the sense of a being who lives a typical wolf's life. Also, we may bring 
more pain and suffering to their lives by taking them into captivity 
than they would endure in the wild-though there may be different 
sorts of pains and sufferings in each location. I don't think we have to 
be do not have to be apologists for nature. Thus, for example, we 
should not accept Howard's ( 1993, 1994) claim that the quality of 
animal lives is superior in human culture than in wild nature. For 
example, with rare exceptions the life of a tiger is not improved by 
putting him in a zoo. Although his food will be provided for him, 
hunting has a played a large role in the evolution of tigers and is essen­
tial to a tiger's way of life. His movement will also be severely re­
stricted, and for animals who typically roam in search of food and 
shelter, captivity produces an impoverished existence. Furthermore, it 
is not at all clear that captive animals live longer than their wild coun­
terparts or that they are healthier. Leigh (1994) reports that captive and 
wild anthropoid apes show considerable overlap in weight, and that 
there is a greater risk for captive males to suffer from obesity when 
compared to wild counterparts. 
Kirkwood (1992) presents a thoughtful essay on the well-being of wild 
animals and considers questions such as whether we should intervene 
on behalf of free-living wild animals, and if so, to what extent and how 
it should be done. While he acknowledges that there are many differ­
ent views on the matter, he claims that "Most would probably agree 
that when wild animals are harmed by man's very recent ( in evolution­
ary terms) changes to the environment (such as oils-spills, power lines, 
roads, and environmental contamination) there is a reasonable case, on 
welfare grounds, to intervene" (p. 143). Kirkwood also writes about 
veterinary intervention to treat injured or sick wild animals He cor­
rectly calls for "an international code on intervention for wildlife 
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welfare to provide guidance on ethics, methods and standards" (p. 
151). While I cannot explore these issues in depth, I do believe that 
there are circumstances in which humans may have to intervene in the 
lives of wild animals, including some of those listed above (see also 
Schaller, 1993). One also needs to give serious consideration to the 
idea that if any experimental manipulation, including the mere pres­
ence of researchers, leads to harm for either the target animal or ( indi­
rectly) for any individual, then we have the obligation to intervene on 
the animals' behalf. 
Further discussion is also needed concerning if and how appeals to the 
"ways of nature" bear on the morality of human treatment of other 
animals (Hettinger, 1994; Bekoff and Jamieson, 1995). Inferring what 
we should do from how nature acts is logically troubling, and superfi­
cial appeals to nature's brutality to justify the treatment of nonhumans 
(e .g., Grandin, 1992; Greenough, 1992; Lansdell, 1988) will not do. 
Crick (1994, p. 110) claims that "it is sentimental to idealize animals" 
and merely asserts that life in captivity is better ( longer and less brutal) 
for many animals than is life in the wild. Even more informed philo­
sophical stances (Rolston, 1989, p. 59) remain unconvincing. Rolston 
claims that "The wild animal has no right or welfare claim to have 
from humans a kinder treatment than in nonhuman nature." But he 
also notes that nature is not a moral agent and neither are animals­
"Even an alligator that eats humans is not being unfair or unjust . . .  " 
(p. 81). [Along these lines, it should be noted that a rare white Bengal 
tiger who recently killed a zookeeper at the Miami, Florida zoo, was 
not destroyed because "the tiger was just being a tiger" (Rocky Moun­
tain News, 7 June, 1994, p. 3A).] Here, we need to ask, who, if anyone, 
is being unkind in, say, a predatory encounter? Perhaps Rolston would 
have been more correct to use the word "better" rather than "kinder." 
Neither predators nor hurricanes are kind, but animals can be treated 
better or worse by predators or by hurricanes. Indeed, if we were to 
think of some animals as moral agents. we need to ask what sorts of 
capacities we would be attributing to them and how their possession 
would in turn influence our treatment of them. Further, do we really 
want an ethic that sanctions the treatment of animals by humans as 
long as it is better than what nature typically has in store for similar 
individuals? I think not. 
Another important and related question that arises frequently is 
whether human-caused pain in animals is less than or equal to what 
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the animal would experience in the wild, and if so, is it then permis­
sible to inflict the pain? For many animals it is difficult to know 
whether human-caused pain in animals is less than or equal to what 
the animal would experience in the wild, for we do not know how 
most individual animals in nature experience pain. Melodramatic 
claims such as Sagoff's in which Frank Perdue's cruelty is compared to 
that of Mother Nature's are vacuous; they just don't seem to have any 
force because of differences in moral agency between Mr. Perdue and 
Ms. Nature (but see Hettinger, 1994). We must be careful that appeals 
to nature's supposed cruelty are not just rationalizations for research­
ers doing what they really want to do on other grounds. They just 
might be caught in what Arluke (1993) calls a "guilt cage." 
What principles should we use as ethical guides? It seems that there 
needs to be more than one principle guiding our treatment of other 
animals given their diversity and given the variability of the situations 
in which we find ourselves confronting them: animals in the wild are 
different from animals who were once wild and are now in captivity 
(although not all animals in the wild or in captivity are the same), 
animals who were born in captivity and then placed back into the wild 
are different from animals were born in the wild and remain there, 
domesticated individuals are certainly different from their wild rela­
tives but the differences do not mandate differences in favoring wild 
animals. Most importantly, there are differences among individuals 
who are members of the same species, variations that seem more 
important in influencing how individuals are to be treated then are 
differences between animals who belong to different species. While it 
might sound "nice" (or correct) to proclaim that we should always 
reduce animal pain and suffering when we can, not only is this imprac­
tical, but as a guiding principle I find it to be one that is far too intru­
sive on animals in the wild who are able to live lives typical of their 
species, lives that might include being eaten, dominated, and gravely 
ill ( see also Comstock, 1988). Even if there are some instances in which 
we can justify our intrusion to relieve pain and suffering, deciding 
when it is appropriate to do so makes for terribly difficult decisions, 
and consistency among different people would certainly be 
unachieveable in terms of the circumstances in which they think they 
are justified in relieving pain and the species for which they show 
greatest concern. Personal views will certainly prevail-personal 
values are impossible to dispense with. Perhaps we should marvel at 
nature and not think that we can or should fix all of what some may 
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call nature's "wrongs." There is only so much that we can do and 
there seems to be no reason to expect that just because we could do 
something, we ought to do it. Furthermore, we must realize that for 
many or most of our intrusive activities, some individuals will benefit 
while others will not; we simply cannot please every individual even if 
wish to do so. 
One important question concerns if and how human interests in indi­
viduals and species can be brought together in a practical way that also 
is not narrowly prescriptive, such as, for example, speciesism may be 
(Singer, 1979; Ryder, 1992; Varner, 1994a,b; Donnelley, 1995; also see 
essays in Hargrove, 1992 and Zimmerman et al., 1993). Ryder (1992) 
offers the notion of painism, "the desire to reduce individual suffering 
in whatever creatures it happens to occur, human or nonhuman, terres­
trial or alien, natural or artificial" (p. 14), as a substitute for anthropo­
centric speciesism and as a motivation for a view of environmentalism 
that is closely aligned with animal welfarists' (usual) concern for 
individual's well-being. Certainly, the broadly applicable of painism 
may be more difficult to override than is speciesism. However, indi­
vidual-based painism does not mandate trading-off individuals for 
species, a trade-off that might be justified by appealing to some combi­
nation of utilitarianism, anthropocentrism, and biocentrism. Thus, 
Ryder (1992, pp. 14-15) writes : "The conservation of a species may also 
be important because the awareness of the existence of that species will 
give pleasure, in the future, to individuals members of our own spe­
cies. Furthermore, that species's continuation may help maintain the 
so-called balance of nature, and have little-understood and currently 
incalculable benefits for innumerable painient individuals of many 
species." Certainly, species are important, and they cannot be ignored 
(Midgley 1983; Ryder, 1992). But, even if it was possible to argue that 
in some cases species should be given preference to individuals, then 
deciding on what criteria to use presents very difficult problems. 
Using scales of life, intelligence (or stupidity), or the importance of 
individuality and sociality (Midgley, 1992) to differentiate among 
species is appealing, but presents many problems (Bekoff, 1992; see 
below). 
Peter. Paul. and Mary:_Many principles have been proposed that 
perhaps could guide us in our treatment of animals : utilitarian ones, 
rights-based ones, interests-based ones, and so forth. Using Peter, 
Paul, and Mary (Singer, Taylor, and Midgley, not Peter Carruthers nor 
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Peter Harrison) as our guides, and expanding their views, seems a 
good idea, though, of course, all have their critics. Scientists often 
operate on the basis of implicit principles and guidelines that are often 
not discussed. All of these principles need to be brought out into the 
open and explicitly debated. First and foremost in any deliberations 
about other animals must be deep concern and respect for their lives 
and for the worlds within which they live-respect for who they are in 
their worlds, and not respect motivated by who we want them be in 
our anthropocentric scheme of things ( see also Westra's, 1994 impor­
tant discussion of integrity). As Taylor (1986, p. 313) notes, a switch 
away from anthropocentrism to biocentrism, in which human superi­
ority comes under critical scrutiny, "may require a profound moral 
reorientation." So be it. 
COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY AND ANIMAL WELL-BEING" A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 
"Also, animals do not suffer as much mental trauma as people." 
Howard, 1994, p. 204) 
"If animals are to be denied reason (logos), and with it belief (doxa), 
then their perceptual content must be compensatingly expanded, to 
enable them to find their way around in the world." (Sorabji, 1993, p. 
7) Here I specifically and briefly address how cognitive ethology, the 
comparative and evolutionary study of cognition, consciousness, and 
the workings of animal minds, can inform discussions about animal 
well-being. As DeGrazia (1995) stresses: "Taking animals seriously 
requires taking their mental lives seriously." This topic has recently 
been reviewed in Bekoff (1994b ), and the reader is directed to this 
paper from which much of this discussion is taken, and also to 
Cavalieri and Singer (1993), Bekoff and Allen (1995), DeGrazia (1995), 
and Masson and McCarthy (1995) for more detailed arguments and 
numerous references. Naturalizing and individualizing animal minds 
means that I favor studies of animal cognition in conditions that most 
closely resemble those in which individuals have evolved or in which 
they currently reside in nature. After a few prefatory comments, I will 
limit myself here to discussing what may be called "not so cognitive" 
individuals. 
Sentience and cognition: Cognitive ethological investigations are 
relevant to animal well-being even if cognition and consciousness are 
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conceptually distinct phenomena. While there are occasions on which 
animals, including humans, who are able to be aware of their own and 
other's behavior and of their surroundings are not conscious of their 
own or other's behavior or of their surroundings but yet appear to 
process information, there are also situations in which certain cognitive 
abilities such as the attribution of mental states to others are difficult to 
explain without invoking consciousness (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and 
Whiten, 1988; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, 1992; Griffin, 1992; Dawkins, 
1993). 
At the start, I would like to make one thought clear-despite the close 
connection between cognitive ethology and animal well-being, follow­
ing Bentham (1789 /1948), the fundamental question that remains "is 
not Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" On this 
account, an individual's ability to experience pain (defined as a hetero­
geneous category of unpleasant sensory or emotional experiences of 
which the individual is aware; see Rose and Adams, 1989; Bateson, 
1991, DeGrazia and Rowan, 1991; and Orlans, 1993 for further discus­
sion) or to suffer ( to show unpleasant emotional responses to more 
than minimal pain or distress; see DeGrazia and Rowan, 1991) or to 
experience anxiety that may threaten one's well-being (DeGrazia and 
Rowan, 1991) provide more compelling reasons to grant her moral 
status and to treat her with respect than does her ability to perform 
actions that demand cognitive explanations-that she has memories of 
past events, is aware of her surroundings, has the ability to think about 
things that are absent, or can have beliefs or desires and be able to 
make future plans. This point needs to be stressed because at least at 
the moment it seems impossible to come up with any rigorous criteria 
that lead to the conclusion that specific cognitive abilities are morally 
relevant or should be valued more than others, that variations in cogni­
tive abilities among nonhumans or between nonhumans and humans 
make a difference in how individuals should be treated by humans 
(Johnson, 1983; see also R. and V. Routley, 1979). Certainly, nonhuman 
animals are different than human animals, but nonhumans can also be 
uniquely different from one another, and it is not at all clear that these 
differences must make a difference in the moral arena. It also is impor­
tant to note that an animal can suffer without feeling any physical sort 
of pain-anticipation of what is likely to happen can produce suffering 
(see above and Adams and Rose, 1989). 
There are many good reasons for adopting Bentham's position (Singer, 
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1990, Bowd and Shapiro, 1993), especially because of the strength of 
subjective assessments of how the behavior of individuals should 
inform decisions about their treatment (Bateson, 1991; Fraser, 1993; 
Mason and Mendl 1993; Wemelsfelder, 1993; see also Broom, 1993). 
Despite the emphasis on sentience rather than on individual cognitive 
abilities in assessments of well-being, it still is important to learn about 
animal behavior and animal cognition, for knowledge in this area will 
help to inform and motivate analyses of what types of situations, social 
and otherwise, might lead to pain, suffering, boredom, or frustration 
and how they may be prevented (Rollin, 1981/1992, 1989; Mineka and 
Cook, 1988; Snowdon, 1989; Bateson, 1991; Dawkins, 1990; Duncan and 
Poole, 1990; Singer, 1990; Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991; Duncan and 
Petherick, 1991; Mason, 1991a,b, 1994a,b; Fagen, 1992; Broom, and 
Johnson, 1993; Carlstead, Brown, and Strawn, 1993; Fraser, 1993; Jensen 
and Toates, 1993; Lawrence and Rushen, 1993; Terlouw, 1993; 
Wemelsfelder, 1993; Gibbons et al., 1994; Masson and McCarthy, 1995; 
but see McGlone, 1993). The work of Mason (199la,b, 1994a,b) on 
stereotyped behavior stands out as an example of what needs to be 
done, in the theoretical and practical arenas, for stereotypes are fre­
quently used in assessments of well-being but we really know little 
about them and generalizations across species are often specious. 
Those who study behavior and behavioral ecology in the field are in a 
good position to make important contributions to animal well-being, 
although unfortunately they often play only a minor role in informing 
legislation on matters of animal well-being (Cuthill 1991). Field work­
ers can help to provide guidelines concerning dietary requirements, 
space needs, the type of captive habitat that would be the most condu­
cive to maintaining the natural activity budgets of the animals being 
held captive, information on social needs in terms of group size and 
age and sex composition, and information about the nature of the 
bonds that are formed between animals and human researchers. 
Comparative analyses of sentience and cognition: More comparative 
data on animal cognition in a wide variety of individuals belonging to 
different taxa, especially those with which we are least familiar and 
those with which we do not identify. While Duncan (1993b, p. 8) 
believes that "it is only appropriate to consider the welfare of sentient 
animals such as vertebrates and higher invertebrates" (but he does not 
devalue "lower invertebrates"; see also Kellert, 1993), I propose that 
we expand our studies to include as many invertebrates as possible 
because of the possibility of learning about the evolution of sentience 
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and the existence of different types of cognitive skills (see also 
Lockwood, 1987); we should not be speciesistic cognitivists. Certainly, 
broad comparative and phylogenetic studies of sentience and cogni­
tion would be helpful in our attempts to draw lines and to avoid slip­
pery slopes concerning their presence or absence (or their possible 
continuity), a matter that Duncan (1993b, p. 9) admits "is still open to 
debate" at least with respect to sentience despite his placing phyloge­
netic limits on our concerns about well-being. As Orlans (1993, p. 152) 
points out, there is a lot of uncertainty concerning the phylogenetic 
distribution of pain and suffering, and there is a trend to include spe­
cies "lower on the phylogenetic scale, and this trend appears likely to 
continue." Such studies will also be helpful for for stressing that the 
word "animal" refers to individuals other than only "mentally normal 
mammals of a year or more" (Regan, 1983, p. 78). While Regan fully 
acknowledge� that he is using the word in this limited sense for 
economy of expression, and he notes that "important moral constraints 
also apply to our dealings with other animals . . .  " (p. 78), this ex­
tremely narrow (but qualified) use of the word "animal" can divert 
attention from the diversity of organisms with whom we share this 
planet and about many of whom we know little or nothing. Further­
more, Regan ignores the incredible amount of variation among differ­
ent mammals at one year of age. All one-year old mammals are not at 
the same comparable level of development (G. Mason, personal com­
munication). 
Although data on sentience and cognition-the subjective worlds of 
animals-are open to question because of the impossibility of ever 
knowing precisely what it is like to be another individual (Mason and 
Mendl, 1993), many rejections of the possibility of learning about 
animal sentience and cognition are based on an ignorance of available 
empirical data, the adoption of double-standards that require more 
rigorous scientific evidence for animal consciousness and animal 
cognition than are demanded for other scientific endeavors in which 
imprecision also abounds, a rejection of the use of anthropomorphic 
and anecdotal explanations, even their heuristic value, or are based on 
contentious philosophical issues. [Of course, many reports of animals' 
responses to novel situations that are often used to make claims about 
cognitive abilities, are anecdotal, in that they are not repeatable and 
and unquantifiable (DeGrazia, 1995). This is a problem for those who 
reject outright the use of anecdote (Bekoff, Townsend, and Jamieson, 
1994).] As Marian Dawkins (1990, p. 1) notes: "Let us not mince words: 
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Animal welfare involves the subjective feelings of animals." Thus, 
because cognitive ethologists do research that includes the study of 
subjective feelings in animals, it is important to know what cognitive 
ethologists do and something about the sources of resistance and 
support of cognitive ethology before relationships between animal 
minds and animal well-being can be discussed in an informed manner. 
Some interests of cognitive ethologists: Cognitive ethologists are gener­
ally interested in evolutionary and comparative studies of thought 
processes, consciousness, beliefs, and rationality in animals. They 
emphasize broad rather than narrow taxonomic comparisons and 
favor observations and experiments in conditions that are as close as 
possible to the natural environment where selection has occurred or in 
the habitats in which individuals currently reside; field studies of 
animals that include careful observation and experimentation can 
inform studies of animal cognition, and cognitive ethology will not 
have to brought into the laboratory to make it respectable. Careful 
attention is also given to the animals' own perceptual worlds, or 
iimwelts. The major problems that cognitive ethology faces are those 
that center on methods of data collection and analysis, and on the 
description, interpretation, and explanation of behavior (Bekoff and 
Jamieson, 1990, Jamieson and Bekoff, 1993). Cognitive psychologists, 
in contrast to cognitive ethologists, typically work on related topics in 
laboratory settings, and do not emphasize comparative or evolutionary 
aspects of animal cognition. When cognitive psychologists do make 
cross-species comparisons, they are generally interested in explaining 
different behavior patterns in terms of common underlying mecha­
nisms. Ethologists, in common with other biologists, are often more 
concerned with the diversity of solutions that individuals have found 
for common problems. 
Given their interest in the evolution of cognition, and following 
Charles Darwin's lead, cognitive ethologists (and many others) also 
pay attention to mental continuity between humans and other animals. 
For example, evolutionary biologists talk about the continuous evolu­
tion of organs such as hearts, lungs, kidneys, stomachs, and even 
brains. If brains are associated in some way with minds and thinking, 
then there is something to be gained by looking at possible continuity 
between human and animal minds and human and animal thinking . 
Can we really believe that humans are the only individuals with feel­
ings, beliefs, desires, goals, expectations, or the ability to think about 
things? Of course, this view does not mean that there is continuity 
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between all taxa, but it does mean that it would be wrong to look at 
continuity between structure and function in some systems and not in 
others. As Bateson (1991, p. 830) stresses, "it would be as irresponsible 
as it would be illogical to suggest that because continuities might not 
be found, they do not exist." Some go as far to suggest that the well­
being of humans depends on our not becoming further estranged from 
the natural world (see many chapters in Kellert and Wilson, 1993) . 
Issues about continuity can be become important in discussions of 
well-being. For example, by wrongly concluding that there are 
"higher" and "lower" species that are, respectively, conscious and 
unconscious (see Sacks, 1992), the way is paved for unjustified differ­
ential treatment. Indeed, the words "higher" and "lower" have fallen 
from grace among most scientists because they are far too difficult to 
define in any useful (or nonarbitrary or circular) way. R. and V. 
Routley (1979) have argued against the inevitability of human chauvin­
ism, that humans should place themselves in some moral arena apart 
from, and above, nonhumans. They analyzed over 30 characteristics 
(e.g. tool use, the ability to use and learn language, having a sense of 
shame, possession of consciousness, having a mental life, having 
interests, belonging to a social community) that often are used for 
justifying human chauvinism and showed why they fail for at least one 
of three reasons, including they are not "possessed by at least all prop­
erly functioning humans" (p. 39), they are possessed by some nonhu­
mans, and they are not "sufficient to justify, in a non-circular way, the 
cut-off of moral consideration at exactly the right point . . .  There must 
be some explanatory logical connection between the set of characteris­
tics and membership of the Moral Club" (p. 40). 
Clearly, cognitive ethology can inform questions concerning animal­
well being that center on consciousness, beliefs about and of things 
( intentional behavior), self-awareness, self-recognition, the evolution of 
cognitive skills, the importance of studying the social and the percep­
tual worlds (iimwelts) of the animals themselves, pain, suffering, and 
the importance of individual differences in decisions about well-being 
(Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991, Bekoff, 1993; Dawkins, 1993). Many who 
were silent in the past are paying more and more attention to ways in 
which the matters of mind inform matters of well-being (e.g. Dennett, 
1991, pp. 448-454; Griffin, 1992, p. 251, many chapters in Cavalieri and 
Singer, 1993). Indeed, Griffin (1992) considers ethics to be one of three 
major reasons to study animal mentality, the other two being philo-
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sophical and scientific. He also claims (p. 251) that "thoughtless cru­
elty is prevalent in some circles", but unfortunately does not tell us 
where. Byrne (1991, p. 47) goes as far as to claim that "If explorations 
of the minds of chimpanzees and other animals do nothing more than 
inform the debate about the ethics of animal use in research, the work 
will have been well worthwhile." 
It is esential that people who espouse positions on how animal cogni­
tion informs their views on animal well-being understand the theory 
and data from which they are drawing their conclusions; unfortu­
nately, this is not always the case for some biologists (e.g. Howard, 
1993, 1994) or some philosophers (e.g. Carruthers, 1989, 1992; Harrison, 
1991; Leahy, 1991; for discussion see E .  Johnson, 1991; Jamieson and 
Bekoff, 1992b; Pluhar, 1993a,b; Bekoff and Hettinger, 1994; Kirk, 1994) . 
For example, Leahy (1991) believes that one does not have to watch 
animals in order to learn about them (for review see Singer, 1992), and 
Harrison (1991) claims that pain has no survival value (but see 
Bateson, 1991 and Pluhar, 1993a,b) . Carruthers (1989, p. 265) asserts 
that "no one would seriously maintain that dogs, cats, sheep, cattle, 
pigs, or chickens would consciously think things to themselves," and 
that the experience of most nonhuman animals is nonconscious. Be­
cause only conscious experience is morally significant and because 
most animals have only nonconscious experience, it follows that the 
experience of most animals is without moral significance. Nonethe­
less, Carruthers does believe that many animals may experience pain 
and pleasure, and have beliefs, desires, and intentions, and yet be 
entirely nonconscious. Carruthers thought seem incoherent (Jamieson 
& Bekoff 1992a, Pluhar 1993a) . He presents no rational grounds for 
eradicating our moral sympathies for brutes, and subsequently he has 
become less strident about his former position: "I shall by-pass the 
position defended in Chapter 8, that the mental states of animals are 
non-conscious ones. For this is, at the moment, too highly speculative 
to serve as a secure basis for moral practice" (Carruthers, 1992, p. 194) . 
THE "NOT SO COGNITIV E" INDIVIDUAL 
If individual cognitive capacities are used for drawing lines along 
some arbitrary scale concerning what can and cannot be done to them, 
granting that an individual is conscious or capable of behaving inten­
tionally and having thoughts about the future (for example) can 
greatly influence the treatment to which he is subjected. Using the 
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word "stupid" to refer to domesticated animals (Callicott, 1980/1989, 
p. 30) when compared to their wild relatives, can certainly inform how 
one treats an individual. 
What might be some of the implications of discovering that some 
animals are "not all that cognitive"-that they have relatively impover­
ished cognitive abilities and lives or that they have fewer memories 
and fewer beliefs about the future? First, we would have to show that 
these so-called cognitive "deficiencies" are morally relevant. Some 
may want to argue that having a more impoverished life might be a 
morally relevant difference, but they can't have it both ways. If some 
individual's-human and nonhuman-cognitive lives are not as rich 
as other "more cognitive" individuals, the limited number of memories 
and expectations that the former individuals have may each be more 
important to them. Not allowing certain expectations to be realized is 
a serious intrusion on their lives, perhaps more serious than not allow­
ing some expectations in animals with richer cognitive lives to be 
realized. As Mendl (personal communication) notes, an animal with 
relatively undeveloped cognitive ability may not learn that she is to be 
fed at a certain time, and may spend the whole day dominated by 
feelings of intense hunger and anxiety for she cannot understand that 
she will eventually be fed; here too is an instance of where there may 
be suffering with no adverse physical pain. 
Furthermore, as some have argued, if the memories of some animals 
are not well-developed so that they live in the present and do not have 
the ability to know about the passage of time into the future, then_their 
pains have no foreseeable end. Thus, I might know that my compan­
ion Jethro's pain might end in 5 seconds, but he cannot know this on 
this account. Even if his sense of time is impoverished in comparison 
with that of a normal human, there don't seem to be any well-thought 
out arguments for the idea that animals totally lack a sense of time. 
They may only have notions of then, now, and later as evidenced by 
their reliance on past events (learning) to inform what they are now 
doing, and the performance of behavior patterns including building 
nests and caching food for future use, but they do have some sense of 
time. While it may be the case that some individuals experience a fear 
of future events, and this ability to anticipate the future is linked some­
how to their cognitive abilities, even if not-so-cognitive individuals 
cannot do this, a balance of some sorts is reached because they may not 
be able to know when something to which they are currently exposed 
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will end. 
Related to this line of reasoning is the observation that many animals, 
even those for whom we would be hard-pressed to suggest a rich 
cognitive life ( e.g. a lobster), take what are called self-regarding steps 
(Hannay, 1990, pp. 154ff); they seem to try to remove themselves from 
situations that they find aversive, situations that resemble those that 
normal human beings and other animals find aversive. Even if they do 
not imagine that there is something that is more pleasurable, and even 
if they are (some might say merely) removing themselves from a situa­
tion that is aversive, they seem to be showing some indication of dis­
pleasure and pain. Not being able to imagine a cooler future does not 
mean that they are not in pain when they are dropped into hot water. 
They are acting as if they do not like the situation in which they find 
themselves and they may be trying to remove themselves from it 
without having a subjective experience of pain or a thought about the 
future. Georgia Mason (1994, pp. 57-58) points out that there seems to 
be no good reason why self-awareness needs to be as a prerequisite for 
suffering, why "the (self aware) feeling 'I am suffering' [should] be 
considered worse than the (not self aware) 'Something truly terrible is 
happening1 11 [ for further discussion of some of these issues see 
Papineau (1993, chapter 4, especially pp. 116ff)]. 
Having a preference for cool water rather than hot water and having a 
preference to live are clearly different. Along these lines, DeGrazia 
(1991) claims that if a struggle for survival is not accompanied by a 
particular mental state, then it fails to reveal a preference to live. This 
claim forces the following issue: We must be sure that there is not a 
particular mental state, perhaps a mental state with which we are 
unfamiliar, that informs a preference shown by an animal who we 
think is "not all that cognitive", and we must remember that this 
remains largely an empirical question. It is possible that some animals 
experience pain and suffer in ways that we cannot yet imagine, and it 
would be wrong now to conclude that their responses to various 
stimuli do not count in decisions about their well-being, that they are 
similar to the various tropisms shown by plants. It is definitely pos­
sible that others who act nothing like we do when we feel pain never­
theless really do feel pain (Lewis, 1980; see also Papineau, 1993, pp. 
131££). Despite their shortcomings (Duncan, 1992, 1993), it is possible 
that preference tests that are developed for a broad spectrum of ani­
mals would help to shed some light on the phylogenetic distribution of 
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
97 
sentience (remembering also that possible relationships between sen­
tience and the having of preferences are complicated; Varner, 1990; 
Kaufman, 1994) . This is a challenge for the future because when ani­
mals do not do what we expect them to do or when they do nothing, it 
is possible that they are not motivated by the situation that we create­
there are as yet unknown factors that influence their behavior (Rozin, 
1976; Gallistel, 1980; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1993; Em; 1994) . 
SOME CONCLUSIONS: WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
"If we conclude that chimpanzees are conscious, we must then 
confront the ethics of our treatment of such animals in captivity and in 
the remaining wild." (Jolly, 1991, p. 231) 
"We take from them their freedom, their health, and often their 
lives. Surely the least we can do is try to provide them with some of 
the things that could make their imprisonment more bearable. "  
(Goodall, 1987, p .  577) 
"It don't make no sense that common sense don't make no sense 
no more." (John Prine, 1975) 
What do people interested in animal well-being need from cognitive 
ethologists? Details can be found in Bekoff (1994b ), but here are some 
suggestions . More data are needed. Broadly comparative studies 
emphasizing individuals in applied cognitive ethological analyses will 
be especially important. This will mean going beyond animals who 
look like humans or act like humans, extending our data base beyond 
those species with which we are most familiar, and thinking about the 
different sensory worlds of animals in which vision is not of great 
importance. Furthermore, we should not let how an animal looks 
inform whether or not she is in pain or suffering; we should not make 
these judgements by vision alone (Bekoff, 1976) . This will also mean 
developing an empathic feeling for the animals being studied (e.g. 
Moore and Hannon, 1993) .  Of course, we should be careful to note that 
data that bear on cognitive abilities may have little to do with pain and 
suffering. We also need to limit the number of animal who are used, 
but unfortunately, this apparently has not happened in studies of 
behavior (McConway, 1992; but see Hilts, 1994) . 
While the desire to learn as much as we can about the behavior of non-
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
98 
humans is laudable, studying animals in the laboratory and in the field 
intervenes in their lives, no matter how careful we are to tread lightly. 
Trapping animals, marking animals, doing playback experiments, and 
changing the size and composition of social groups, for example, can 
be extremely disruptive, and the highest of ethical principles must be 
adhered to in our efforts. That field biologists are concerned is re­
flected both in the published guidelines of many professional societies 
and in the practices of some field biologists (see, for example, Rollin, 
1989; Bekoff et al ., 1992; Bekoff, 1993, 1994d; Bekoff and Hettinger, 
1994; Clutton-Brock, 1994, p. 33; Laurenson and Caro, 1994) . Field 
researchers are able to study the behavioral effects of the techniques 
that are used to study wild animals to determine if there are behavioral 
changes that might influence the validity of the data that are collected 
(Bekoff, 1994d; Laurenson and Caro, 1994), and their subsequent use or 
misuse in decisions about how individuals are treated. In some cases it 
might be impossible to justify the costs of doing what needs to be 
done, and suitable alternatives will have to be developed or some 
research questions might have to go unanswered for the time being. 
(On my campus, many people were greatly disturbed because prairie 
dogs were killed so that a greenhouse could be built; Hilliard, 1992.) 
Careless and premature line-drawing, especially for generalizations 
about the behavior of species should be discouraged. With with re­
spect to cognitive abilities, it also needs to be decided if there are 
morally relevant differences in cognition and, if so, why we think this 
is the case. DeGrazia (1991) and Rachels (1990) emphasize, a difference 
between individuals that justifies one sort of difference in treatment 
might be irrelevant in justifying another difference in treatment. 
For me and some others, the bottom line is that when uncertain about 
the possibility of an individual's sentience, we should err on her side. 
Dennett (1991, pp. 451-452) agrees, but is more guarded. He writes: 
But in the absence of positive grounds for imputing suffering, or posi­
tive grounds for suspecting that such positive grounds are for one 
reason or another systematically concealed, we should conclude that 
there is no suffering. 
We need not fear that this austere rule will lead us to slight our fellow 
creatures. It still provides ample ground for positive conclusions: 
Many, but not all, animals are capable of significant degrees of suffer-
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ing. A more persuasive case in support of humane treatment can be 
mounted by acknowledging the vast differences in degrees, than by 
piously promulgating an unsupportable dogma about the universality 
and equality of animal pain." 
Some possible problems with this perspective include questions such 
as: (1) What are "positive grounds for imputing suffering" or for sus­
pecting that they are concealed? (2) What is a "significant degree of 
suffering"? (3) How can we measure differences in degrees of suffer­
ing and are they morally relevant? 
David Hardy_(l990, p. 11) has concluded that a detailed exploration of 
problems associated with animal well-being " . . .  must be consigned to 
those who have independent sources of wealth, no family obligations, 
and a lamented shortage of concrete worries." I disagree: everyone 
needs to be concerned with the treatment to which nonhumans are 
subjected. We must not only think of the animals when it is convenient 
for us to do so. Although the issues are at once difficult, frightening, 
and challenging, this does not mean they are impossible with which to 
deal. Certainly we cannot let the animals suffer because of our inabil­
ity to come to terms with difficult issues. While some countries are 
devoting a lot of effort to applied ethological studies that center on 
issues of animal well-being, others, including the United States, seem 
to be lagging behind (Duncan, 1993a; see also Gavaghan, 1992) . 
In our deliberations about animal well-being and animal welfare, we 
must not forget that humans and other animals are all part of the same 
world, and that humans and animals are deeply connected at many 
levels of interaction. When things go awry in our interactions with 
animals, as they surely will, and animals are set apart from and inevi­
tably below humans, it seems certain that we will miss the animals 
more than the animal survivors will miss us. In many cases our intui­
tions are reliable guides; we don't need to be an Albert-Einstein or 
Schweitzer-to know that normal dogs, cats, wolves, monkeys, great 
apes, dolphins, rats, robins, goldfish, snakes, lizards, and many other 
animals, including many invertebrates, experience pain and are able to 
suffer as a result of different forms of human intervention. Anecdotes, 
anthropomorphism, common sense, sympathy and compassion, and 
hard scientific data all have an important place in our deliberations 
about the animals for whom we speak; none, taken alone, including 
science (Tarnas, 1991, pp. 354ff, Dupre, 1993), can deliver. This is not to 
be anti-science, for questioning science will make for better and more 
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responsible science ( e.g. Rose, 1992; Farnsworth and Rosovsky, 1993; 
Berger, 1994), and lessen the chance that mistakes of the past will be 
revisited. 
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BEKOFF DISCUSSION 
Rowan: Wittgenstein said that if lions could speak we would not be 
able to understand them. Do you agree or disagree with that state­
ment? 
Bekoff: I think lions can and do speak, but they speak "lionese" rather 
than English. Lions can teli us a lot about what they are feeling. I 
think we can have a general understanding of what it is they are trying 
to convey. Therefore I generally disagree with Wittgenstein's state­
ment, because I think the word "speak" is not appropriate. Perhaps 
communication would be a better choice. 
Rowan: It seems to me to be an important issue in terms of what one 
believes about the cognitive quality of an animal's life. Wittgenstein 
seems to be saying that they are so different from us that we could not 
develop any sort of emphatic connection of communication with them. 
Bekoff: I think that is a wrong assessment. Through watching or 
interacting with animals it is possible to connect with them. 
Lewis: I found Bekoff 's paper to be incredibly rich. If I were to re­
spond to every point that deserves response we would be here all day, 
therefore I have confined myself to points that I and other animal 
protection people and organizations feel are important in judging an 
animal's well-being. 
The first is the naturalizing and individualizing definition of well­
being, a definition which expressed my feelings in a much more articu­
late way than I had been able. Bekoff 's definition states that an animal 
should be able to live its natural life in the wild as far away from 
human intrusion as possible. In many cases this is not feasible, but is 
certainly an ideal for which we should strive. I find that to be a good 
working definition of what "wildness" is, for autonomy is an essential 
part of wildness. Bringing a wild animal into captivity and not allow­
ing it to make its own decisions does not make it a different animal, 
but decreases its wildness in some way. 
Human interest should not be the focus of concern with animals. We 
need to have concern and respect for who animals are in their own 
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world, not for who we want or wish them to be or what they signify to 
us . It is more intellectually honest to look at them as they are and try 
to understand who they are in their own world. 
Animals definitely possess cognitive ability. Anyone observing ani­
mals can see that they possess this ability. The history of our relation­
ship with animals has been discovering that they have abilities that we 
did not think they possessed; use of tools, forming societies, organized 
behavior, etc. We need to expiore these cognitive abilities in order to 
better understand the impact we have on animals when we have them 
in captivity so that we may prevent suffering. The fact that they may 
not express pain and suffering in ways that we can understand does 
not mean it does not occur. We do not have the knowledge to deter­
mine whether sea urchins suffer. If they exhibit adverse behavior to an 
invasive action I think it is a reasonable assumption that they can 
suffer. 
We should be testing a broad a biogentic net and exploring the sen­
tience and cognitive ability of as many species as possible. We need to 
look into invertebrates, lower vertebrates . For instance, I have a lot of 
trouble with fishing, believing it to cause suffering. We need to be 
aware of individual differences among those of the same species. One 
gorilla does not equal another gorilla. I am not denying the existence 
of common species characteristics, but asserting that we need to look at 
both species and individual characteristics in order to understand what 
is going on with a particular animal. I realize there are times when we 
are forced to make a fast policy decision without a lot of information. 
We never really have enough information but we must do the best we 
can. 
If we have question as to whether or not an animal is sentient we 
should go with the assumption that the animal is cognizant. If later 
determined otherwise we can change our policy, but we need to make 
that initial assumption of sentience in order to avoid suffering. 
Cognitive behavioral studies, as Bekoff said, are best performed in 
natural or wild conditions, for in this way we can best understand how 
the animal operates in its own world. Such knowledge will help us 
replicate the animal's natural environment to the maximum extent 
possible while in captivity. I understand that the behavior of zoo 
animals gives us insight into their well-being, but the focus should be 
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on what studies show us about their behavior in the wild. 
I myself have never believed that appeals to brutality of nature justify 
any of our actions towards animals, whether it is bringing them into 
captivity, displaying them for educational purposes, killing them for 
sport or for their fur. Such a defense does not work. Nature is not a 
moral agent. Humans are moral agents. When we impose our actions 
on animals it is our responsibility to act in as respectful and kind a 
manner as possibie. 
Although captivity may provide animals with respite from some types 
of problems it gives rise to other concerns, such as the loss of au­
tonomy. The problems raised in captivity may cause an animal suffer­
ing that we cannot comprehend. This concept is the reason that most 
animal protection agencies feel there are very few justifications for 
keeping an animal in captivity. The two justifications I think most of 
us would accept are the breeding and preservation of endangered 
species and education of the public about animals. Personal experi­
ence and other modes of knowledge are important additions to scien­
tific study but may lead to rampant anthropomorphism and total 
misunderstanding of animals. We also need to be aware of whose 
personal opinions we are using. For example, a lay person may think a 
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Although I use them myself, euphemisms such as "euthanasia" and 
"harvest" obscure what we are actually doing with animals, and it 
would be much more honest if we used the word "kill." 
Rowan: In terms of the sentience issue you raise; if one applies a heat 
stimulus to the feet of a human quadriplegic she will withdraw her 
foot, but feels nothing. There is no suffering or pain involved for the 
human in that situation. It is just a reflex. This is where the cognitive 
element, I think, demonstrates its importance. 
? :  How do you know they do not feel pain? 
Rowan: They report that fact. 
? :  Exactly. The problem is that an animal is not able to express that to 
you. 
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Rowan: I agree that the situation is difficult. However the fact that a 
sea anemone withdraws from a physical prod does not necessarily 
mean that it is suffering. Suffering is a very curious issue, a word we 
throw out very widely and broadly as if we are all clear as to its mean­
ing. I am not sure that we are. 
?: I agree, and there is much that we do not know about that realm. 
However we certainly know that some creatures suffer. Some make 
the argument that we have no way to be sure, therefore the whole 
principle should be set aside. Th.at is certainly not your argument. We 
know that cows and other animals feel pain, there can be no doubt. 
We should not let this contention swipe away the merits of the evi­
dence. 
McManamon: I have some of Terry Maple's comments regarding 
Bekoff's paper, and have interjected some of my own. Th.ere are many 
very thoughtful and important concepts in Bekoff' s paper, and both 
Maple and I agree that animals have cognitive ability and should be 
studied as much as possible. The most common concerns today focus 
on the well-being of animals in zoo collections and the wild, and we 
support the use of several measures, specifically behavioral observa­
tion, to evaluate the success. 
The ultimate goal of well-being is to save the lives of a population of 
animals. When you save a species you save a multitude of individuals. 
Zoo professionals must be concerned with individuals, but there are 
situations that require compromise or sacrifice of an element of an 
individual's well-being for the greater good of many, the population. 
Wherever possible we must strive to respect the rights of both indi­
viduals and species to achieve a win/win situation. 
The fundamental challenge for zoo professionals is time. In Rwanda a 
slow but steady encroachment of humans into gorilla habitat has been 
execrated in just a few days. Thousands of people are fleeing for their 
lives from cities into the countryside. Many of our actions are occa­
sioned by such emergencies or the rescue of individual animals. We 
often must act with incomplete information or inadequate time. We 
willingly debate the role of cognitive ecology in questions of well­
being and conservation, but life and death goes on while we await data 
and conclusions. Maple was trained for a life of academia but became 
immersed in the zoo world and international cultural perceptions. 
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Faced with the choice of debating theoretical issues here at the confer­
ence or formulating actions for a chaotic and imperfect wildlife situa­
tion, he rushed to aid the gorillas in Rwanda. I am certain that anyone 
else in this room would do the same. 
The well-being of wild gorillas depends on peace and goodwill among 
humans. By acting to protect their ecosystem we protect all creatures 
within it, including creatures with lesser powers of cognition. Maple 
and I recognize that cognitive animals are easier to protect. They are 
easier to discuss than to speculate about. So are the more beautiful and 
cuddly creatures. But we are equally concerned about those that are 
less gifted, reptiles being a case in point. We do not know the limits of 
their perceptions or intelligence but when faced with a rattlesnake 
roundup, a situation where the snakes are poisoned and the habitat is 
degraded for other species, the snake's cognitive abilities should be 
irrelevant as far as our willingness to defend the snake. By defending 
any class of wildlife we surely protect them all, even if only indirectly. 
Criminologists have discovered that children with a history of cruelty 
to animals often grown up to be violent to other humans. Intervening 
on behalf of a reptile today may save the lives of other species tomor­
row. In its educational mold a zoo teaches personal responsibility, 
empathy and love for animals. Hopefully this will inoculate the devel­
oping child against being neglectful or cruel later. The empathetic zoo 
teaches people to care about the well-being of wildlife. The sights, 
sounds and smells of an individual animal is a profoundly moving 
experience for a child. 
Bekoff reminds us that it is possible for animals and people to learn to 
trust one another. But the well-being concept promoted daily in the 
zoo is often done under conditions of distrust. Many animals learn to 
fear the veterinary staff and the discomfort that the veterinarian may 
cause by handling or separating the individual animal from the group, 
yet the work of the veterinarian directly improves the animal's overall 
well-being. The removal of a tumor causes pain that is significant and 
may last for some time, even if it is followed by a longer period of 
improved well-being. The cause and effect are unlikely to be perceived 
by the animal. Animals may distrust us and we may have to deliber­
ately double-cross them to issue a medication, but the eventual out­
come is beneficial for the animal. Trust is a wonderful thing, but often 
we must act in the absence of trust. Such relationships are similar to a 
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The fascinating questions raised in philosophy and cognitive ethology 
are worthy of study. However, world events such as poaching, war 
and habitat destruction continue to decline populations. Extinction is 
a likely outcome for many charismatic creatures such as gorillas, rhi­
nos, condors, tigers and pandas. Answers are needed to the questions 
of cognitive ethology. Such information may change the direction of 
our conservation mission. Action, even if incomplete or sometimes 
misguided, is a priority. Rather than succumb to learned helplessness 
we must act to save Jethro or the wolves. Either choice is acceptable, 
for inaction or refusing to make the choice will ensure that both are 
lost. Far better that we try to act to save both, but painful decisions 
will be inevitable. 
Bekoff enlists the name of Schaller in his criticism of captive breeding 
programs. Bekoff should have mentioned that Schaller was not critical 
of captive breeding in general; Schaller criticized the management 
program for giant pandas in China, both captive and wild. It should 
be noted that there is currently no captive breeding program for pan­
das in North America, although we do aspire to create one. 
Returning to the dilemma of Jethro dog and the last remaining wolf; 
Maple and I have debated issues of similar complexity having to do 
with orangutans. When Maple was chairman of the Orangutan Spe­
cies Survival Plan it was decided to manage three populations of 
orangutans. There were two pure species, and these were permitted to 
breed. The hybrids were designated as a non-breeding population. To 
some degree this has resulted in a relatively neglected population since 
it is difficult to allocate identical resources and space to a population 
that will be essentially managed to extinction. The point here is that 
the committee had to act, even though we were uncomfortable with 
the arbitrariness of labeling or excluding hybrids from breeding situa­
tions. At the time we knew how to genetically differentiate individu­
als, though we did not know to what extent separation was present in 
the wild. We could either produce more hybrids or manage them 
separately. We chose to act, even though the biological meaning of the 
distinction was still being debated. In the end the decision was con­
firmed by the subsequent research and the limited space is not further 
reduced by the hybrid offspring that would have been produced in the 
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interim when we were delaying. 
Finally, Maple and I have a question for Bekoff. Is a human being in 
captivity, or in circumstances that limit his or her autonomy, less of a 
human being? We must recognize the inherent wildness in our cap­
tive animals. We must seek ways to preserve and elicit their natural 
behavior patterns. This is the essential goal of all programs of enrich­
ment and naturalistic architecture . In captivity a wolf might express 
only ninety percent of his identity, but it is still a wolf. If we handle the 
situation properly and constantly seek the truth, such an animal will 
not be mistaken for a dog. 
Rowan: Bekoff, before I ask you to respond I would like you, if you 
would, to respond to the issue of euphemism. I too believed that 
"sacrifice" was an inappropriate term until I read a paper on sacrificial 
symbolism. I no longer believe that sacrifice in the animal research 
laboratory is the wrong word, I think it is actually a great term. It 
means, in anthropological terms, converting an object or being from 
one reality into another. Laboratory animals are converted from ani­
mals to data. The word "sacrifice" connotes not only harm or cost to 
the individual being sacrificed, but also harm or cost to the individual 
doing the sacrificing. To me the word, used in that deeper anthropo­
logical sense, is in fact a more accurate description than 11killing," a 
word which lacks specificity. It is a much richer thing than just killing 
an animal. People are not doing it arbitrarily. 
Hutchins: I am bothered by the fact that there are a lot of assumptions 
regarding how scientists feel about animals and how they relate to 
them. There is a myth that scientists are totally unbiased and look at 
animals as mere objects . I certainly did not do that when I was study­
ing mountain goats in the wild. I recognized individuals, and subtle­
ties in their behavior. I think that makes our decisions about animals 
and wildlife much more difficult . However, I would rather have some­
one like myself who cares about animals making those hard decisions 
than someone who does not care about them. 
These are issues regarding our philosophical considerations of the 
liberty and autonomy of animals . I would argue that even humans do 
not have liberty and / or autonomy and that all social animals operate 
under considerable constraint. I am a strong believer in environmental 
enrichment. This gives captive animals more opportunities to make 
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decisions, under constraints; but, wild animals are under constraints as 
well. An animal cannot go into another animal's territory, is limited as 
to where it can move, and socially constrained in the way that one 
interacts with other individuals within a population. These are deci­
sions that animals make, although we are not aware as to how much 
cognition is involved in each decision. Certainly there is some cogni­
tion in many of the decisions that mammals make. Wild animals are 
not free to do everything that they wish, but the potential for decision 
making even under constraints is something that we do need to con­
sider. We need to offer opportunities for captive animals to make 
choices, knowing that those choices are always constrained by some 
external factor. 
Bekoff: I suppose "sacrifice" is a richer term, more loaded than killing. 
I dropped out of a medical program because I was tired of being told 
that I was sacrificing cats. I was twenty-five years old, doing great 
research in neurobiology. I woke up one day and decided I did not 
want to do that anymore. I was killing cats. I can see that there are 
deep anthropomorphic meanings to the word sacrifice, but the fact of 
the matter is that I was walking into a lab and cutting the heads off cats 
and trying to localize a lesion that we had been producing in their 
brains. I wanted to be a neurosurgeon but I did not want any part of 
that. I agree there are terms that are more appropriate. Maybe "sacri­
fice" is acceptable, but for me it just does not cut it. 
Interventions, the removal of a tumor for example, are necessary 
intrusions. This is not the same as the basic intrusion on an animal's 
life, keeping him or her in a cage. I feel they are very different issues. 
As for natural constraints, Joe Coyote not being able to move six feet 
because Harry Coyote has territory boundary is an incredibly different 
notion of constraint than if Mark Bekoff goes into the field and builds a 
fence so that Joe Coyote's movements are constricted. If you are a 
subordinate animal in a group you do not have what we view to be a 
"great life." There are studies that show that subordinate animals in 
groups are far better off than subordinate or even high-ranking ani­
mals that live alone, at least in terms of the protection incurred by 
being in a group. 
Jamieson: Maple's comments included remarks on "the zoo." Just as 
we recognize variability among animals, not speaking of "the cheetah" 
or "the gorilla," we ought not talk about "the zoo." We all know that 
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in a great many zoos animal welfare is really deeply and seriously 
compromised. That is an issue that needs to be discussed. 
In 1985 I wrote a paper stating that zoos did not do enough regarding 
education. People disagreed, asserting that the role of zoos is captive 
breeding and species survival. So when I then talked about species 
survival certain people said that zoos were educational. What do we 
want people to learn in zoos? What do we think they can learn in 
zoos? How effective are zoos at education? These are really open 
questions and we have a lot of rhetoric about what goes on. If we are 
serious about education we need to have some empirical data. 
Hutchins: There are approximately nine million school children every 
year that go through a formal educational experience at AZA institu­
tions, and there are a number of programs that are extremely effective 
in changing people's attitudes about animals. Some zoos ask people to 
take personal responsibility, to make one sacrifice for wildlife life such 
as recycling. Other programs are done jointly with similar organiza­
tions. One hundred and five million people go through our institu­
tions every year. I agree that we need to get better at what we do, but 
zoos are the place where most urban dwellers, ninety percent of the 
populous, are going to come into contact with wildlife. The potential 
is tremendous, and I agree that we need to think hard about what our 
goals are and follow through on them. 
Clutton-Brock: In response to a comment made earlier by Lewis, 
fishing is like hunting; conservation and therefore welfare of a species 
or animal ecosystem is often attained because fishermen are such a 
powerful lobby. They do manage to conserve rivers, particularly in 
Britain where waters are cleaner than they otherwise would be because 
people want to fish. This concept can be brought to a laboratory situa­
tion in which the animals are sacrificed. We do not know if the ani­
mals sacrifice themselves willingly. They may realize what is going on 
and agree to be killed for the sake of science. We have no idea what 
the laboratory animal is thinking. 
Clifton: I think the following illustration can easily clarified with a 
very simple diagram. Draw yourself a line with a "y" axis. Mark one 
quarter of the axis education, which I think all of us in the zoo business 
or animal protection business agree is one of our important functions. 
Another axis would be animal and species protection, conservation for 
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short. The third axis is one that many of us deny exists or intermingle 
with education; entertainment. This is where many of the conflicts of 
our respective occupations and organizations come in. Zoos have to 
bring people through the gates to generate some of the revenues that 
support our various programs. You have got to give people access to 
the charismatic species. Animals may prefer privacy so we have to 
find a way around that conflict. Those of us in the news business have 
to keep people reading. We cannot just focus on education. We have 
to have a certain amount of titillation, a certain amount of sex, scandal 
and horror because if people do not buy the paper they do not get the 
education and we do not stay in business. People in animal protection 
are in the situation where they have to bring in contributions to keep 
the non-profit organizations going. The range of things they are ca­
pable of is similar to what the news media can do, but animal protec­
tionists are more restricted in their opportunities to use sex and humor. 
They have to do their shocking with the animal "horror story." That is 
essentially an entertainment function too, although I have never heard 
anyone in animal protection acknowledge it. You have go to have your 
horror show of the week in order to keep your organization running. 
This builds in an inherent conflict whenever an animal protest organi­
zation decides it wants to address an issue. In order to generate the 
issue it has to come up with a horror show. They cannot say "Here is a 
problem. Let's work together to find a solution." They have got to say 
"Here is a terrible situation and zoos are responsible ."  I would like to 
see this aspect of entertainment addressed. 
Lukas: I would like to bring the discussion back to well-being. We 
have tied the animals to the ecosystems involved.  The well-being of 
the individual is directly tied to the location and place where it lives . 
Another critical point; man has been on this continent for eleven thou­
sand years and has been burning the woods in the south eastern 
United States for ten thousand years . Man is an integral part of these 
animals' lives.  It is a continuum, but we cannot say that animals far 
removed from people are experiencing a state of well-being. There is a 
certain level where man has gone too far in being involved with the 
environment, but to say that man has no part in the well-being of 
animals is ridiculous . In a captive situation man is directly involved in 
the well-being of that animal. It is intent that must be considered. 
Sometimes being close to man is the best for the well-being of some 
species. 
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Weer: I am an educator, therefore I approach this discussion with the 
hope of expanding my ability to instruct. I had an interesting experi­
ence this summer when I took my daughters to the New Orleans zoo. 
They had a swamp exhibit that was really exceptional. In one corner of 
the zoo you could hear growls and snarls and noises coming from a 
plastic dinosaur. You had to pay an additional $8.00 per person, after 
paying the zoo's $15.00 entrance fee, to look at this exhibit of plastic 
dinosaurs. The entire crowd was lined up to see the dinosaurs rather 
than giving their attention to the wonderful Louisiana swamp exhibit. 
Is it true that we have to base education on live animals that one can 
smell and touch and see? Does this go back to the entertainment 
factor? What and how do we educate? Would we be better off with a 
plastic elephant? If we are going to justify our being here through 
education, maybe we need to look at how people learn, what they are 
learning, how they want to learn. The average person spends forty­
four seconds in front of each exhibit. Ninety-seven percent of people 
go to zoos go with someone else. People that go to art galleries and 
museums traditionally go alone to really experience and learn. 
Kaufmann: One thing I have seen in the educational departments of 
zoos I have been associated with is that we do a disservice to the pub­
lic when we circumvent the role of animals in our lives. It is not just 
that we eat them, not just scientific or that historically they have associ­
ated with us; they are beautiful. We can enjoy them, we can love them. 
It encompasses the realm of art, the realm that is totally away from the 
logical, from the scientific, from the things that can be defined in 
words. There is a great fear of those realms in the educational depart­
ments of some zoos. They are desperately trying to contain the educa­
tional message in scientific, rational terms. There is very little room 
for things that are fuzzy. This fear is destructive because the general 
public, specifically children, need that to make that connection. 
Serpell: I think we need to be cautious about assuming that the place 
where we find the wild animal is necessarily the habitat to which it is 
ancestrally adapted. Animals have been moved into marginal habitats 
as a result of human activity. We also have to take on board the devel­
opmental history of that individual animal. An animals that is born 
and raised in captivity will have very different habitat preferences 
from its kinsman who have been raised in the wild. It might be quite 
wrong to stick it in captivity if there is only one left or if it is not famil­
iar habitat. You might actually be harming its welfare. 
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I also wanted to address the question of educational roles of zoos. It is 
not enough to say that millions of children visit zoos, for we do not 
know that the experience of simply observing animals in zoos is educa­
tional. It might have a very serious negative effect in some cases. I 
used to spend my lunch hours standing in front of the cages and listen­
ing to what was being said about the activity going on inside. Very 
often I went away extremely depressed, for an image of the animal was 
being concocted that was extremely denigrating to that creature, par­
ticularly with primates. There is an urgent priority for zoos and similar 
organizations to organize their strategy regarding education as well as 
differentiate education from recreation. 
I also wish people would stop misquoting the studies dealing with 
psychopaths having been cruel to animals as children. People con­
stantly quote this as if it demonstrates a cause and effect relationship, 
that because those people were cruel to animals they therefore became 
psychopaths. There is no evidence for that conclusion and the issue 
really needs much more study before we can make such statements. 
Bekoff: Of the five major factors they have found that produce psycho­
paths, none had to do with interaction with animals. The types of 
interaction serial killers had with animals stem from lack of socializa­
tion with other human beings. 
Robinson: One of the problems we have as a group is the inability to 
focus on something on which we can disagree. I, like Bekoff, am a 
behaviorist and am interested in cognitive ethnology. I can read his 
paper and agree with what he has to say. When it comes down to the 
fundamental points which were discussed I do not think there is really 
any fundamental disagreement. None among this group disagrees that 
animals possess cognitive ability, there is no fundamental disagree­
ment that animals suffer, that human interest should not be the focus 
of concern or that animals should be able to live their lives in nature. 
So why are we having this particular discussion? All of this comes 
down to one issue; when is intervention really necessary? How do you 
justify captivity? 
Rowan: I came in to the discussion thinking that one of the fundamen­
tal issues was species population versus individuals. I now feel that 
the fundamental question has to do with human intervention. Is 
human intervention desirable? When is human intervention desirable? 
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What type is desirable? 
Grandy: Bekoff began this morning by talking about sentience in 
animals. I was pleased that he included all species rather than restrict 
his comments to major species. Later he talked about having a few 
programs which were exemplary rather than a number of programs 
which were merely average or worse. The comments following 
Bekoff's presentation were extremely good, and I was particularly 
taken by those statements having to do with the type of debates 
Robinson just mentioned. We have found ourselves in discussions that 
go on and on about ethnology, cognition, wildness and liberty. These 
are interesting and important things. Then we went on to discuss 
children and education in zoos. I find myself beginning to like what I 
am hearing, for we are drawing a lot of things together and getting to 
the real issues. 
This group needs to talk about and come to grips with the conditions 
that are in zoos. It is really tempting for all of us, particularly here at 
White Oak where we see the best that can be dreamed of, to concen­
trate on the best. Although there are zoos in the United States that 
meet our standards, the animals in the majority of zoos are suffering. 
People who see squalid conditions in zoos time after time will come to 
think that is the norm and is acceptable. 
Hutchins: I agree. Roadside menageries are an abomination and 
should be closed. AZA has been critical of the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service for its policy of granting permits to organizations that 
are not involved in cooperative scientifically-managed breeding pro­
grams and do not have educational programs. I think we can find a 
consensus that such a situation should not occur. Such facilities are not 
AZA members and therefore we have no way to influence the situa­
tion, other than trying to educate people about what good zoos are and 
getting people politically active in changing some of the policies. 
We have spoken of individual variation extensively. Variability results 
in flexibility, and in good captive conditions animals are flexible 
enough to adapt to those kinds of conditions, perhaps not suffering as 
much as we assume. I am not discounting the issue of well-being, but 
environments vary and animals adapt to them. 
I believe that conservationists operate under certain assumptions, 
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assumptions that are well thought out and thought to be justified. One 
of these assumptions is that biodiversity is good. But it is naturally 
occurring biodiversity that is good . We could artificially create variet­
ies of different animals and release them in the wild, but this is not the 
type of diversity we are striving for. I am not apologetic for the val­
ues held by conservationists for I believe they are good for a variety of 
reasons, reasons running from the aesthetic to the practical. I do not 
think intervention is always a great thing. It causes problems and 
mistakes are inevitable. 
Lindburg: Jamieson asked about data on the types of educational 
programs at institutions . A multi-million dollar exhibit was built in 
San Diego with beautiful grounds .  We put a person there with a stop 
watch, the objective being to see how many people who stopped took 
at least ten seconds looking at the plaque, which took a minimum of 
three or four minutes to read. The results were less than 2 percent. We 
did not know whether to conclude that it was a bad plaque or the 
results had a deeper message, namely that most people do not come to 
zoos to be educated . We have to recognize that the public perceives a 
zoo to be a place to go to be entertained.  The last thing that the major­
ity of people have on their minds is conservation or education, there­
fore the objective for educators is to "trick" the public, get a learning 
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Natural behavior is inherently interesting, no plastic elephant can have 
the same effects as a real one. There is presently a great deal of concern 
for creating circumstances where natural behavior will be observed.  I 
found it a breath of fresh air that Bekoff did not allude in his paper to 
an act of Congress mandating that we be concerned about the psycho­
logical well-being of animals in captivity. (see ANR's notes) .  It is 
encouraging to know that in the last decade zoological institutions 
have made tremendous strides in focusing on so many of the concerns 
we are discussing here today. 
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ANIMAL WELL-BEING IN THE WILD AND 
IN CAPTIVITY 
Stephen Bostock 
Glasgow Zoological Gardens 
Glasgow, Scotland 
INTRODUCTION 
Some, like a character in Galsworthy's The Forsyte Saga (1922, 189-
191), would consider there was nothing to discuss about the rival 
merits of wild and captivity. "To shut up a lion or tiger," thought 
Young Jolyon at London Zoo, "was surely a horrible barbarity." Here 
is contemporary comic writer Stephen Fry in serious mood: "Is it 
possible, [our grandchildren] will ask, that we actually stole polar 
bears away from the Arctic and set them in concrete-floored cages in 
southern climes to be gawped at?" (Fry 1993, 275). In fact, similar 
sentiments were expressed 600 years ago by Chaucer (1960, 524), who 
noted how a captive bird's wild habitat ( '  a forest, that is rude and 
cold') seems unattractive to us (as compared with the fine conditions 
we think we are providing), but there's no doubt which the bird would 
prefer: "For ever this brid wol doon his bisinesse; To escape out of his 
cage, if he may; His libertee this brid desireth ay." 
Some recent philosophical writers, who seem to be fighting a sort of 
rearguard action on behalf of behaviorism - the refusal to take seri­
ously the reality and important of the animal's own conscious experi­
ence - which has been scientific orthodoxy through much of this cen­
tury, would probably suggest we were being anthropomorphic in 
worrying about the animal's own feelings. Michael Leahy (1991, 92) 
maintains that the captive animal's necessary non-realization of its 
situation, its inability to conceptualize its state, means that these must 
be quite different from, and nothing like so serious a matter as, human 
captivity. Another philosopher who thinks our concern for animals 
misplaced is Peter Carruthers (1992, 196). Peter Harrison (1991) thinks 
animals no more able to suffer than plants, because of their lack of an 
inner life. I don't agree, not least because thinking this way seems so 
out of line with our recognition - on straightforward scientific grounds, 
135 years after The Origin of Species - that we humans are ourselves 
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mammals, primates, indeed probably on genetic grounds strictly apes 
(Dawkins 1993, 82). 
I believe we can sensibly speak of an animal's well-being, and not just 
in the sense we might possibly speak of a plant's well-being. An ani­
mal in a state of well-being presumably feels better, perhaps enjoys 
itself more, at least suffers less than if it were in a poorer state. 
Let's come back to the dreadful contrast of wild and captivity, as por­
trayed or suggested by Chaucer, Galsworthy and Fry. It seems to me 
that there were several other, and more acceptable, ways of keeping 
animals even long ago than the bare cages we should all abhor - deer 
parks, for example (Bostock 1993, 18-20). Francis Bacon wrote 400 
years ago about how he didn't like aviaries, except they "be of that 
largeness as they may be turfed, and have living plants and bushes set 
in them; that the birds may have more scope and natural nestling ... " 
Wouldn't a bird, kept in an aviary like this, probably not choose to 
escape, even if it could, and wouldn't that be a pretty good indication 
of good conditions? I will come back to the range of ways of keeping 
animals in my last section, to try to show there are acceptable ap­
proaches to keeping animals; some kinds of "captivity" contrast pretty 
favorably with the wild, though we need, ideally, as much knowledge 
as possible of the animal's natural habitat and way of life there, to 
make our captive conditions acceptable., 
But first, I want to compare wild and captivity. This isn't a straight 
comparison of good with bad. Animals do suffer in the wild, and they 
are protected in good captivity. I will fill out the details of this in the 
following sections, before discussing how captivity can be more be­
nign, whether or not it can ever strictly be regarded as better than life 
in the wild. 
LENGTH OF LIFE AND VIOLENT DEATH 
It was all very well for Blake to write that: A robin redbreast in a cage 
Puts all Heaven in a Rage but he couldn't know that robins normally 
live in the wild a mere tenth of their potential life span and have, any 
year, only a 50% chance of surviving to the next (Lack 1970, 88-106). So 
captive animals often do live longer than wild ones; for many animals 
it must be true that only with human protection have they any chance 
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of dying of (as we say) old age. A robin in a roomy, comfortable aviary 
like Bacon's might have a rather good bargain in terms of total plea­
sure or satisfaction from living. The risks in adult life for large mam­
mals like lions or chimpanzees are probably much less than for small 
birds or small mammals such as rodents, but there will still be for lions 
and chimpanzees a high death rate in early years (as there was with 
humans until the protection offered by modern medicine). Bertram 
recorded that about 20% of lion cubs survive in the wild to maturity, 
most cubs dying of starvation. 
Not, of course, that the animals know they face short lives, so it doesn't 
make their lives miserable, as the theologian B. H. Streeter (1935, 156-7) 
notes, in the course of considering the degree of suffering in nature. 
However, so far as zoos are concerned, it is surely true that many of 
their animals would, if they had lived in the wild instead, have died 
young. If we assume that in some cases at least life in a zoo is satisfac­
tory for the animal concerned, and where an animal would have been 
living no life at all were it not in a zoo, in such cases the comment on 
their captivity "It seems sad" is inappropriate (Rachels 1976, 213). 
Not that all animals in zoos live to old age or, sadly, can all be allowed 
to. As the breeding of captive animals improves and approaches the 
rate of increase in the wild, either birth control or the killing of surplus 
animals is likely to be necessary (Cherfas 1984, 119, 122). But at least if 
any animal has to be killed in a zoo it will be a humane death. Death 
in the wild can be violent, or slow, as from injury or disease. 
A mouse caught and played with by a cat is not a pleasant sight; a wild 
cheetah will provide her cubs with a living, injured young gazelle to 
practice hunting on (Ammann 1984, 111). Personally, I find disturbing 
even the sight of a hen carrying a struggling frog. Still, these may be 
isolated incidents. Obviously, they will only happen once in a victim's 
life, and may in any case be alleviated by the action of endorphins or 
some similar mechanism, just as severely injured humans ( in sport or 
battle) often feel no pain till later. Still, I would dispute the confidence 
of Streeter ( 1935, 156-7) that life and death struggles between animals 
involve little suffering because non-humans probably hardly feel pain. 
On biological grounds this seems unlikely, as recognized in an interest­
ing discussion by the contemporary theologian John Hick (1968, 356 
ff.). 
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So the fact an animal in a zoo is protected from the violence and other 
dangers of natural life is not an aspect of captivity to be scorned Gones 
1987). We are in some degree conferring on our captive animals a 
protection which civilization has ( to some extent) conferred on our­
selves. 
ARE ZOO ANIMALS HEALTHIER THAN WILD 
ANIMALS? 
Take health first in the straightforward sense of freedom from infection 
or injury. Wild animals are anything but free from such problems. A 
single individual can be astonishingly heavily parasitized (Rothschild 
and Clay 1961, 17). Wild animals cari be very much worse for wear 
compared to their protected, medically attended cousins in captivity; 
for example a wild lion compared to a zoo or safari park lion (Smith 
1979, xv). 
Many wild animals must be able to cope with their infections, but 
those who cannot die. If serious ill-health isn't obvious among wild 
animals, that is because a seriously unhealthy wild animal is soon a 
dead one. The middle course open to humans and well-cared-for 
captive animals is not an option. 
Still, mild states of ill-health can cause discomfort without causing 
death. A successful parasite (biologically) does not kill its host, but 
may cause discomfort or worse. Here the captive animal is better off in 
that treatment easing minor suffering should be available. 
But zoo animals can have their own particular health problems. The 
stress of being captured and transported can make an animal more 
liable to serious parasitic infection. Conditions in zoos can aid the 
spread of parasites, or else necessitate the provision of a dull, sterile 
environment in order to restrict their spread. Ungulates kept in small 
paddocks are prone to parasitic infection; cats can be, when kept in 
other than very large enclosures. Until recently, they were thought to 
require concrete or tiles, easily washed and sterilized - and thus robbed 
of familiar and carefully deposited smells. It has now been found that 
deep woodchip litter, in addition to other advantages, prevents para­
sites' eggs surviving. The new findings have greatly improved the 
situation for zoo primates too (Chamove et al 1982). An animal can be 
exposed in a zoo to infections that it wouldn't face in the wild (Dunn 
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sense of purposefulness. 
Our feeling of frustration in failing to complete some task is (like pain, 
pleasure and boredom) no doubt biologically useful. So it is likely that 
animals can feel similar frustration to ours - say if a lion has a meal to 
eat, but keeps being disturbed by hyenas. 
Probably very important also are a sense of security and a sense of 
belonging. The Harlows' (very inhumane) experiments showed how 
infant monkeys need a source of security, a source of confidence 
(Rowell 1972, 135 ff). Dogs can show their general sense of unease by 
failing to groom themselves. Of course an animal should be able to 
enjoy this sense of security, and indeed many other pleasures, in good 
zoo conditions. 
Obviously in the wild there are all sorts of discomforts, problems and 
very real dangers: parasites, insect bites, problems of finding food - the 
unpleasantness of sometimes going without or actually starving - and 
so on. But we have our problems too, and for most of us, most of the 
time, they are not overwhelming. What often prevents nervous break­
down is a sense of purpose and a sense of security. Although war is a 
cause of appalling suffering, the suicide rate tends to go down in 
wartime, presumably because people have more sense of purpose, and 
of comradeship and belonging, and these more than compensate for 
the presence of extra hardships in preventing extreme depression. A 
state of non-depression, a state far from that extreme depression which 
could lead to suicide is likely to accompany the state of being very 
busy; having things to get on with. 
It is probably important to many animals, too, to have plenty to get on 
with, which wild animals normally obviously do, as well as having a 
sense of security and, where appropriate, companionship, a home base 
and proper relations with one's companions in the case of a social 
animal. Marian Dawkins mentions experimental findings that sheep 
are stressed by situations such as being put in a truck or chased by a 
dog but nothing like as much as they are stressed by simply being 
separated from the rest of the flock (Dawkins 1980, 59), which bears 
out what I am suggesting. 
And life in the wild is often not all "business," essential activities for 
survival, compensated for only by a sense of purpose such as I have 
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been proposing. There are also plenty of reports of animals enjoying 
themselves in a direct way - otters sliding down banks, badgers play­
ing leapfrog, and so on. 
So in brief, to give the provision of regular food and safety from preda­
tors and other dangers, not to mention discomforts, as pure and simple 
advantages, of captivity over against life in the wild is to leave out 
certain related disadvantages which go hand in hand with such advan­
tages: the loss, in particular, of purposeful living. However, in many 
cases it is possible to provide conditions of captivity which do a lot to 
compensate for the loss of the positive side of wild existence. But we 
need to recognize that positive side to realize our responsibility to 
provide suitably enriched captive conditions. 
E V OLUTION AND ADAPTATION 
All animals, obviously, are adapted to life in their natural habitats ( the 
"wild"). I think it follows from this that they are in a state of well­
being there, but only to some extent. It follows also that they are not 
very likely to be in a state of well-being in captivity, but not that they 
can't be in a state of well-being there - certainly if we take trouble to 
provide what they need. 
One argument for animals' positive well-being in the wild is that as 
animals presumably cannot live efficiently, and cannot reproduce 
efficiently if they find life too difficult - if they get too disturbed, or too 
miserable, or are hurt too much - there will be selection of characteris­
tics producing some degree of well-being, perhaps some degree of 
happiness (Darwin 1929, 146). 
Whether this is an additional adaptation, or an additional feature of 
adaptations in general - i.e., perhaps adaptation in some respect to a 
particular aspect of one's environment involves being in a state of well­
being in regard to it - my next point is that adaptation is not perfect or 
complete. Here are several reasons for this (perhaps worth noting not 
least because passionate people like the novelist Richard Adams who 
oppose zoos are inclined to talk as if animals are perfectly adapted to 
their natural environments - and therefore inevitably in a state of ill­
being anywhere else). 
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1. Animals are, so to speak, never designed from first principles, 
but rather themselves "adaptations", in the sense of "adaptive 
alterations," of what went before. One human example of 
imperfect adaptation is the tendency to suffer arthritis around 
the area of the hip bones, probably partly as a result of our 
being a two-legged "vertical" animal converted from a four­
legged "horizontal" one. 
2. If animals were perfectly adapted, evolution, which is essen­
tially the improvement of adaptations, could not occur (de Beer 
1972, 10). 
3. All individuals of any particular species differ slightly, having 
slightly different sets of genes, so that they are not equally 
adapted, even though to a great extent they are all inheritors of 
millions of years of natural section. Even if one could identify a 
pair of animals almost perfectly adapted to their environment, 
their young would not be to the same extent, or to the same 
extent as each other, for all get dealt a slightly different genetic 
"hand." 
4. As evolution is a matter of the differential passing on of genes, 
so that different genes gradualiy become more widespread 
through the gene pool of any particular species, as a result of the 
individuals carrying them being slightly more successful in 
reproducing, the welfare of individual animals is hardly going 
to be benefited by evolution except in as much as genes aiding 
welfare also enable the animals carrying them to reproduce 
successfully, which also includes surviving long enough to 
reproduce. There seems no way in which the welfare of animals 
past breeding age can be selected for, except where their welfare 
assists younger relative of theirs to reproduce. 
5. There must be some "survival of the fittest." Although even a 
small reproductive advantage conferred by a gene is enough to 
ensure its selection - i.e., its gradual spread through the gene 
pool - it seems likely that many individuals of any species die 
young, in some cases this being part of natural selection ( i.e., 
where the death is due to some genetically inherited disadvan 
tageous feature in an animal compared to its conspecifics). So 
while the so-called struggle for survival is in many ways a 
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peaceful struggle, hardly suggesting nature red in tooth and 
claw, it still does involve a great many animals dying long 
before their potential life span, and by no means entirely with 
out suffering (as we saw above). 
6. In some cases certain species, as a result of environmental 
changes they fail to adjust to, are in varying degrees ill-adapted 
(de Beer 1972, 10-13). Animals (perhaps certain more adventur 
ous or exploratory individuals of a species) will sometimes 
move into new habitats, or may adopt some new behavior. This 
may be a substantial factor in evolution (Hardy 1975: 37-45; 
Ewer 1953: 117-119). In the new habitat or the new niche, selec­
tion will operate to improve adaptation to it, but this will be a 
slow process, and the developement will be occurring in a 
population, not in any single individuals. Some or all individu­
als may well be rather ill-adapted in the early stages of moving 
into a new habitat or a new niche, as in the situation of an envi­
ronmental change which forces upon a population a need to 
adapt, if it has enough genetic adaptability; failure to adapt in 
such circumstances is likely of course to result in extinction ( de 
Beer 1972, 5-6; 10-13). Tigers may have moved fairly recently 
into trooical re�dons , and be as vet inadequately enough 
.l V , .J ..a. ., ......, 
adapted to them to suffer discomfort from the heat. 
So here are several reasons why adaptation cannot be perfect, and I 
think they are reasons similarly why animals are not going to be in a 
state of complete well-being in the wild. They aren't necessarily rea­
sons why animals are likely instead to be in a state of well-being in 
captivity, not least because we, in our varying degrees of ignorance 
about animals' environmental adaptations, must often force upon them 
captive conditions to which they are not at all adapted. However, it's 
still quite possible that captive conditions may be comfortable in ways 
in which wild conditions are not. Natural selection isn't operating, or 
not in the same way, in captivity, so animals are here free of the factors 
which are likely to produce some degree of discomfort in the wild. 
Another point about different animals' possible "suitability" for captiv­
ity is that animals are adaptable as individuals: they have varying 
degrees of cultural or behavioral (or physiological) adaptability. Some 
move readily into new environments created by man (like cities); 
others cannot adapt so easily. Some become tame easily, some can be 
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trained easily, others not. Some can change their habits easily, e.g., 
switch to different kinds of food (of course, within limits); some ( like 
koalas) cannot. This is a theoretical reason why it's not out of the 
question that we can keep some animals in a state of well-being. Of 
course we should go a long way, in fact as far as possible, towards 
providing the conditions they need. But the fact we can never do this 
perfectly - we can't reproduce the wild - doesn't mean that we can 
never keep animals properly. With our providing, as far as we can, the 
right conditions, and their ability to adapt ( in varying degrees), it may 
well be the case that some of them can be in a state of well-being in 
captivity. 
KEEPING ANIMALS 
We began with comments on lions, polar bears and birds in cages. But 
keeping animals doesn't have to be like this. Sometimes, indeed, we 
can create an artificial habitat so attractive that animals just drop in: 
ponds for wildfowl, or for freshwater invertebrates, for example. 
Agreed, this is exceptional. In some ways the deer in a large park may 
be living almost naturally. The Duke of Bedford, who saved the Pere 
David's deer from extinction in the early years of this century, kept 
th�em at Woburn in a very large area ,Alith lakes and marshes, v·vl1ere 
they bred well, but also faced such natural hazards as a high loss of 
young born in particularly bad weather. 
The more normal, basic way of keeping animals is in what I would 
(perhaps over-optimistically) call a semi-naturalistic enclosure - one 
which hopefully suggests the wild habitat to some degree, if not very 
closely. But the really important thing is that it should produce what­
ever features the animals need to allow and stimulate a large portion of 
their natural behavior, certainly including whatever means of locomo­
tion - climbing, burrowing, swimming, and so on - they would nor­
mally use in the wild. For many animals such as various ungulates, 
and wallabies, their needs may be met by little more than a field suit­
ably enclosed (Duncan and Poole 1990, 220). Rodents such as prairie 
dogs or porcupines may need only an enclosure of reasonable size 
allowing burrowing: they will create for themselves what else they 
need, and will be fully occupied by excavations and their social rela­
tions. 
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Even with animals quite easily catered for, there is always room for 
improvement, especially in the light of their wild behavior, guided by 
careful monitoring of the animals' behavior in the enclosure ( ibid.: 222-
3), but such improvement, or enrichment, becomes much more urgent 
with the more "difficult" animals: the highly intelligent, exploratory, 
opportunist and sometimes also ( to make it worse) physically power­
ful animals such as bears, dogs, primates (especially apes), and per­
haps pigs. 
Needed here is ingenuity in doing all possible to make the animals' 
lives more interesting, in particular whatever can be done to elicit their 
natural behavior (Shepherdson 1988). The obvious deprivation of zoo 
animals is the occupation of food seeking which in many cases would 
occupy them for long periods in the wild. The remedy is to hide food 
so that it has to be searched for, or provide it so that it has to be 
worked for in some way. As before, it is usually a matter of providing 
a more or less natural-looking area. But where an area something like 
the natural habitat will probably be enough for wallabies, this may be 
far from enough, even with a tree or two or a climbing frame or two, 
for chimpanzees. A wooded enclosure the size of the chimpanzee 
island at Arnhem (de Wall 1982) is a different matter. Where an area 
like this is not available, it is still desirable for the enclosure to be as 
natural as possible or at least have natural elements such as a grassy 
area and plants, but it is still more important to provide what will 
stimulate the animals, which may be, for example, an artificial termite 
mound into which they can stick straws to extract not termites but 
honey. The significant thing about this example is that it is provided in 
the light of knowledge of what chimpanzees do in the wild. 
Knowledge of the animal's wild habitat and behavior is the best source 
of ideas for what can be provided to enrich its captive environment, 
and naturalistic enrichment - features identical to those in the natural 
habitat which would stimulate the animals' natural, or simulation of 
wild features - is probably the best approach. Examples of such enrich­
ment at Glasgow Zoo for black bears, polar bears and cats are de­
scribed by Colin Tudge (1991, 223-8). 
Markowitz has pioneered several elaborate devices to elicit their natu­
ral behavior from animals, such as flying meatballs for servals to leap 
to grab, or arrangements by which polar bears or primates can perform 
some task and thus produce food (Markowitz 1982, 46-55; 175-9). He 
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has found that many animals will voluntarily work for their food in 
preference to merely being given it, which is eloquent evidence of the 
need of some animals for occupation and even creative activity. Some 
of Markowitz's work has been criticized (e.g., for conditioning animals 
to respond to artificial stimuli) (Cherfas 1984, 128 ff; Campbell 1979, 
213), but there is clearly great room for, on the one hand, learning from 
study of the animals' wild behavior, and, on the other, exercising 
ingenuity in how to simulate or substitute for features of their wild 
environment in the captive one. 
Sometime animals may be kept in an enclosure which is frankly non­
naturalistic but which is highly suitable for them even so because it 
succeeds in supplying what they need. A paradigm example of an 
enclosure of this sort, though not in a zoo, is the "enriched pig pen" 
developed at the Edinburgh School of Agriculture. Domestic pigs were 
studied in semi-wild conditions for many months and (very signifi­
cantly) much natural behavior was observed. A pen was then de­
signed so as to include the right features to elicit most of the behavior 
which had been observed in the larger area - nestmaking, rooting, and 
so on. This approach worked: most of the pigs' wild behavior still 
occurred in the "enriched pig pen" (Woodgush 1983, 196-8; 
Huntingford 1984; Duncan and Poole 1990, 209-213). Zoos will nor­
mally have much more space available than the area of the "pig pen", 
but the wild study leading to the identification of the essential stimuli 
for eliciting different parts of the animals' behavioral repertoire, and 
then the careful providing either of those stimuli or of substitutes for 
them is a fine demonstration of how an enclosure can be improved - or 
designed from scratch - in the light of study of the wild behavior of the 
species concerned. 
Howletts' gorilla enclosure (near Canterbury in England) is a good 
example of a non-naturalistic enclosure which yet meets the animals' 
requirements admirably, as is borne out by their breeding success. The 
enclosure looks more like a sort of gymnasium than a bit of rain-forest 
- a sort of health club for gorillas, indeed, or a holiday camp. 
Enclosures can be much more realistic - if money and imagination are 
available - as in some very elaborate displays described by David 
Hancocks (1989, 264), though some naturalistic displays (not 
Hancocks') are more for the public benefit than the animals'. Animal 
occupants of beautiful exhibits sometimes have far less space than 
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appears and can't reach the plants. And short term changes in enclo­
sures - recommended for example by Hancocks - are unlikely to be 
feasible in vastly expensive displays with fiber-glass trees and the like. 
A very different approach to keeping animals is training them to per­
form various tasks and generally treating them as domesticated ani­
mals, which camels and llamas are, and perhaps elephants too, though 
only partially. To have llamas pulling carts, and camels giving rides, 
where possible, seems, in view of their being domesticated animals, 
unobjectionable and likely to be good for their mental as well as their 
physical health (Kiley-Worthington 1990; Hediger 1968, 133-9) . 
So in the end contrasting the wild and captivity is not really the point, 
for it makes all the difference what sort of captivity we are thinking of. 
Really good captivity probably compares quite favorably with the 
wild, on which, in some respects, it should have been modeled. It also 
makes a great difference what animal we are thinking of. Our criteria 
for judging animal well-being - natural behavior especially, but also 
health, breeding, the occurrence of abnormal behavior and so on -
should also guide us as to whether some animals should not be kept at 
all. Whether enrichment for (for example) polar bears (providing 
stimulating items to investigate and so on) is in the end more than 
alleviation of their captive state remains a matter of dispute. I wonder 
myself just how far we can compensate in a zoo for the range of experi­
ences, the range of smells and sights and sounds, the meeting with 
members of its own or other species, of an animal's natural life. Much 
remains to be investigated. 
Of course other matters come into the question of whether a certain 
species should be kept, such as the need or otherwise for conserva­
tional captive breeding. But our judgment of the animal's well-being 
must clearly be a major factor as a guide to action, only to be overruled 
to a very limited degree by other considerations. 
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BOSTOCK DISCUSSION 
Pokras: I love the fact that Bostock's paper came after Bekoff 's presen­
tation. This is a nice transition and melding of ideas. One of the issues 
I see Bostock questioning are the goals of keeping animals. We have 
educational goals, long-term conservation captive breeding goals, even 
research goals. Those goals are in some sense very separate. It may be 
that individual institutions cannot or should not be doing all those 
things, that perhaps specialization could be important. 
i��gain, one of the important factors is timescale. If we are talking 
about a very short timescale, such as an emergency or a highly endan­
gered species, perhaps it would be more appropriate to do a higher 
degree of intervention. But if our goal is long-term conservation of a 
population, one thousand years for example, then we cannot exclude 
evolution. If I want to keep a population for one thousand years I have 
got a very difficult issue, for I have a population that is going to be 
subject to a lot of evolutionary pressures in that one thousand years. 
That is going to be difficult to accomplish, for I cannot keep them by 
themselves. They are what they are because they have had the preda­
tor I prey interaction. 
We veterinarians go in and inocuiate short-term captive animais with a 
vaccine to prevent parasites. We should not do that with a long-term 
population. Parasites and hosts evolve together, they are a part of 
biodiversity. Elimination of the parasites is not in the best interest of 
the animal if they are to be held in long-term captivity. In the short­
term we can enhance the animal's well-being, but if we are talking 
about evolutionary time our goals are very different. 
Part of well-being is the issue of variety. Things change drastically 
over time, the time scale depending on that particular animal's biologi­
cal clock. A very small animal with a high heart rate and a very short 
life span is running on faster time. Its life happens more quickly than 
that of a whale. Whales and reptiles do things very slowly. To appreci­
ate and understand what is going on we need time-lapse photography 
or a different set of skills, understanding and sensitivity. 
I do not know what animal's cognitive lives are like, but there is huge 
individual variation. Again, what that means for long-term captive 
management I am not quite sure, but think people have begun to take 
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that into account. Choice is a very important factor for animals in 
captivity. The word "choice" may have a connotation of consciousness 
that I do not mean to imply. I am speaking of the ability to make 
maximum number of choices on their own such as food selection. 
Perhaps this is bringing me back to the need for specialization, need 
for wider cooperation. There are probably a number of facilities that 
should not be trying to captive-breed anything, but do a wonderful job 
with environmental education. 
Robinson: I will begin by addressing the paper on its own terms, and 
then look at certain fundamental assumptions that might underlie it 
and some of the disagreements that may generate. Without being 
pejorative, I read Bekoff's paper as a wonderful apology for captivity. I 
think the argument is made very strongly that life for creatures in 
captivity can frequently be favorably compared to life in the wild. The 
assumption is that it is better to live long, live healthy and be better 
fed. Certainly looking at our own species we recognize that that is not 
always the case. Literature is full of examples demonstrating that we 
do not particularly like pleasant, well-fed circumstances or the bour­
geois life. The existence of hang-gliding and fast cars suggest that we 
do not like that lowest common denominator of good health. There is 
also the self-destructive urge, such as alcohol and tobacco, and anyone 
who looks at animals recognizes that animals go through the same 
thing. They frequently search out stressful circumstances. 
Another thing that was alluded to in Bostock's paper is the idea of 
freedom of choice, the idea of mental health. How does one get at this 
notion? How important is freedom to us as human beings? To ani­
mals? Do we become accustomed to a lack of freedom? Is it relative? 
Is it purely an anglo-saxon preoccupation? 
Looking at some of the deeper assumptions underlying the paper, 
there is an conjecture that the well-being of animals provides a crite­
rion on which to evaluate captivity. I make the argument that once an 
animal is in captivity its well-being is of greatest importance. But the 
well-being of an individual animal is not the paramount criterion on 
which a decision is made about bringing that animal into captivity. 
This leads into another issue; how do you balance the well-being of 
individuals and species? Captivity can be justified on the basis of the 
well-being of the aggregate of all individuals in the species, rather than 
the well-being of the well-being of those individual animals in captiv-
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ity. I think this assumption underlies many of the justifications that the 
captive breeding zoo community has used about bringing animals into 
captivity. 
Why bother to conserve species? Is this an important moral argument? 
The answer to that question can justify the preceding one, which is 
whether animals should be brought into captivity. I would argue yes. 
I think we have a moral responsibility to care for our fellow human 
beings, domestic animals and wild animals. Because of our resource 
consumption and desire to populate the world with our own progeny 
we directly affect other people and animals. Because we do interfere in 
the lives of others, especially wild species, we do have the responsibil­
ity to conserve their populations, and to do so in as humane a way as 
possible. 
Bostock: Rolston has very strong comments about how we cannot 
conserve animals in zoos because it is not done within the evolutionary 
process. It is outside natural selection. 
Jamieson: Back to education; virtually all campaigns providing people 
solely with environmental information fail. In cases where informa­
tion does work, people approach the data with conceptual models, 
belief systems. In many cases we simply do not bother to find out how 
people represent the issues, what their beliefs are. These models can 
be incredibly conceptually conservative. People assimilate new infor­
mation in a way consistent with what they already believe. You can 
take two people, show them the same thing and they will each view 
that as reinforcing their private set of beliefs. 
How information is presented is extremely important. Generally 
impersonal abstract information does not engage people. People are 
engaged by anecdotes as well as personalized and vivid information. 
The source of information is also of importance. Data that comes from 
institutions is much less effective than information that comes from 
individuals. Studies back up this notion of distrust of anonymous or 
institutional information. 
My second point concerns suffering and nature. There is a lot of struc­
turing and interpretation about what goes on in nature. We need to be 
cautious about the extent to which we incorporate stereotypes and 
social constructions when we discuss this issue. 
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There are two serious differences among the people at this table. First 
is the question of how we are going to handle the surplus of animals 
that results from captive breeding programs. Secondly there are issues 
of individual versus species. In some sense we all agree that nature is 
in the equivalent of an intensive care unit, and some believe in heroic 
medical intervention to save nature. Others are more skeptical, ques­
tioning if it tortures the "patient" more than helps him. 
Lewis: It might be fruitful for the AZA and the animal protection 
community to sit down and have an honest discussion about whether 
something can be done together. I think that discussion would have to 
be undertaken with the understanding that no conclusion or common 
action might be reached, but the discussion may be positive nonethe­
less. 
Lacy: Virtually every zoo, even the good zoos, has bad exhibits. It is 
worth discussing whether there is a way to close down those exhibits. 
There are animals in facilities that we know are not capable of provid­
ing a natural habitat. For example, any zoo that cannot handle polar 
bears should not have them. There are some very good zoos with 
polar bears in bad exhibits. 
Farinato: Sixteen-hundred zoos are licensed and registered by the 
USDA. Of that figure, ten percent are accredited with the AZA. 
Ninety percent are not ascribing to anything we are talking about here. 
The few that teach empathy, personal responsibility, love and respect 
for wildlife are not the problem. The problem is caused by the others. 
What messages are being given to people visiting the ninety percent? 
Hutchins: Zoos are being blamed for a lot of weaknesses in our soci­
ety. People are getting inadequate scientific knowledge and coming to 
the zoo with those preconceived notions. 
Regarding the issue of education and entertainment, we have a very 
puritanical view of education. Education and entertainment are not 
antithetical. It is possible to have both. However, if you go too far you 
wind up with exploitation rather than entertainment. 
Bekoff: Bostock' s paper is an apology. He unnecessarily makes an 
excuse for zoos, such as his appeal to death in nature as more humane 
than death in captivity. Is having a relatively good state of well-being 
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good enough? Bostock and I definitely disagree on what it means to 
have a humane death. 
Lindburg: Feeding is one part of their keeping that is radically altered 
from the natural environment. Most zoos stop with nutrition and 
forget about the process; the searching, collecting, preparation and act 
of assimilation itself, such as parceling off thirty pounds of animal 
carcass with your teeth. Zoos take an anthropomorphic approach to 
provisioning. All have very expensive facilities for food preparation 
but the food comes out pulverized as though the jaws, teeth and hands 
of these animals were ill-equipped to handle the food. 
Clutton-Brock: In response to Hutchins' question about what it is we 
are conserving I would like to remind everyone of Przewalski' s horse, 
a flagship species in the world or conservation. It is really a non­
species or a new species which came out of Mongolia in the last cen­
tury. These animals are very inbred and have become domesticated. 
We really do not know what we are conserving here; is it a domestic or 
wild animal? 
Lukas: In Florida all roadside zoos are state regulated. The federal 
government cannot do anything except through USDA inspections and 
enforcing minimum animal care. They have formed a committee with 
the state and are rewriting the laws together. Florida and California 
are the only states with such state associations, and as a result roadside 
zoos will eventually be illegal in Florida. 
As for long-term conservation programs, there is presently an attempt 
to develop a model in Zaire where the priorities are to set up conserva­
tion programs and see to captive situations. Genetic material will be 
recycled from the wild into the captivity program and then back out to 
the wild. This allows the evolutionary forces to still maintain an effect 
on the gene we get from the wild population, as well as driving habitat 
protection. The key is a strong linkage between habitat protection and 
captive breeding programs. 
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PRESERVING INDIVIDUALS VERSUS CONSERVING 
POPULATIONS: IS THERE A CONFLICT? 
INTRODUCTION 
Donald G. Lindburg 
Zoological Society of San Diego 
_ San Diego, California 
It is relatively easy to achieve agreement that conserving biodiversity 
is a worthy sentiment, but vast differences in priorities emerge when 
there are competing interests and values. 
Summarized briefly, animal liberation/ animal rights' valuation of the 
individual above its zoological taxon or associates in a community is 
an extension of ethical theory to animals, using the criterion of sen­
tience rather than rationality for ascribing to the individual the right to 
an existence free of human-imposed pain and suffering. Humans are 
not entitled to inflict pain for any purpose, according to this view, 
including the utilization of animals for food or clothing, for scientific 
and medical experimentation, for recreation, or even for the animals' 
own survival as a zoological entity. Insofar as they have written on the 
subject, the major articulators of animal rights philosophy have es­
poused essentially a hands-off policy with regard to preservation of 
animal life in the wild state. Singer (1975), for example, sees most 
human attempts at manipulating ecosystems as causing more harm 
than good ( i.e., an increase in suffering), and advocates that we refrain 
from further meddling in their lives. Regan (1983), in an oft quoted 
statement, holds that "the rights view does not recognize the moral 
rights of species to anything, including survival" (p. 359), and recom­
mends that with regard to wild animals, including the highly endan­
gered, the correct policy is to "let them be! "  (p. 361). If we respect the 
rights of the individual, it is held, it should be apparent that the species 
will in turn benefit. 
Environmental ethicists, on the other hand, view the individual as 
transitory, appearing on the stage of life for but a short time as the 
carrier of but a small portion of its taxon's genome, essential however 
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to the continuity of its kind over the vast expanse of time. Although 
finding the concerns expressed for individual welfare commendable, 
environmental philosophers hold that individuals "do not endure long 
enough in terms of preservationist time scales for any efforts at this 
level to be of much consequence" (Hargrove, 1989, p. 128). In addition, 
since a species cannot experience pain or pleasure, an ethic based on 
individual rights does not entitle it to moral consideration. Absence of 
any entitlement for plants has been cited as another shortcoming of 
rights philosophy. As summarized by Norton (1986, p. 275), "Attribu­
tion of rights to other species ( than humans) are, at best, useful as an 
expression of moral concern and commitment or as a forensic device. 
But they provide no theoretically defensible basis for species preserva­
tion." 
Zoos are philosophically more closely aligned with environmentalist 
than with rights advocates in that they attach higher value to aggre­
gates such as taxa or ecosystems than to individual animals. Captive 
breeding efforts seek justification on the basis of a need for interven­
tion to forestall extinctions (Hutchins and Wemmer, 1991), and this 
requirement is held to be ample reason for the frequent violations of 
individual interests, such as euthanatizing unneeded individuals 
(Lacy, 1991). Just as disease and predation act as agents for maintain­
ing the viabilit-y of wild populations, zoo managers have embraced the 
role of selecting agent in the captive sector, determining on the basis of 
genetic representation, health, age, and various other criteria who shall 
live and who shall die., 
Despite the view that adherents of these conflicting value systems have 
little prospect of living happily ever after, it is imperative that dialogue 
continue if for no other reason than to find common starting points for 
debate. Perhaps the words of Hargrove (1992) can serve as a guiding 
principle, namely that "The resolution of the controversy is not simply 
a matter of finding a winning argument, but of finding a position that 
all those concerned about the environment can understand, feel com­
fortable with, and apply in their professional work and their daily 
lives" (pp. xxii-xxiii). 
Before raising some examples of how these conflicting values come to 
bear on the activities of zoos, I would like to emphasize that zoos are 
but a small, perhaps even minuscule example, by comparison, of a 
very broad spectrum of cases in which the same issues are in evidence. 
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Two examples come readily to mind, namely restoration ecology and 
the practice of sustainable utilization. 
Restoration ecology is the attempt to restore to their former pristine 
state habitats that have been decimated by human activity. It takes 
many forms, from replanting of timbered slopes to the cleansing of 
polluted rivers. Germane to this discussion is the introduction by 
humans of alien species that have, over time, resulted in major modifi­
cation of original habitats, in particular the near extinction of endemic 
wildlife. An example is the French subarctic island of Kerguelen, to 
which domestic cattle and cats, the brown rat and several other alien 
species were introduced by seal hunters and whalers during the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. 
These introductions resulted in significant modification of plant 
communities and in the near extinction of native fauna such as the 
burrowing petrel. To restore the ecology of Kerguelen and other 
islands in the area, various campaigns for eradication of alien species 
were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s, including the shooting of 
thousands of feral cats and introduction of fleas carrying the myxoma­
tosis virus to eliminate rabbits (Chapuis et al., 1994). Any number of 
examples closer to home, in which shooting, poisoning, or biological 
agents have been used to exterminate alien animals could be cited 
(see, for example, Atkinson, 1989). 
Sustainable utilization, embraced by major conservation organizations 
such as AWF, WWF, and IUCN, cannot fairly be depicted as a pro­
gram designed to look after the interests of individual animals. Quite 
the contrary, it is an approach which endorses culling at levels that 
prevent the habitat from being overwhelmed on the one hand, but 
which insures that wild populations will remain viable on the other. 
In the case of the African elephant, a number of countries in the south­
ern part of the continent had painstakingly evolved programs for 
harvesting elephants, using funds derived therefrom to protect wild­
life generally. The total ban on trading in elephant ivory is held by 
these countries to be disastrous for future conservation efforts. The 
ban on ivory trading was ostensibly to save elephants from being 
extirpated by poachers. Yet, many have argued that in fact its ratio­
nale eventually shifted to emotional appeals based on the "right" of 
elephants to exist. Advocacy on the grounds of saving individuals 
generated the fear that, ultimately, any other position on the part of 
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conservation organizations would result in disastrous losses in mem­
bership and in revenue. This position was adopted despite continuing 
espousal and implementation of the sustainable utilization doctrine in 
other cases. The journalist Raymond Bonner in his book "At the 
Hands of Man" (1993) portrays the people living at ground zero, so to 
speak, as having their crops destroyed, their lives increasingly endan­
gered, and their rights violated from a burgeoning elephant popula­
tion. Bonner's essay presents several examples of local efforts to find 
accommodation between wildlife and poverty stricken tribals, all 
based on a system of population regulation (of animals only) through 
cropping. 
This case illustrates how animal rights philosophy, as articulated by 
Regan ( 1983), for example, can join in supporting efforts to end poach­
ing, not because elephant extinction is morally indefensible, but be­
cause of concerns about their suffering at the hands of the poacher. 
ZOOS AS CONSERVATION ENTITIES V S. ZOOS AS INHUMANE 
KEEPERS OF WILDLIFE 
Ascription to the view that pain is evil leads to behavior that would 
minimize its occurrence, and would do so wherever the potential for 
experiencing pain is found. As summed up by Callicott ( 1980), moral 
agents should therefore, among other things, "cease to eat the flesh of 
animals, to hunt them, to wear fur and leather clothing and bone 
ornaments and other articles made from the bodies of animals, to eat 
eggs and drink milk, if the animal producers of these commodities are 
retained under inhumane circumstances, and to patronize zoos (as 
sources of psychological if not physical torment of animals)" (p. 317, 
emphasis added). Clearly, zoos are viewed by many as facilities that 
deny animals their freedom, subject them to spatially restricted and 
sterile living environments, expose them to invasive physical manipu­
lations, and often result in the loss of species-typical behaviors. Ac­
cording to Fox (1986), scientific director for the Humane Society of the 
U.S., zoos are places to visit if you want to see unhealthy, neurotic 
animals, many of which are disabled by learned helplessness, and 
which are mere caricatures of wild conspecifics. They give visitors the 
wrong message, namely, that abnormal behavior is the norm, and that 
domination of animals is a cultural ideal. Like others who find captiv­
ity for wild animals distasteful, Fox advocates reliance on films as a 
better way for urban-living humans to experience wild animals. Given 
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that it is sometimes associated with violence, it is not known whether 
he would advocate that humans should experience sex in the same 
way. 
To these may be added the notion that elevation of humans to the role 
of primary agent of selection results in an inevitable domestication 
process which, given enough generations, may leave scant resem­
blance between the captive animal and its wild counterpart. 
In reality, however, the lines between captive and wild have become 
somewhat blurred in recent years, particularly in the case of wildlife 
"imprisoned" in sanctuaries and reserves. Here, too, freedom of move­
ment may be limited to small and frequently overcrowded ranges (e.g., 
Amboseli National park), and the growth of ecotourism insures a daily 
invasion of visitor-laden vehicles that disrupts their solitude, checks 
their movements, and sometimes interferes with their pursuit of food. 
These are environments in which the unchecked growth of lion popu­
lations results in an imbalance leading to the demise of a subordinate 
carnivore, the cheetah. In the Aberdares of northern Kenya, the beauti­
ful bongo antelope is near extirpation for the same reason. Some 
would hold that arguments against zoos that are based on the evils of 
captivity are somewhat less convincing in light of these realities. 
It has also been suggested that the harshness of captivity is mollified 
by the fact that the majority of zoo-living animals are now captive 
born, meaning that they have been accustomed since birth to the re­
stricted environments of captivity, and therefore respond quite differ­
ently in terms of flight/ fight responses or tolerance of potentially 
unpleasant stimulation than an individual that began its life in the 
wild. Unless specially prepared, captive born individuals, may, fur­
thermore, be ill equipped for survival in a natural milieu, underscoring 
the naivete of those who would like to open the cage doors and set 
them free. Attempts at reintroduction of captive born cheetahs to wild 
habitat in southern Africa, for example, have been notable failures, in 
large part because they had not learned to recognize lions as predators, 
and were killed. 
Inaccurate notions about wild and captive animals may be a symptom 
of generations of living in urban environments, far removed from 
anything more than transient and superficial contact with the world of 
nature. Nature is often portrayed as edenic and friendly, when in 
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reality it entails a continuous struggle with predators, disease, starva­
tion, drought, and the extremes of climate. We may wonder if much 
thought is given, despite the easy access to televised episodes of this 
struggle, to the fact that a gazelle must be constantly on the alert for 
predators, may be forced to flee at top speed to escape being the lion's 
next victim, may have its dependent young slaughtered before its eyes, 
and must conceal any physical weakness, including pain, to avoid 
being targeted for the next kill. In a reversal of the conventional wis­
dom, Sagoff is quoted (Callicott, 1986) as stating that if one truly cares 
about animal pain and suffering, the best thing for wild animals would 
be to remove them to the protective confines of zoos! 
The value of captive breeding and the fate of wild animals that are 
maintained in zoos for this purpse probably lies somewhere between 
the caricatures provided by their partisans on the one hand, and their 
detractors on the other. Although a handful of species survive today 
only in zoos, zoos' ability to take endangered species a step or two 
back from the brink of extinction is probably overstated, and their 
success in fostering values favorable to preservation of wild forms is 
not easily measured. On the other hand, much of the criticism of zoos 
appears to rest on outdated notions of what they are like, and on 
emotional rather than factual characterizations of captive living envi­
ronments. 
THE APPLICATION OF IN VASIV E METHODS TO THE CARE 
AND PROPAGATION OF CAPTIV E WILDLIFE 
It would be inaccurate to suggest that, despite improved health, nutri­
tionally superior diets, absence of predation, protection from the ex­
cesses of heat and cold, and increased longevity, the zoo environment 
is therefore an environment free of stress. In fact, some of the activities 
of zoos espoused in the name of captive propagation have been con­
demned as "a moral atrocity" (Varner and Monroe, 1991). Among the 
practices mentioned by Varner and Monroe are euthanization of ge­
netic surplus, embryo transfers between species, injections to supero­
vulate females, and double-clutching. They conclude that, "From a 
sentient perspective, even if a species is going extinct in the wild so 
that captive breeding is the only possible way to preserve it, it is still 
difficult or impossible to justify captive breeding the remaining indi­
viduals" (p. 28). Others concerned with animal welfare hold that 
captive breeding cannot possibly be good when viewed from the 
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perspective of the individual animal (Regan, 1983), and that extinction 
is preferable to an existence only in a captive situation (Jamieson, 1985; 
Fox, 1986). How meritorious are these claims? And, insofar as they 
inflict suffering on the individual that is being manipulated, does not 
the end justify the means which, in this case, is the increased prospect 
of species survival? 
Animals in both wild and captive locales develop cancer and diabetes, 
contract infectious diseases, become parasite infested, and suffer from 
wounds inflicted by their conspecifics. In zoological gardens, not a 
day goes by but that hundreds of ailing individuals receive treatment 
designed to cure their illnesses and in many cases save their lives. 
What could be more noble? Yet, given human propensities for becom­
ing immunized to suffering, do not the assertions of Varner and Mon­
roe merit examination? 
Consider that a young chimpanzee, unlike its human counterpart, 
cannot be made to understand that the pain of its medical experience if 
for its own good. It will be captured, anesthetized, and wake up in a 
recovery area that is strange and far removed from its familiar sur­
rounds. The struggles of a wild animal succumbing to and recovering 
from anesthesia cannot be passed off as of no consequence. The indi­
vidual does suffer, witness the fact that it quickiy iearns to react to the 
sudden appearance of extra personnel and the sight of capture para­
phernalia with unmistakable signs of fear and avoidance. And the 
effects of separation from cagemates and kin, leading to greatly height­
ened agitation and eventual depression, are commonly seen during 
hospital stays, especially in the highly social primates. 
Quarantine is, by definition, isolation in a sterile, easily sanitized 
( therefore, hard and cold) environment for a minimum period of 30 
days, during which it receives the minimum treatment necessary to 
sustain life ( e.g., food, shelter, and temperature control). The quaran­
tine experience is as frequent as the act of transferring animals between 
institutions or countries. 
The practice of animal medicine has been largely immune to outside 
scrutiny from the standpoint of pain and suffering, since intervention 
is widely accepted as an obvious necessity and because the practitio­
ners are themselves regarded as the highest authority. Quarantine 
cannot be abolished if we are to have captive animals, but one might 
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argue that steps could be taken to soften the impact of this experience. 
The immobilization of ill or wounded individuals is a necessary form 
of intervention, but perhaps this highly stressful act should be under­
taken only as needed to restore health, not as a routine search for 
potentially harmful pathogens. Hospitals are anthropomorphic in 
design in that those needing treatment, however minor, are funneled in 
from all corners of the institution, and held in a strange and odious 
environment as long as treatment and surveillance of recovery is 
deemed necessary. Is sufficient thought given to the possibility that 
some forms of health care may be taken to the animal, so that it is 
treated in a familiar environment, or to reducing hospital retention 
time that is dictated by convenience to staff rather than the animal 
under treatment? Recognition should be given to the fact that the 
hospital experience for a wild animal can never be pleasant, only more 
or less tolerable. 
A second category of stressful experiences that have been brought into 
question arise from the practice of what has come to be known as 
"assisted reproduction." Semen collection via rectal probe electrical 
stimulation, or the scrutiny of female organs via laparoscopy, or the 
flushing out of embryos for cryopreservation or in vitro fertilization, 
are all carried out under anesthesia. These are the acts of front-line 
news stories, the application of human ingenuity to the development 
of new techniques of propagation in a world where natural processes 
are often compromised. As in health care, these acts of immobilization 
are stressful, and are carried out without the comprehension or coop­
eration of the animal whose representation in future generations is at 
issue. Although there is no public score keeping, those on the inside 
will acknowledge that an individual "used" in assisted reproduction 
may be subjected to dozens upon dozens of such procedures. Are 
those who react with concern about the quantity of stress and distress 
visited upon the animal in these programs merely emotionally mis­
guided, or is there a question of ethics that needs to be examined? 
Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to point out that the same or 
similar procedures are increasingly common in the study and manage­
ment of wild populations. Individuals of a given species, for example, 
are darted with anesthetic projectiles to enable the procurement of 
tissue samples for laboratory analysis or to collect biometric data that 
is applied to their long term management. Some conservationists 
envision a time when gametes rather than whole animals will be trans-
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£erred between fragmented wild populations in the interest of maxi­
mizing genetic diversity. Relevant here, also, is what some would 
characterize as the ultimate indignity, namely the removal of their 
horns with chain saws to immunize wild living rhinos to poaching. 
Such actions unquestionably bring into conflict those who value the 
species' long-term survival with those concerned about the discomfort 
attending the use of invasive procedures. 
If the morality that guides human interaction with wild animals is the 
minimizing of pain and suffering, it is quite obvious that in both cap­
tive and natural milieus much must be left to fate. This would seem­
ingly be a scenario that will result in the demise of a very large number 
of wild forms. If, on the other hand, the long tern view of providing 
continuity between generations is a practical if not moral imperative, 
then tolerance of some measure of suffering and sacrificing of indi­
viduals must be accommodated. 
THE FATE OF CAPTIV E ANIMALS THAT ARE NOT ESSENTIAL 
TO CONSERVATION (IE., THE SURPLUS PROBLEM) 
There is unanimity among zoo professionals on the point that captive 
breeding programs unavoidably generate a population that becomes 
surplus to their conservation endeavors. The notion that individuals 
become surplus needs emphasis in order to counter the notion that 
surplus animals result only from unnecessary and wanton breeding, 
and that the problem would go away if zoos merely practiced restraint 
( see Grandy, 1989, as an example of this position). Because the size of 
the captive population for a given species is the minimum deemed 
necessary to preserve acceptable levels of genetic diversity, the rules 
governing small-population propagation come into effect. That is, 
special care must be given to the number of founders at the outset, and 
to the genetic representation of given individuals in the captive gene 
pool subsequently. Put simply, to maintain the steady state in popula­
tion size, dictated by the captive space available to the species, a point 
is reached where each member of the population is allowed to breed 
only to the level of replacing itself in the next generation, usually from 
two to three offspring per parent. Consequently, in the case of an 
animal for which 10 to 15 offspring is a lifetime norm, its genetic quota 
may be reached while it is still relatively young and expected to sur­
vive, let us say, for another 15 to 20 years. To be free from the burden 
of long-term care and feeding, the view held by a majority of zoo 
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professional is that these surplus individuals should be euthanized in 
order to free up resources for the future propagation of their own or 
other species (Lacy, 1991). Individual interests, in other words, may be 
sacrificed to the greater good of perpetuating the taxon to which one 
belongs. Interestingly enough, at present zoos use an hierarchically 
ordered approach in dealing with this problem, such that surplus 
gorillas will be readily euthanized, but surplus zorillas will not. This 
position rests not on a carefully reasoned set of values, but on a prag­
matic approach to what public sentiment will allow. 
We have elsewhere attempted to deal with both ethical and pragmatic 
aspects of this problem (Lindburg, 1991; Lindburg and Lindburg, 
1995), and will only summarize a few of our main points here. We 
have taken the position that an hierarchical approach is unworkable 
precisely because it rests on a sliding scale of valuation, and that at 
least at the present time there are appealing alternatives to euthanasia 
such as the construction of retirement facilities, alternative benign uses 
of surplus individuals, and conversion of scarce space in zoos from 
species not in need of captive propagation to those that are. Implied in 
this approach is the belief that zoos may ultimately have to act against 
the interests of individuals, but that a reordering of priorities and 
development of new initiatives have the potential of accommodating 
both individual and species interests. 
To these earlier discussions may be added the prospect of manipulat­
ing generation times in steady-state populations, such that genetic 
contributions are spread over the lifetime of individuals rather than 
being concentrated in the early years of life. The process of producing 
replacement offspring is, in other words, slowed down in relation to 
the projected average life span for a given taxon. While morally more 
acceptable, this scenario entails a bit of a gamble that animal "x" will 
not contract a fatal illness before it has its opportunity to reproduce in 
the later stages of reproductive life. And for species such as the highly 
social primates whose young are dependent on age-mates for socializa­
tion, this approach would produce the equivalent of human young­
sters growing up in a world of adults only. 
To conclude this point, we reiterate our statement from the Atlanta 
Conference (Lindburg and Lindburg, 1995) that accommodation be­
tween the often competing need to respect the welfare of individuals 
and to preserve species derive from the realization that "humans stand 
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apart from the rest of the biological world in terms of conscience and 
moral responsibility. As Rolston has put it, Humans are in the world 
ethically as nothing else is (1989, p. 238, original italics) . It follows that 
in exercising our judgements we must act honestly and responsibly, 
and in the present case this means that we must pursue the unrealized 
options that are available to zoos in dealing with healthy surplus 
animals. "  
CONCLUSION 
It cannot be denied that, left to themselves, many species will disap­
pear from our planet in the decades ahead, or that the vast majority of 
these extinctions will be due to human activity - so aptly described by 
Rolston (1985) as "super killing by a super killer." Nor can we deny 
that if this trend is to be slowed, human intervention is required. 
Wherever they go, humans have a degrading impact on the natural 
world. Being a culture-bearing creature means, among other things, 
having a unique capacity for modifying the environment, usually at 
the expense of natural processes and natural systems. Who can doubt, 
for instance, that the role of natural selection is lessened because it 
operates in a world increasingly shaped by human decisions as to 
what shall be? Having arrived at a point where the imoact of human-
� L L 
kind on the natural world is so pervasive, we cannot but acknowledge 
that we are henceforth deeply involved in determining the future of 
this planet, for good or bad. Playing god is something we have been 
doing from the first appearance of culturally patterned behavior. Now, 
the question is, given this capability, what kind of world we will settle 
for, not what kind of world we want. 
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LINDBURG DISCUSSION 
Pacelle: I take issue with a number of points in Lindburg's paper. I 
found the early part of his work to be a manifesto for intervention with 
respect to ecosystems, captive breeding programs, etc. as well as what 
we should do with individual animals in zoos. I agree that there 
should be intervention, but the questions are when and how. 
I would like to make a point about conservation, biodiversity and 
environmental advocacy. It seems that, with the exception of captive 
breeding and important international research work the zoo commu­
nity is not really at the forefront of the conservation movement. When 
I think of the major domestic environmental issues in this country I do 
not see the zoo community there. The zoo community has an interna­
tional bias but is not strongly involved in national conservation, just as 
the animal protection, welfare and rights community has historically 
not done much about habitat. 
There are three other issues I would like to touch on. Lindburg 
brought up the phrase "restoration ecology," and spoke about the 
eradication of exotics in particular areas where they are having a detri­
mental impact on the global ecological community. When we have 
questions regarding exotic animal management it is not an all or noth­
ing game. More and more we are taking each of these cases on an 
individual basis. There is not a categorical opposition to control exot­
ics. One example is the pig situation in Hawaii. The state is engaged 
in a campaign to eradicate pigs through the use of neck snares. There 
are very compelling reasons to eradicate pigs from that ecosystem; 
they have been brought there in the last few centuries and are having a 
negative impact on the landscape. PETA does not oppose this killing 
of pigs. They object to the use of neck snares and urge the use of a 
more humane way of eradication. Another example is the mountain 
goat population in Olympic National Park. There is controversy as to 
whether the goats are native to the peninsula. There is not a scintilla of 
evidence that mountain goats are a peril to any native plant species in 
the national park, yet there is this great push to eliminate them from 
the environment. We need to look at the justification. Just because 
they are exotic does not mean we should eliminate them through 
inhumane methods, which at this time is the only way that mountain 
goats could be eliminated. 
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Lindburg embraces the principle of sustainable utilization of wildlife. 
The zoo community's focus on population leads to this idea of sustain­
able utilization, which I feel is a tremendously detrimental impact on 
the welfare of individual animals. One could make the argument that 
whaling can be done sustainably and that whales can be killed in a 
manner that is regulated and will not peril the existence of certain 
whale species. I find the idea of killing whales entirely repugnant, 
even if some economic benefit could be derived from the activity. 
Questions about wildlife management have to involve this critical 
question of ethics and the treatment of individual animals, not just 
sustaining the population for future generations. The state of Alaska is 
killing wolves to create a giant game farm. This may not imperil the 
wolf population, but what does it say about the "wild?" What does it 
say about allowing ecosystems to function and predator /prey relation­
ships to exist? This is a perfect example of sustainable utilization. 
Baker: I do not look at this as individual versus population, for we 
cannot preserve populations without preserving individuals. I look at 
it as conflicts that are better defined as conflicts between individuals. 
A weighing of individual interests is necessary for a solution. 
Many of us view animals in captivity as ambassadors for their species. 
It is not in their best interest to be in captivity, but in the best interest of 
a number of other animals in the wild. 
Another conflict is where actions are in the best interest of future 
individuals. We look at what goes on with animal behavior and we see 
they place a great deal of importance on the continuation of their 
species. For example, there is a small Australian carnivore called 
antichinus, one of the few mammals that breeds once and then dies. If 
you prevent the male from breeding they live much longer. Yet they 
choose to breed and die rather than live longer. They display a strong 
desire to preserve the species. 
The real issue is not what rights animals have, but what value they 
have. I would hate to see an argument that rights are dependent on 
cognitive ability. A number of things are worthy of value, including 
biodiversity and invertebrates. 
Lindburg: The paper was not meant as a blanket endorsement of 
sustainable utilization. We must remember that the world today is not 
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as it used to be. Many of the natural checks and balances that would 
limit a population are no longer in effect. We have created this situa­
tion. One of the major examples of the dilemma we face with surplus 
animals in zoos is that of the orangutans. It has been decided to man­
age the eighty-eight hybrid species to extinction. The cost to keep 
these animals as we do now for the remainder of their normal lives 
comes to approximately three and a half million dollars. I hope there 
would be less expensive alternatives, for example warm climate retire­
ment communities could be built at much less cost. 
Pacelle: I appreciate your qualification on the sustainable utilization 
issue. You seem to define it in the text as a response to the overpopula­
tion of animals. I think more and more it is defined by country and 
state as a means to generate income from the use of wildlife, whether 
or not they are an abundant population. The state fish and game 
agencies treat deer and other species as if they are a crop to be har­
vested every year and that we should derive certain recreational or 
economic benefits from them. 
Robinson: I would argue that zoological parks have been unprec­
edented in their allocation of resources for the conservation endeavor. 
Zoos have a unique capability to address certain kinds of conservation 
problems and they tend to do those rather well. They tend to come out 
of a technological, scientific, problem-solving orientation. Increasingly 
in the conservation field implementation of conservation projects is 
being taken over by zoo-based conservation organizations. 
de Boer : Zoos are one of the few institutions focused on the global 
perspective of conservation. It would be fine if more action was taken 
on local conservation issues but the global situation is extremely im­
portant. Apart from the zoo world, there is no comparable network, 
nothing that like the zoo network can so efficiently teach people in 
Europe to be interested in rain forests in Brazil, or that North Ameri­
cans should work to save the forests in the East of Europe. 
Robinson: Zoo conservation efforts have tended to be very divorced 
from collections. There has been an interesting debate within the 
zoological community whether or not to focus on domestic conserva­
tion issues. For the most part the argument frequently is that, in the 
United States, there are a lot more resources going into domestic con­
servation than international conservation. 
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Jamieson: When we breed animals and endangered species and then 
kill them we violate a trust with the animal and with the public. The 
cost of that radically outweighs any relatively minor concerns about 
whether a small amount of money could be best spent in one way or 
another. 
Hutchins: Regarding what Pacelle said about mountain goats, I spent 
five years studying those animals. I do not buy the evidence that they 
were there before 1920 . A lot of times there is reaching from the ani­
mals protection community to find evidence to support their point of 
view. The goats are not threatening all the plant species in the park. 
However, the environment has definitely been influenced by the intro­
duction of this species. We should be looking at more humane ways to 
control them but I consider introduced species to be one of the top two 
or three ecological problems we have in the world today. 
Pacelle also stated that zoos are not major players in conservation. I 
would turn that around and say that animal protection groups are not 
major players in conservation. I would like to see a more responsible 
approach to conservation by the animal protection community. We 
would like to work together with them on these things. The AZA is 
very active in conservation. 
Clifton: Roadside zoos are often run by people who were once em­
ployed by a zoo or circus but were let go as new legislation arose. 
Many of these people have the "old" mentality regarding animals and 
their care. A lot of them have no alternatives to make a living and 
have opened their own operations. 
We need to educate the public about what a credible zoo is and sensi­
tize them about what is bad about roadside zoos. It is possible to pull 
roadside zoo operators back into the network. Have these people take 
care of some of the surplus animals now living in zoos, set up terms 
and contracts with them and follow through on inspections. Provide a 
stipend for the care and feeding of the animals. Such a program would 
still allow the operators to make a living while giving us control over 
the roadside zoo situation. 
Grandy: I find the discussion of exotic species to be a huge issue. It 
extends far beyond wildlife in every dimension. The United States is 
full of exotic flora and fauna. I overheard a discussion earlier regard-
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ing "good" animal surplus versus "bad" surplus. Good surplus came 
out of carefully engineered captive breeding programs while bad 
surplus is animals produced as a result of sloppy management, sloppy 
animal husbandry. There is a huge difference between the two. We 
ought to do everything in our power to prevent the production of bad 
surplus. 
Pokras: I would like to put myself forward as an advocate for selective 
euthanasia. It is a very sad and sobering thing and one wonders what 
decision is appropriate. For example, a bird gets hurt but can be saved 
through surgery. However, it will not be able to fly again. What 
should we do? A lot of this depends on the quality of the facility 
where we can put this creature. If I could find nice homes that would 
provide care and nutrition I would feel great. I end up killing about 
one thousand animals per year. On the large scale I feel okay about 
doing that, for it is in the interest of the animal's well-being to kill it. 
To keep it alive and put it in a less than adequate facility would be 
inhumane. As we get better with our medical and surgical techniques 
we may not have to euthanize as frequently, but we still will not be 
able to save them all. Death needs to be discussed openly and the 
value of death education acknowledged. I really think it is sometimes 
more humane to give an animal the quiet and comfort and finality of 
death than to put it somepiace we know to be less than optimal. 
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ANIMAL WELL-BEING IN ZOOS, CONSERVATION 
CENTERS AND IN-SITU CONSERVATION PROGRAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
John Lukas 
White Oak Conservation Center 
Yulee, Florida 
Well-being, as defined in reference to one's welfare, is the condition of 
happiness, prosperity and good health. In dealing with an animal's 
well-being, there are two frames of reference to consider. First, biologi­
cal well-being which encompasses the spacial, social, nutritional, 
behavioral and reproductive needs of a species. Secondly, cultural 
well-being which reflects how human beings interpret the state of well­
being of animals concentrating on their perception of happiness, clean­
liness, safety and the way the animals are treated by the people who 
care for them. 
In this paper, we are not addressing freedom as a condition of well­
being, only happiness, prosperity and good health. Free-ranging wild 
animals are not free but are restricted by consideration of space, time 
and individual relationships (Hediger, 1969). We will look at animal 
well-being under these restrictions and discuss the effort needed to 
maintain well-being, as the level of constraint imposed by man on 
animals increases, and natural surroundings give way to artificial 
enclosures. 
To look at animal well-being under different management schemes, we 
first need to define the level of confinement addressed in the paper. 
In Situ 
In s itu refers to populations of animal existing in range states where 
they naturally occur. Usually the animals are inside a national park or 
wildlife reserve where they are afforded some protection from human 
activities. 
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Intensive Protection Zones 
An Intensive Protection Zone ( IPZ) is an area, usually within govern­
ment wildlife department lands, in range states into which individuals 
of a threatened species are concentrated. The area is strategically 
defined by fences, guard posts and natural barriers. The animals 
inside IPZs are afforded greater protection from man-induced mortal­
ity by the presence of a large, well-trained unit of wildlife guards. The 
IPZ connects to a larger wildlife reserve into which the animals can be 
moved after the threats of their survival have been controlled or elimi­
nated. 
Conservation Center 
A conservation center is an institution outside the range states that 
maintains anima species in semi-natural conditions with the emphasis 
on scientific management to aid their survival The overriding premise 
is one that puts the needs of animals first. Usually, they are not open 
to the public and any viewing of animals is strictly controlled. 
Nature Center 
Nature centers exhibit native fauna in very naturaiistic surroundings 
in an effort to educate the local populace about their indigenous plants 
and animals. Nature centers concentrate on topics related to ecology 
and man's relationship with wildlife on a local level. 
Zoos exhibit animals in artificial environments meant to depict the 
animal in a resemblance of its natural habitat for educational and 
recreational objectives. Progressive zoos dedicate resources to off­
exhibit breeding and research programs and make each exhibit as 
natural and representative of the local habitat of the species main­
tained as is possible, . There are different levels of accomplishment in 
zoos in reaching the foal of naturalistic display of animals and having 
outreach conservation and breeding programs. I have arbitrarily 
divided zoos into progressive zoos, good zoos, and bad zoos base don 
their respective level of naturalistic exhibitry and the attention paid to 
well-being in providing for their animals. 
Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 1995 
172 
Biological Well-being 
Each species has specific biological needs that need to be fulfilled for it 
to survive and reproduce. For most species, these biological needs are 
known and documented. How and where these biological needs are 
satisfied determines the level of well-being a species can experience in 
different environments. 
For each species, biological and behavioral needs should be prioritized 
to reflect the most important needs necessary for survival. From this 
list, a profile of essential needs can be developed that must be met for 
basic biological well-being. Like essential vitamins or amino acids, 
certain biological needs must be present for biological survival. These 
must be satisfied in all instances. Other biological needs are less criti­
cal to survival but do play an important role in providing increasingly 
better living conditions for the animals ( i.e., well-being. 
Based on these parameters, the in-situ animal populations would 
possess the maximum amount of biological resources needed for 
biological well-being. These biological resources would steadily de­
cline as we put the animals under increasing levels of confinement. As 
the natural sources of biological well-being pare away, man attempts to 
substitute them to maintain the animals well-be:h7.g. As the animal 
becomes more confined, man substitutes hay for natural grasses, 
prepared meat diets for carcasses, culverts for dens and concrete pools 
for lakes. This is all done to maintain biological well-being. How 
successful we are in providing for biological well-being depends on 
how well we understand the biological needs of the species and how 
well we provide for their biological needs within different levels of 
confinement. 
Cultural Well-being 
Cultural well-being is reflected in how human beings interpret the 
state of the animals well-being in relation to its living conditions. This 
is essentially done by asking the question, "Is it happy?". Happiness 
being an essential part of well-being, along with prosperity (offspring?, 
territory?) and good health. 
These are some generalizations that I have encountered over the years 
observing the relationship between people and wild animals held in 
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People seem to sense an animal is happy when: 
it has a reasonable amount of space to live in. 
it is living in a normal social grouping of conspecific 
it is in a habitat that resembles its natural home. 
the food provided resembles its natural diet. 
the environment is clean 
the environment is safe and secure. 
they do not look or act bored. 
Cultural well-being takes the biological needs of the animals and 
injects into them human ideas about happiness and examines how 
they are reflected in the animals environment and its behavior. 
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Different levels of confinement provide more or less of the factors 
humans expect to find in the environment and in the animal that make 
it appear happy. We will now look at these factors in relationship to 
varying degrees of confinement. 
In people's minds, an animal can never have too much space, for 
people equate space with freedom. But when people come to view 
wildlife, they expect the animals to be easily observed. In a national 
park or wildlife reserve, this is accomplished by conditioning the 
animal to tourist vehicles or boats. This can be done because the ani­
mals are protect by law from harm by people and quickly become used 
to another neutral entity in their lives. Some animals even use tourist 
vehicles for their advantage as evidence by cheetahs in the Masaii 
Mara who use land rovers as elevated observation points from which 
to look for suitable prey. 
In an IPZ, and to a lesser extent in conservation centers, suitable space 
is provided but with little emphasis on visibility and greater emphasis 
on protection. The goal here being to increase and maintain a frag­
mented population at all costs. Poaching, disruption of behavior and 
harassment of the animals is strictly forbidden. Great efforts are made 
to insure the protection of these animals as is the case with IPZ's for 
black rhinos in Zimbabwe where poachers are shot on sight. 
Zoos must provide viability by design. They are in business to exhibit 
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animals. The space allocated to each species should be the maximum 
available to satisfy biological and cultural demands of well-being. This 
requires innovative and costly exhibits. More importantly, it requires 
careful selection of species which are exhibited, making sure their 
allotted space is biologically and culturally perceived as adequate. If 
this cannot be done, they should not be maintained until quality space 
can be dedicated to their zoo home range. 
In regards to social groupings, surrounding and food, wildlife reserves 
provide the best balance of these needs. As we confine the animals 
into smaller spaces, we need to provide as natural a situation as pos­
sible. IPZs and conservation centers stress the importance of these 
factors and integrate them into their overall management. At the zoo 
level, the more that appears natural in the animals lives the more 
people will perceive the animals are happy and prosperous. Selection f 
species that can be afforded properly constructed exhibits, allowing a 
natural lifestyle, will go a long way in presenting a positive image to 
the visiting public. Even if the above natural factors are met, there is 
still a need to consider boredom as a factor affecting people's percep­
tion of happiness in animals. If an animal is not provided with a 
proper environment and looks bored or sad or displays stereotypic 
behavior, the public will respond adversely. These behaviors are 
unnatural responses to an artificial environment. An improvement in 
space, habitat quality, food sources, the number of conspecific and 
health care usually will eliminate these negative behaviors. If these 
improvements in the quality of its life do not change the negative 
behaviors then most likely this individual/species should not be kept 
at the zoo level of confinement. Preferably, if needs to be maintained 
only in conservation centers where the more abundant semi-natural 
environments can help to eliminate destructive behaviors. Even in 
certain cases, the conservation center may not provide enough re­
sources for well-being and the animal should be maintained only in 
situ. 
Safety, security and cleanliness are uniquely human responses to living 
in this world. Animals do not worry about their safety , they go about 
their lives concerned about living, not worrying about being injured or 
killed. Many species of mammals and birds clean and groom them­
selves and some animals keep their den sights clean, but most go about 
their lives not overly concerned with a clean home range. People are 
concerned about unclean environments because of the relationship to 
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disease The impact of waste on a restricted environment is well 
known. People like cleanliness and an animal in a clean environment 
makes them happy so they feel the animal also must be happy about it. 
In regards to these factors, there is a reversal of which level of confine­
ment provides the best situation for animals as people see them. In 
situ areas provide little security or cleanliness as people want it. Natu­
ral factors such as predation, disease, starvation, intra-species aggres­
sion, along with human poaching, hunting and harassment take a 
heavy toll on individual animals living in wild places. IPZ and conser­
vation centers provide protection from certain types of harm like 
poaching, harassment, starvation and at time, predation and disease. 
Intra-specific aggression and some health related problems related to 
large areas and limited observation of animals will still occur. Zoos do 
provide the best security and the cleanest environment for animals. 
Most of the in situ mortality factors can be eliminated by the extensive 
care and protection provided in a zoo situation. Two factors that 
contribute occasionally to making a zoo environment unsafe for ani­
mals are accidents; usually due to small spaces, poorly designed facili­
ties or improper care and vandals. 
Because of this improve security and cleanliness, zoo animals live 
much longer than wild animals. This is both a blessing and a curse. 
Long-live animals produce more offspring over their life-time. They 
also must be expensively maintained well past their reproductive and 
even exhibit value years. here again, the perception of happiness 
depends on the quality of life than on the quantity of years. Zoos must 
be prepared to provide quality environments and care for all their 
animals for their entire life if they are to be perceived as providing 
conditions conducive for well-being. Aged animals, like aged people, 
deserve special care. Planning for their retirement needs to begin 
while the animal is young. 
If a wild animal is perceived by people to live in natural surroundings, 
in natural social grouping, eating natural looking food in a large area 
but still visible and the area is clean and safe and it does not appear 
bored or sad, then the animal must be happy. If wild animals are 
treated at all like we treat domestic animals, people consider the cruel. 
We must remember that wild animals did not ask to be confined and in 
providing for their care we are held to higher standards than those 
deemed acceptable for domestic animal management. 
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Standards 
Now that we have looked at what well-being means for animals both 
biologically and culturally, how do we attempt to provide animals 
with a state of well-being as their level of confinement becomes more 
artificial. One way is to develop standards that guide people in devel­
oping the proper environment for animals that not only provides for 
but also fosters well-being. 
A standard is defined as a grade or level of excellence or advancement 
generally regarded as right and fitting. For each species to be managed 
in confinement in zoos or conservation centers, a set of standards 
should be developed by a committee with representation coming from 
a diverse audience such as that represented at this meeting; biologist, 
zoologists, curators, philosophers, behaviorists, animal protectionists, 
field researchers and administrator. 
The American Zoos and Aquariums Association through Species 
Survival Plans, (SSP) provide expertise in genetic and demographic 
management of a captive population. What is greatly overlooked is 
the consideration of what each species needs in captivity to experience 
well-being. 
In SSP master-planning, a husbandry manual is formulated which 
describes certain standards to maintain a species in artificial environ­
ments. I have attended several of these planning sessions and feel it is 
detrimental to develop of these so-called minimum standards It is a 
contradiction in terms if we define a standard as a "level of excellence 
generally regarded as right." How can providing the minimum to 
house a species in captivity be promoted? By basing our present 
standards on the status quo which includes some depiorable facilities 
for certain species, the zoo community leaves itself open for justly 
deserved criticism. Husbandry manuals fall short because they de­
scribe what is being done now, not what should be done for the ani­
mals to raise their standard of living to a level where they can experi­
ence a state of well-being. The standards for management of a species 
in captivity should stand by themselves, be emulated, be goals to reach 
for. For the sake of discussion, let us call them optimum standards of 
confinement (OSC). These OSCs, if set by a multi-disciplinary commit­
tee, should satisfy the biological needs of a species and our culturally 
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based response to how those needs are being satisfied. By doing this, a 
new dimension of performance would be created which will raise 
animal care to species care .  These OSC' s will allow for animal well­
being to be the driving force of captive conservation programs because 
it sets forth the level at which an animal can be satisfactorily main­
tained and experience well-being in different degrees of confinement. 
Just managing numbers and space allotment, removes dignity and 
well-being from the equation. When well-being is considered first, 
then the number of suitable spaces will be real and the numbers of 
animals that can fill those spaces will be real. 
The decision to maintain animals in conservation centers or in zoos 
should be linked to a percentage of compliance with the OSC as deter­
mined by the committee. For instance, if the committee determines 
that 75% compliance with the OSC for species "A" provides adequate 
resources for a state of well-being in a zoo setting, then zoos, realizing 
that level of compliance could exhibit animals of species "A" while 
continuing to strive for a complete realization of OSC for that species. 
If a zoo could only attain 60% compliance, they could not maintain this 
species until they had brought their facilities up to the 75% compliance 
level. 
At this point, I wouid iike to run though an example of setting an OSC 
for an animal I am very familiar with, the okapi (Okapi johnstoni) . 
BIOLOGICAL NEED 
Okapi are forest dwellers that 
need shade and cover. 
Range over a relatively small 
area (2km2) in the wild . 
Solitary except for mother 
w I calf, female territories 
overlap, males wander 
through the territories of 
several females. 
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RESPONSE IN CAPTIVITY 
Trees in pen, areas with thick 
brush and shrubs .  Access to 
shelter at all times. 
Need 1 acre per animal which 
is heavily wooded . 
Can exhibit alone, preferably 




Eat leaves from 125 species 
of trees, spends 12-14 hrs a 
day eating. 
Drinks water frequently. 
Mother spends very little 
with her calf during the 
first three months. 
Sensitive to loud noises. 
Sensitive to cold. 
Male needs to remain with 
females for 24 hours during 
estrus. 
Does not like rain. 
Does not iike insects. 





Okapi do better if they 
have access to the outside 
year round. 
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Provide browse, several times 
a day, good diet of hay, grain 
and vegetables. 
Fresh water always available. 
Provide separate calving areas 
w I multi-stall/pens for mother 
to avoid calf except for nursing. 
Locate away from sources of 
loud noises, provide place to 
hide when frightened. 
Provide heated winter quarters. 
Provide for 24 hour watches 
during estrus. 
Provide shelter. 
Spray for insects, provide 
insect proof quarters. 
Provide for long-term optimum 
care. 
RESPONSE IN CAPTIVITY 
Pick up manure twice daily. 
Clean waters every day. 
All fences/ facilities neat and in 
good repair. Barriers suitable 
for a large ungulate. 
Concentrate captive population 
in warmer climates. 
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Security 
Easy viewing. 
Locked gates, 24-hour security 
force, visible keeper staff. 
Browse in areas close to public. 
Hay inside one thicket. 
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The okapi will be happy and the pubic will feel they are happy if the 
okapi has the above conditions provided for them. This list satisfies 
the spacial, temporal and social needs of the okapi; i.e., their biological 
well-being, as well as what people would like to see in the exhibit to 
satisfy their cultural view of the okapi's well-being. A committee 
would determine what parts of the OSC are mandatory and what 
areas could be escrowed for an institution to receive and house one 
okapi. For instance, an institution may have only 3/ 4 acre/per okapi 
available now, but more space will be made available in the future, 
with approval from the OSC committee they could then receive and 
manage okapi. But, if the area has little tree cover, more trees must be 
planted before okapi can be housed there. Trees being so essential for 
okapi well-being that no trees can not be tolerated, but a little less 
space is not as critical. 
This process will vary with each species, but should be kept simple by 
outlining basic biological and cultural needs of each species. First 
prioritizing them, then having a committee structure a standard and 
decide what percentage of the standard should be required to be in 
place to provide confined animals with a basic state of well-being. 
The assumption that underlies the process is that institutions are 
striving for a complete representation of the OSC realizing certain 
aspects of the animals' needs must be present initially to provide for 
well-being and that less critical needs will be attended to as soon as 
funds and time permit. This is in their best interest since public and 
private notions of their operation can only become more positive as 
their attention to animal well-being becomes more apparent. 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that animal well-being is an important goal of conserva­
tionists, we must be able to describe well-being for each species and 
design a method to implement programs that provide for a state of 
well-being when they are confined. In this paper, I have suggested 
developing standard which detail optimum conditions for animal 
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well-being in different degrees of confinement. 
Implementation of these standards will be difficult and costly. But, if 
we are to raise the level of care of animals confined by us for their own 
good, we must dedicate new resources and new energy to developing 
and realizing optimum standards of confinement. To raise the stan­
dards of care under different degrees of confinement requires less 
effort and expense in places of little confinement and becomes steadily 
more costly as the level of confinement increases. Here is where hard 
decisions lie, for if we cannot provide the standard at a certain level of 
confinement then the animal should only be rnaintained in situations 
of less confinement. 
Until a standard can be met at a certain level of condiment, efforts 
should be concentrated on maintaining the species at the level where 
standards of well-being are already being met. 
Coming from a conservation center background, I see that conserva­
tion centers have more resources available in which to satisfy biologi­
cal well-being for certain species than zoos do. But, for other species, 
conservation centers have less resources available than those working 
in s itu . Every time White Oak Conservation Center considers helping a 
new species, we go through our own OSC checklist to see if we can 
really provide for that species' well-being. Believe me, sometimes the 
answer is no. We may have to let certain species fight for their survival 
in s itu because we can not realistically satisfy their OSC at the conser­
vation center or zoo level. (But, we can provide in situ support as if 
they are part of our programs.) Other species may only be helped at 
the conservation center level which is the best level for species being 
considered for reintroduction attempts where they may better prosper 
in s itu . 
Everyone working with confined wildlife needs to consider the well­
being of individual animals while we consider the well-being of a 
species. As the human consciousness explores more meaningful rela­
tionships with other species on this earth, the conservation community 
needs to be leading the way in developing a new covenant with wild­
life based on dignity and well-being. 
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LUKAS DISCUSSION 
Grandy: This paper is a spectacular beginning for what we are trying 
to do, to come together. Lukas makes several critical points in his 
work, such as the notion that space should be the maximum available 
to satisfy the biological and social needs of the animal. If this is not 
feasible then the animal should not be maintained. A few important 
issues addressed were quality housing, the ability to afford animals 
before we bring them in and maintaining the animals well beyond 
their reproductive years. 
This paper speaks fundamentally to the kinds of responsibilities that 
the animal protection community and the public see as necessary to 
properly care and maintain animals. We have to provide them with far 
more than minimum care. I heartily endorse the idea of standards. We 
should, in all cases, have a floor of humane care that provides not 
"minimally" but "fully" for the care and well-being of the animals. I 
do not accept the notion of settling for seventy-five percent of opti­
mum. Seventy-five percent will never become one-hundred percent 
unless there is a forcing mechanism. Zoos are fraught with problems 
of economics and budget and place too much emphasis on variety of 
species rather than quality housing. We need mandatory standards to 
eliminate these problems. 
The notion of "bad surplus" was discussed yesterday. The "good" 
surplus animals are brought into being as a result of our meeting what 
we see as our responsibility to endangered species, and we all agreed 
that bad surplus, that is animals produced as a result of poor facilities 
and poor, sloppy husbandry, should be immediately eliminated 
through use of contraceptives or otherwise improved husbandry and 
care. But we need to evaluate more critically the concept of good 
surplus. The word "good" is used because the animals are produced 
as a result of a presumably "good" purpose - that is, reproduction of 
an endangered species. The word surplus is used because, for ex­
ample, only two offspring are needed for the program, but six are 
contained in a litter leaving four as so-called surplus. I think the whole 
use of the concept of surplus in this situation is wrong and represents 
an abdication of the responsibilities of those maintaining these ani­
mals. The reality here is that these animals are only surplus to the 
immediate needs of the endangered species breeding program. They 
are not, however, surplus to life. Let me repeat that these are animals 
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produced as a result of our decision to allow breeding, and their lives 
are not surplus and the animals themselves are not surplus to life. Nor 
are they surplus to the responsibility of those who allowed the breed­
ing to occur to provide appropriate care and facilities for the animals. 
If they are surplus to adequate facilities, it is because space for them 
was not planned. They are not something to be euthanized, killed, 
sacrificed or thrown away. They are animals that need to be main­
tained. In short, those who take responsibility for allowing their 
production must take responsibility for the humane care and mainte­
nance of offspring for the lives of the animals. 
Standards would also take into account the permissibility of keeping 
certain kinds of animals, such as polar bears. There needs to be a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the permissibility of keeping some kind 
of animals in captivity and the kind of mechanism that Lukas describes 
is the way to do it. I can only say I wish I had written this paper. 
Lukas: The existing AWA standards are much lower than the existing 
zoo standards. 
de Boer: Lukas' paper could not have been better. I do have a few 
remarks. Optimal standards would be very welcome, however I had 
the impression that within European breeding programs the protocols 
for drafting husbandry and management guidelines are continually 
striding for the formulation of optimal guidelines. I have great confi­
dence that the aspects of well-being are increasingly focused on. 
Lukas described the number of aspects of okapi well-being, asserting 
that since they dislike insects we should spray to keep them out of 
okapi enclosures. I believe the experience of well-being is only pos­
sible after occasional experiences of slightly less well-being. The chas­
ing away of insects is a natural behavior and occupation for many 
animals. Even if an animal dislikes insects their presence is not harm­
ful unless they negatively affect the animal's health. 
The aspects of cultural well-being are entirely anthropomorphic; clean­
liness, open spaces, plants present in the enclosures. We need to take 
great care not to fall into too many of these traps for they can be coun­
terproductive to conservation aims and even harmful to individuals. It 
has been mentioned that "active health" is very important in conserva­
tion. Such anthropomorphic views may almost exclude the building of 
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active health in certain individuals. 
In reference to the problem of good and bad zoos, I would like to refer 
to the "World Zoo Conservation Strategy." I did some work on draft­
ing this document, including a chapter on good and bad zoos. I be­
lieve those zoos that want to be part of an organization express a 
willingness to work towards a common future. Zoos that are orga­
nized into federations are part of an effort and are zoos with which we 
are able to communicate. Those outside the federations are beyond 
our community network and we cannot bring them to higher stan­
dards. 
This type of discussion is wonderful, but at some point we need to take 
action. By basing ourselves on the "World Zoo Conservation Strategy" 
we would work together and use the community network to strive 
toward a common future of organized zoos of the world. Secondly, it 
would allow us to eliminate or phase out those zoos that do not wish 
to be part of a common future goal. 
There is a large difference between North America and other parts of 
the world. Many zoos in Eastern Europe - for instance, are in a very 
bad state, and if we saw one here we would close it immediately. Yet, 
in their own countries these zoos have a very important role to play, as 
in the local circumstances these are the only places where the vast 
majority of the people can ever see a glimpse of wildlife, including 
even wild animals from their own country. Thus, we should be careful 
in our judgment. 
Lukas: We must appreciate the anthropomorphic concerns but do not 
have to pander to them. We need to be aware of how people view 
animals and incorporate that into how we provide well-being. 
Kaufmann: There are many organizations that are part of associations 
and are struggling with the problems this situation brings. Are you 
there to encourage and lead or to push and prod? Some associations 
are weaker than the parts they are there to lead. 
Lewis: I think statutory enforcement is critical, for the bad zoos who 
pay no attention to the AZA now will pay no attention to AZA stan­
dards in the future. My understanding is that the medical research 
community is the strongest opponent of this. If you are willing to cut a 
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Hutchins: It is clear that the goals that zoos and zoo associations are 
aiming at cannot be met unless animals are kept in better than mini­
mum conditions. This goes for conservation, for education, and for 
science. We know that animals kept in naturalistic exhibits, natural 
social groupings and provided choices will be better subjects for scien­
tific study. They are also better for educational purposes for they can 
present types of behavior to the general public which illustrate the 
connection between nature and animals. I do not believe this can be 
achieved in a concrete cage. 
We are suffering from historical inertia. We have a lot of good ideas of 
where we should head, but have a lot of existing animals that are not 
being properly taken care of. They are in sub-standard exhibits and 
collections that have been assembled with very little planning. Turn­
ing that around will not be easy but must be done. 
I would like to talk about some of the practical difficulties we are going 
to run into. We need standards. However, there are thousands of 
species of mammals and birds, reptiles and amphibians, in zoo collec­
tions each with specific bioiogicai needs that must be accounted for. 
This is an incredible task. In many cases we are operating with imper­
fect knowledge, with very little information to try to develop their 
diets, their care and maintenance standards. We know very little about 
their behavior. Information from the field has led to the understanding 
of many animals we were previously not doing well with in captivity. 
In some cases it depends on who is developing the standards. Many of 
the standards initially developed by the biomedical community for 
primates were not good for the welfare of those animals. For example, 
if the focus is on hygiene rather than psychological well-being you end 
up with animals in stainless steel cages that can easily be cleaned, but 
do not meet the behavioral needs of the animals. In fact, cleaning a 
cage can actually be stressful for the animal. 
The federal regulatory agencies are not only responsible for the profes­
sional zoo community and the professional humane community. Any­
one who handles animals is subject to their regulations. This is a big 
problem. They have a horrendous task and it makes it difficult for 
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them to recognize certain members of the community that are striving 
to do a good job. It is also difficult to be specific in legislation because 
they have to cover such a wide variety of situations. That is why I 
believe regulation itself is not necessarily going to lead to improved 
well-being in animals. I think education is the most important factor. 
The public requires education to raise their level of what they require 
of organizations that hold and care for animals, but education is also 
required for those individuals who care for animals. We need excellent 
education programs for staff so they do no habituate themselves to bad 
conditions. They must be constantly on guard and watching for ways 
in which to improve the lot of animals under their care. 
Lindburg: I commend Lukas on his use of the word "happiness." It 
may not be scientific, but it is one to which we can all relate and should 
be the standard for which we strive. 
I would like to extend his presentation to one more dimension. An 
animal is not constant, it changes in relation to its experiences. Its 
happiness, therefore, is dependent on how its circumstances relate to 
its experience. For example, in the captive world the wild animal's 
environment is highly conditioned by humans. We deliver food at a 
certain time every day. Animals quickly learn when the food truck will 
arrive. This is an anticipatory and tense time for them. If we are going 
to impose artificial conditions on the animals we must keep them 
consistent if we want to treat these creatures in a humane way. 
The second aspect is that we often say the animal born in captivity has 
different expectations, even though it comes to that experience with 
certain species-typical potential for behavior. What is has learned in 
captivity from birth somehow ameliorates some of the more stringent 
conditions of captivity. This is true, but also potentially dangerous. 
For example when cheetahs three or four generations removed from 
the wild are put in a small space they will begin to pace. I think it is 
their search for the freedom of movement they are denied. We need to 
take a hard look at how being born in this environment does and does 
not affect the well-being of the animal. 
Kaufmann: We speak of changing and modifying standards and 
policies, and that is a big part of what must be done. There is another 
aspect that goes into the educational role; standing up for what you 
believe and not being afraid to say it. To have the courage to say that 
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we do not have the laws, that we cannot get a grip on the industry or 
the field. However, while there may be some wishy-washy areas there 
are also some definite rights and wrongs. It is wrong to keep a chimp 
in a cage, make him smoke a cigar and wear a suit. None of us like it. 
We need to have the courage to use the word "happiness," even 
though someone might press us on our meaning of the term. I would 
like to see more writing on this subject in the popular press, not just 
within the community. 
Clutton-Brock: I was brought up with the notion that anthropomor­
phism was the worst sin you could commit, when animals were con­
sidered as something that could be harvested. The most marvelous 
change I have seen in my career is getting away from this attitude and 
being allowed and encouraged to view animals as individuals. I fear, 
however, that this is not happening to domestic animals. The worst 
aspect for animals in domesticity is that thenpeople who keep them on 
a large scale are habituated to bad standards. They do not see them as 
individuals, but as units to be harvested. I hope in years to come there 
will be a change. I think the zoo community is leading the way, and 
hope it will be extended to domestic animals. The veterinary commu­
nity should lead the way but there needs to be a change in thought 
with how to deal with domestic animals from the veterinary commu­
nity as well. 
Cohn: I would like to infuse a little political reality into the discussion. 
Washington is a very budget-conscious right at the moment. There is 
not an agency in government that could not use more money, so the 
chances of our being funded for the things we are looking for are slim. 
Therefore we have to take the long view. It is not going to happen 
overnight. 
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FINAL COMMENTS 
Andrew Rowan, Director 
Center for Animals and Public Policy 
Tufts Veterinary School 
I have long been interested in the fact that there are groups that appear 
to be antagonistic to one another, giving the appearance that they are 
opposing one another on a variety of animal issues, for examply the 
biomedical community versus the animal rights community. My 
experience in both the animal protection movement as well as with a 
number of humane organizations is that there exists more agreement 
than disagreement between such groups. People tend to exaggerate 
the areas of disagreement and ignore the areas of agreement. The 
classic problem, specifically in groups that tend to be closely allied 
with one another, is that both believe they are driven by certain moral 
imperatives. It is these imperatives wherein the difference is believed 
to lie. 
The White Oak conference was developed in part to talk around those 
moral imperatives. At the beginning, I thought there would be certain 
issues that would highlight the differences between zoo and animal 
protection participants. It was only after discussion and debate that 
those issues turned out to be not nearly as important as I first believed. 
Through the process of discussion, we identified situations where 
groups argued about issues that are thought to be important but are 
actually not, and not dealing wi th those that deserve attention. This 
enables groups to work togther and make real progress. 
Rowan has worked on this issue in the area of animal testing. He 
initiated the development of a program creating dialogue between 
animal protection organizations and industrial companies. As a result 
of that program a seed was established within the National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences (?) that Rowan hopes will grow into 
quite a substantial power, addressing many of the of the public's 
concerns about the use of animals in testing. More importantly, the 
industrial representatives and the animal protection representatives 
learned to see one another as people that can be worked with to solve 
common problems. There are still differences, but these groups are 
now able to work together as opposed to arguing. In that same sense 
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There are also some issues of style that get in the way of substance. 
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The zoo community tends to be focused on scientific arguments while 
the animal protection community focuses on moral arguments. There 
are differences in style in those types of discussion that tend to get in 
the way of developing trust. There are political elements as well that 
create barriers. For example, both areas of interest have their own 
political constituencies that they have to speak and listen to which tend 
to inhibit true communication. 
The topics chosen for this conference were wildness as captivity, the 
issue of well-being and individuals versus populations. The paper 
presented by Lukas dealing with conservation and in situ, zoos, etc. 
tried to bring all of these issues together. Rowan asserted that there 
were some interesting and useful ideas that came out of this workshop 
for him, personally. One he feels all can use with a fair amount of 
utility is the idea of biological versus cultural well-being. We must pay 
attention to both these issues, but not necessarily in the same way. 
There were also some questions of semantics, having important bear­
ing on the discussion of captivity versus confinement. 




The Gilman Foundation 
I would like to see our Foundation be an example and demonstrate 
that different groups can get together and things can be accomplished 
with private and corporate backing. There is not necessarily an enor­
mous difference between financial interests and animal interests. If 
people can be exposed to what is happening here at White Oak, and 
leave with the hopeful feeling that things really can and do happen, 
the experience may affect their thinking in the future. They may begin 
to believe that we can be effective and set standards. It shows that it 
really does work if you pay attention and are willing to give an emo­
tional and financial commitment. I want you all take a hopeful note 
from this conference and feel it is worth following up, that we can do 
more than just write reports. White Oak hopes to expose people to 
ideas, for people learn through exposure. Thank you again for being 
here. 
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
SURVEY OF ATTITUDES OF CONFERENCE 
ATTENDEES TO WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 
AND ZOO ISSUES 
191 
Towards the end of the second day of the workshop, the moderator 
suggested that the participants agreed with each other far more than 
disagreed. Nearly all those present disagreed with this conclusion! 
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which would address significant zoo and conservation issues to deter­
mine just how much disagreement actually existed. The survey was 
anonymous but everybody identified whether they belonged to the 
zoo or animal protection community or had some other institutional 
affiliation (mainly academic). 
The survey was developed by Dr. Andrew Rowan with the assistance 
of Ms. Jennifer Lewis of the MSPCA and Dr. John Robinson of the 
International Wildlife Conservation Center and is reproduced below. 
In general, there was considerable agreement among the representa­
tives of the zoo/ conservation and animal protection organizations. 
Animal protection representatives were somewhat more negative on 
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and animal protection participants were in total opposition was the 
generation of funds from controlled hunting to support conservation in 
an African conservation area. In the question on suburban deer, sev­
eral respondents selected more than one option, explaining that one 
might have to take more drastic action in the short-term but that a non­
lethal long-term management plan should be developed. 
This is not a survey of a random sample and it cannot be generalized 
to wider populations. Nevertheless, all the participants are very 
knowledgeable and are actively involved in the debate about how best 
to conserve and protect wild animals. Therefore, the survey indicates 
that supposed differences in attitudes between zoo and animal protec­
tion professionals may be more imagined than real and that both 
groups should be much more prepared to work together to help the 
world's threatened and endangered wildlife. 
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WORKSHOP SURVEY (Answers are given in the boxes) 
Please circle/ check the answer or scale point that most closely repre­
sents your views. 
1. Please identify your affiliation/inclination 
Zoo I Conservation Program Animal Protection Other 
Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
10 7 6 23 
2. Please indicate how strongly you approve/disapprove of:­







1 2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Strongly disapprove 
8 9 10 
b) Producing animals for endangered species' plans 
c) Producing animals to maintain genetically-balanced captive 
populations of non-endangered species 
d) Producing by accident 
Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
9.0 9.5 6.5 8.5 
1 .6 3.5 2.0 2.2 
2.8 5.0 4.5 4.0 
9.0 10.0 7.5 9.0 
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3. A donor has just offered $4 million dollars to the Orang SSP and 
has stated that the money may either be used for maintenance of the 
88 hybrid orangs for their life-time or to establish an in situ captive 
breeding and park preservation probram in Borneo (Indonesia) .  If 
you do not use the funds to maintain the 88 hybrid orangs, the SSP 
has decided that they would be euthanized (it would be truly hu­
mane) . Please choose one of the options. 
A 
B 
a) Maintain the hybrid orangs. 
b) Support the in situ program. 






4. The 100-200 rhinos in Namibia are currently not under threat from 
poachers but it is expected that they will come under threat when 
the Zimbabwe rhino population has been decimated. Which of 





a) Do nothing. 
b) Capture them and move them to a secure captive breeding 
site in Namibia. The park/habitat of the rhinos is in no 
danger of being converted to farmland if they are removed. 
c) Strengthen anti-poaching units even though this is unlikely 
to be a long-term panacea. 
d) Dehorn all rhinos before the culture of poaching develops. 
Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
0 0 1 1 
5 5 2 12 
5 2 2 9 
0 0 1 1 
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5. You are negotiating over the fate of a wildlife area (1000 square 
kilometers) in Africa. The national authorities are supporting the 
involvement of the local communities (who currently are actively 
involved in poaching in the area) . After discussing a variety of 
options, it is decided that the local communities will become the 
conservators of the area in exchange for money from 1,000 permits 
to be issued to sport hunters only for common antelope species 
and for carefully selected elephant to maintain the elephant herd 
at a level already agreed to be appropriate for the area. How 
strongly do you approve/disapprove of this plan? 
Strongly approve Neutral Strongly disapprove 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
2.6 9.0 3.5 4.0 
6. It has been determined that a relatively isolated deer herd in the 
midst of suburban sprawl has exceeded the carrying capacity of 
the area. The undergrowth has been virtually eliminated to the 
browse line and the winter produces extensive deer die offs every 
year. Which of the following options would you choose to deal 
with this scenario? 
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a) Open up the area to sport hunters 
b) Send in sharpshooters with specific instructions to re 
move females, especially any observed to be in poor 
condition. 
c) Start an immunocontraception program. 
d) Do nothing. 
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Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
A 1 0 0 1 
B 3 2 3 8 
C 7 7 7 21 
D 2 0 0 2 
7. You have produced a population of 100 Siberian tigers in captivity 
that could now be restored to a reserve that currently only has a 
few tigers that are already inbred and will most likely die out in 
the next ten years if you do nothing. Fortunately, the poaching 
that caused this problem has been stopped and strong leadership 
in the region has been re-established so that restoring the popula­
tion with some of the captive-bred tigers will most likely be suc­
cessful. Unfortunately, mortality among the captive-bred tigers 
will be high (80% will die due to the rigors of the reintroduction 
process). Would you approve or disapprove of restoring your 100 
captive- bred Siberian tigers to the area? 
Stongly approve Neutral Strongly disapprove 
1 2 3 5 6 7 � " lU  
Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
3.0 2.6 2.7 3.0 
8.  You are running a zoo in which you have had great success in 
breeding endangered Orinoco crocodiles and Emperor tamarins. 
However your resources are being cut back and you have to 
euthanize either a group of crocodiles or a group of tamarins. 
Which group would you euthanize? 
a) The crocodiles 
b) The tamarins 
c) Refused to choose 
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Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
A 2 3 4 9 
B 5 3 1 9 
C 3 1 1 5 
9. You have a limited budget for a new education/marketing pro­
gram. You could set up a very successful model dinosaur exhibit 
that has been shown to draw visitors and to cover the capital costs 
within five years. However, you also have been approached by a 
school teacher who won one of the $25,000 "teacher awards" for 
excellence who now wants to start an education program at your 
zoo. Which project do you choose? 
a) The dinosaurs 
b) The teacher 
Zoo/Consrvn Animal Protn Other All 
A 0 0 0 0 
B 9 6 6 21 
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WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, ZOOS, AND ANIMAL 
PROTECTION: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
Jennifer Lewis 
Massachusetts Society for the Prevention 
& Cruety to Animals 
Boston, MA 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this report is to analyze the effectiveness of the United 
States' animal protection organizations and zoo community in achiev­
ing their objectives with regard to wildlife conservation, and to suggest 
strategies for future action. Specifically, the report is to look at attitudes 
and campaigns of animal protection organizations towards zoos, both 
historical and contemporary; effectiveness of the zoo community, includ­
ing the American Zoos and Aquarium Association (AZA), on specific 
conservation issues; recent changes in AZA policies and practices and 
their effect on the mission and goals of zoos; effectiveness of zoo/ animal 
protection policies and practices in furthering their wildlife conserva­
tion objectives; and recommended changes in strategy, if necessary, for 
the animal protection and zoo communities; in their rel ationship to each 
other and their pursuit of conservation objectives . The report is not in­
tended to be an exhaustive and detailed catalogue of zoo and animal 
protection efforts in wildlife conservation; it is rather a summary analy­
sis, based on existing documents. Original research was conducted on 
historical and current attitudes and actions of the animal protection com­
munity toward zoos . 
ANIMAL PROTECTION ATTITUDES AND CAMPAIGNS 
TOWARDS ZOOS 
A. Historical: 1868 - 1970 
Historically, animal protection organizations such as the Massachusetts 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), the Ameri­
can Humane Association (AHA), and the American Society for the Pre­
vention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) criticized zoos but did not mount 
campaigns to reform them. ASPCA, MSPCA, and AHA were three of 
the earliest humane organizations, founded in 1866, 1868, and 1877 re­
spectively. They were leaders in the nascent humane movement and 
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their attitudes and policies set the movement's agenda. Both the MSPCA 
and AHA have publications going back to their founding, which were 
surveyed for this report. 
The MSPCA, almost from its inception, strongly criticized zoos . The 
Society's concerns were two: humane care of zoo animals and the lack of 
freedom and abilities to express natural behavior (when compared to 
the wild). These concerns seem strikingly modern and are mirrored in 
the concerns of animal protection organizations today. However, while 
the MSPCA mounted major and successful campaigns on issues such as 
legislation to prohibit cruelty to domestic animals, education of children 
in humane values, and opposition to performing animal acts, they took 
no major action on zoos that I could find between 1868 and 1970. From 
the 1970s to the present, the MSPCA has not mounted zoo campaigns . It 
has, however, been involved in issues of humane care and administra­
tive restructuring at several Massachusetts zoos, particularly Franklin 
Park and Stone Zoos in metropolitan Boston. 
AHA focused its attention largely on prevention of suffering to domestic 
animals and children. It worked on some wildlife issues, such as fur­
bearer trapping, but showed little evidence of any real interest in zoos . 
The ASPCA' s founder, Henry Bergh, was very concerned about the con­
ditions in which animals were kept at New York's Central Park Zoo in 
the late nineteenth century. He complained frequently to the park com­
missioners about inadequate food, lack of sanitation, poor ventilation, 
and other problems . He even enlisted the Tribune and the New York 
Times in his struggle to improve conditions, to no avail ( Steele, 1942). 
Ernest Bell, an early leader of the humane movement in England, wrote 
a number of articles on zoos between 1900 and 1920 that expressed much 
the same concern shown by the MSPCA for the humane care of zoo ani­
mals, the abysmal conditions in which they were kept, and their lack of 
freedom. In addition, he was horrified by the high death rates in zoo 
animals and by their capture and transport from the wild, an action he 
considered unconscionably cruel (Bell, 1927). 
Why, if the leaders of the humane movement were appalled by zoos, did 
they neither try to reform nor abolish them between the mid-nineteenth 
and mid-twentieth centuries? My feeling is that they realized how popu­
lar zoos were with the public, both as entertainment and as symbols of 
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civic pride. The humane leaders were far ahead of their time in feeling 
empathy and love for wild animals, and in their (admittedly intuitive 
rather than scientific) understanding of the benefits conferred on wild 
animals by autonomy. Many people, even in industrializing countries, 
either lived in or were not far removed from rural life, in which wild 
animals were regarded as dangerous, fearsome, and pestiferous. The 
keeping of pets, an urban phenomenon that teaches owners to love ani­
mals and regard them as individuals capable of suffering and happiness, 
was not sufficiently widespread to encourage a shift in attitudes which 
could then transfer to wildlife. Films and television programs that showed 
wild animals in a positive light in their natural habitats were far in the 
future. The public simply lacked sufficient understanding of or feelings 
of affiliation with wild animals for anti-zoo campaigns to succeed, even 
if massive education efforts had been mounted. In addition, people who 
did feel some affiliation with wildlife may have been less susceptible to 
action because so many of these animals remained in the wild. 
Is there a lesson for today in this history? Though attitudes of love and 
empathy for wild creatures have increased greatly for a number of rea­
sons, and the visiting public is more sophisticated in its understanding 
of what constitutes humane care, the current popularity of zoos (more 
than 100 million visits each year) ( IUDZG/IUCN, 1993) and the belief of 
many that keeping wildlife in captivity is not cruel if the animals are 
treated well (Kellert and Dunlap, 1989) militates against the success of 
public campaigns to abolish all zoos. Please see Recommendations for 
further discussion of this point. 
B. Contemporary: 1970 - Present 
In 1971, the Humane Society of the United States hired a zoo advocate, 
ushering in a era of action on zoos. The HSUS zoo advocacy department 
eventually encompassed three full-time staff, who worked with zoos and 
municipal authorities to improve conditions, directed media attention to 
zoo problems and problem zoos, advocated with zoos, AZA, and the 
public for better care, naturalistic exhibits, responsible disposition of sur­
plus animals, and other improvements. Occasional assistance was pro­
vided to zoos in finding homes for surplus animals or animals retired for 
other reasons. Some exposes were mounted, notably the "Ten Substan­
dard Zoos" article in Parade Magazine in the middle 1980's. The article 
brought zoo animal care to the attention of the public, and along with 
pressure being applied by the zoo community, helped bring about ma-
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jor improvements in the Atlanta and New Orleans Zoos (Pressman, 1995). 
Though some changes occurred in the mid-1980s, the HSUS still has a 
zoo advocate on staff who continues to work to improve zoos. 
Although a shift occurred in the 1970's from complaining about zoos to 
hiring personnel to investigate zoos and advocate for zoo animals, few 
other animal protection organizations followed suit. Other organizations 
who have worked on zoo issues in this period have included People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the Fund for Animais, the Ani­
mal Welfare Institute/Society for Animal Protective Legislation (AWI/ 
SAPL), the MSPCA, the vVorld Society for the Protection of Animals 
(WSPA), the Born Free Foundation (BFF) and some local and regional 
groups. With the exception of WSPA/BFF's Zoo Check in Canada and 
the United Kingdom, and a new effort now under development at WSPA, 
these organizations have tended to focus on a few specific institutions 
and issues, rather than setting up an ongoing program to look at a vari­
ety of zoo issues. This is true of the HSUS' current program as well, 
which largely focuses on the issue of surplus animal disposition. Atten­
tion has often been directed by animal groups to the death or mistreat­
ment of specific animals at particular zoos, such as the beating of an el­
ephant at the San Diego Zoo in 1988, the 1993 death of an elephant at the 
Los Angeles Zoo, the euthanasia of several tigers at the Detroit Zoo in 
the early 1980s, and the exhibition of imported Chinese pandas at the 
Columbus Zoo during the AZA moratorium on such exhibits. 
In 1994, WSPA and BFF published The Zoo Inquiry, an investigation into 
the welfare of zoo animals, and the conservation and education programs 
by which zoos justify their existence. The report covers zoos all over the 
world, but it focuses primarily on European zoos. The Zoo Inquiry takes 
zoos to task for failure to provide adequately for animal welfare, result­
ing in both physical and psychological suffering; lack of interest in field 
conservation, especially in the empowering of local people to appreciate 
and manage their wildlife; too great a reliance on captive breeding and 
reintroduction in saving species; lack of justification for keeping many 
species in captivity; and failures of education programs. While the re­
port makes a number of interesting points, it appears to start from the 
premise that zoos have adopted conservation and education rhetoric to 
"sanitise" their existence, and to quote selectively from a relatively small 
number of sources to support this view. The authors do not appear to 
distinguish between progressive and regressive (good and bad) zoos (or 
perhaps they do not feel such a distinction exists), and the tone of the 
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report is generally hostile. They correctly point out that, given space 
and financial limitations, captive breeding and reintroduction are of lim­
ited usefulness, and they address issues that the zoo profession seems 
reluctant to discuss outside the profession, such as abnormal behavior, 
psychological suffering, disposition of surplus animals to inhumane fates, 
the low rate of success in reintroductions, unnecessary breeding, and 
appropriate social groupings. But they give the zoo profession no credit 
for the current changes taking place. The report would have been more 
effective had it been less hostile and apparently biased. 
In addition to their work directly related to zoos, animal protection orga­
nizations have also taken other actions to foster protecting species in the 
wild, including major roles in the periodic reauthorizations of the En­
dangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act and in the 
passage of the Wild Bird Conservation Act; participation in the biennial 
meetings of the parties to the Convention on International Trade in En­
dangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES); work at the internationat 
national and state and local level to abolish the use of the leghold and 
other injurious traps; campaigns against fur garments; attempts to ban 
hunting and trapping on the National Wildlife Refuge System; lawsuits 
on the protection of wildlife in the refuge system and the National Park 
System; successful state referenda variously banning spring bear hunt­
ing, hunting of bears and mountain lions with dogs (including all lion 
hunting in Californiat and banning trapping on public lands; rescue and 
relocation of wildlife endangered dam construction and other manmade 
and natural disasters; a few habitat protection and species reintroduc­
tion efforts; and contraception of free-roaming deer populations. 
AZA/ZOO EFFECTIV ENESS ON CONSERVATION ISSUES 
This section will focus on the effectiveness of zoos and the AZA on the 
following issues: captive breeding and reintroduction of endangered 
species, field conservation projects, and conservation education. These 
are the programs that zoos use to justify their existence. 
A. Captive Breeding and Reintroduction 
This issue is composed of two parts: 1) captive breeding for reintroduc­
tion programs and reintroduction success; and 2) development of cap­
tive-breeding techniques. 
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1. Breeding for Reintroduction: Thousands of the world's spe­
cies are endangered and E.O. Wilson (1992) conservatively es­
timates that 27,000 species (mainly invertebrate) are disappear­
ing each year in rain forests around the world. In 1991, about 
350 endangered species were being bred in zoos worldwide, 
and about 450 maintained ( International Zoo Yearbook, 1992). 
Sixteen have been successfully reintroduced to the wild. (Suc­
cess in this case means establishing self-sustaining populations, 
or having a high potential to do so.) Indeed, for institutions 
that justify their existence partly by endangered species pres­
ervation, a surprisingly small part of zoo collections seems to 
be made up of these animals. 
At their best, reintroductions such as the Golden Lion Tamarin 
Program both save a species and help preserve its vanishing 
habitat, in no small part by raising concern in the habitat coun­
try for its preservation. (Though one critic within the zoo pro­
fession believes the increase in protected habitat could have 
been achieved without captive breeding and reintroduction, 
because it resulted from building support within the habitat 
country for its preservation (REFERENCE).) Limitations on 
space and other resources, however, mean that only some cur­
rently endangered species can be preserved by ex-situ pro­
grams. The World Zoo Conservation Strategy estimates the 
number of endangered species that can be maintained in zoos 
at 1000-2000, assuming 500,000 places in larger zoos around 
the world and breeding populations of 250-500 animals. This 
estimate assumes that all currently and potentially available 
spaces in larger zoos are used ( IUDZG/CBSG, 1993). Main­
taining smaller populations of some species 1) as "security re­
serves" for animals endangered but not extinct in the wild, 
and 2) for shorter time periods (5-20 years) until most indi­
viduals can return to the wild, as well as mobilizing smaller 
zoos and even non-zoo facilities to provide more space, may 
enlarge somewhat the number of species that could be cap­
tive-bred. However, it is clear that the "Noah's Ark" para­
digm of saving most or all endangered species in captivity for 
eventual reintroduction is untenable. (See AZA: Changes in 
Policies and Practices, below, for more discussion.) 
Even if the maximum number of species could be maintained, 
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other problems remain. No guarantee exists that native habi­
tats will be available to which to return captive-bred animals. 
Indeed, their removal to captive breeding programs, especially 
if all remaining members of a population are removed, may 
tend to accelerate habitat loss by lowering immediate incen­
tives for its preservation. Even if habitat remains, other fac­
tors which originally resulted in their declines may still be 
present, such as capture for the pet trade, killing for food or 
wildlife products, or killing to eliminate competition with hu­
mans for resources. Another problem is the effect of captivity 
on the species over a number of generations. Effects may re­
sult from long-term captivity which decrease the species' abil­
ity to survive in the wild, such as loss of the abilities to mate, 
raise young, find food, avoid humans; younger age of first 
breeding and lengthened seasons for bearing of offspring 
(which may not correspond to favorable weather or food con­
ditions in the native habitat). These effects are most pro­
nounced in animals where learning plays a large part in ac­
quiring survival skills, such as mammals. 
The vast majority of endangered species being kept at zoos are 
mammals and birds. Zoos have been criticized for concentrat­
ing their efforts on charismatic megavertebrates and neglect­
ing the less glamorous, less warm-and-fuzzy species such as 
reptiles, amphibians, fish, and invertebrates who are also key 
components of ecosystems. To their credit, zoo professionals 
have begun to pay more attention to these species, as evidenced 
by, for instance, the establishment of the Lake Victoria Cichlid 
SSP on endangered fishes. (See AZA: Changes in Policies and 
Practices below for a related discussion of flagship taxa and 
keystone species.) 
2. Captive Breeding Techniques: On the brighter side, it is help­
ful to realize how far zoos have come in the last 25 years in the 
science of captive breeding and maintenance of many species, 
and in techniques and knowledge vital to reintroduction. Zoo­
and aquarium-based research have been responsible for a num­
ber of advances. Technological progress in animal reproduc­
tion, such as gamete cryopreservation, in vitro fertilization, 
embryo transfer and artificial insemination, have assisted in 
improving breeding success. Advances in telemetry for moni-
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toring species movements; methods of identifying individual 
animals; major advances in wildlife medicine, including the 
initiation of an international field veterinary program by the 
Wildlife Conservation Society; research into the ecology, re­
productive biology, genetics, behavior, and nutrition of a num­
ber of species; professional training and technology transfer 
in habitat countries; and the establishment of Species Survival 
Plans resulting in progress in the genetic and demographic 
management of small populations have all contributed to in­
creased success in captive breeding, maintenance, and rein­
troduction. However uncomfortable animal protectionists may 
be with the degree of manipulation and intervention neces­
sary to some of these advances, without them much progress 
would not have occurred. 
Endangered species breeding, maintenance, and reintroduc­
tion have only been zoo priorities since about 1970. Species 
Survival Plans were initiated in 1981. Considering how rela­
tively short a time has elapsed since the initiation of these pro­
grams, zoos have done a creditable job, particularly in captive 
breeding and maintenance, and they deserve recognition by 
animal protectionists. 
B. Field Conservation 
A few zoos and zoo-based groups have also instituted in-situ programs 
on specific species or habitats. Some of these programs include 
1995 
*the Fort Wayne Children's Zoo education, exhibition and fund­
raising program to conserve endangered primates and their 
habitats in Indonesia's Mentawai Islands; 
*the Golden Lion Tamarin Conservation program, a project of the 
Brazilian government and a consortium of zoos, combin­
ing captive breeding and reintroduction with habitat pres­
ervation and raising awareness in the local area; 
*the AZA Sumatran Tiger SSP's Indonesia program, involving 
captive breeding, habitat mapping, analysis of resource use 
in tiger habitats, population modelling, and training of In­
donesian wildlife personnel; 
*the White Oak Conservation Center 's okapi project in Zaire; 
*the Chicago Zoological Society's support for the Brookfield Con­
servation Park in Australia and financial support of field 
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projects; and 
*the Minnesota Zoological Garden's support for Java's Ujung 
Kulon National Park, home of the critically endangered 
Javan rhino. 
These projects and a variety of programs undertaken by the Wildlife Con­
servation Society, the leader in zoo-related field conservation, give en­
couraging evidence that some zoos are taking in-situ conservation seri­
ously. Some projects have been successful and some have not; a mean­
ingful assessment of the general success of these programs is probably 
premature, given their newness at many institutions. 
C. Conservation Education 
Education of the visiting public about the necessity of preserving species 
and habitats is the third major reason that zoos give for their existence. 
Zoos attempt to teach conservation both through exhibits and informa­
tion displays and through formal education programs. All accredited 
zoos across the country have formal education programs, and millions 
of people, especially primary school children, pass through them each 
year. Millions more make casual visits to zoos each year to see the exhib­
its. But how successful has zoo education been? 
About 119,000,000 people visit accredited zoos and aquaria yearly in 
North America (AZA, 1994). Worldwide, an estimated 619,000,000 visits 
are made to zoos each year ( IUDZG/CBSG, 1993). In 1991, 14,000,000 
people went through formal zoo education programs, including 
10,000,000 children and 35,000 teachers (Conway, 1995). The zoo profes­
sion makes sweeping statements about the educational value of both 
viewing exhibits and participating in formal education programs. "Zoos 
make a huge contribution to the success of education campaigns under­
taken by governmental and nature conservation organizations ( such as 
the World-Wide Fund for Nature) simply by providing the opportunity 
for contact with examples that these organizations are concerned with .... [If 
the right messages are given to the visitor] he or she will more rapidly be 
prepared to make a personal contribution to nature conservation .. .in at­
titude, personal commitment, financial support, and so on .... If the entire 
zoo staff is indeed education-minded and time is made available, then 
even small zoos which cannot afford to set up an education department 
can still be excellent educational institutions" ( IUDZG/CBSG, 1993). 
Public education is one of the most important responsibilities of modern 
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zoological parks" (Hutchins and Conway, in press). "The most profound 
and moving lessons zoo education has to offer are simply well-cared-for, 
well-exhibited, living animals. They live with us, daily creating news 
and arousing interest, acting as ambassadors for their kind. They do not 
permit us to ignore the fact that their kind exists. In the United States, 
well over 100 million people took advantage of that lesson in 1991..." 
(Conway, 1995). "Zoos and aquariums host from 300 million to 400 mil­
lion visitors each year, providing the benefits of meaningful education 
and recreation" (Maple, 1995). 
These statements make a very important assumption: show a visitor a 
well-designed exhibit or teach a visitor a conservation lesson, and s/he 
will receive the right message, form the desired values, and take actions 
to support conservation. Data to support this assumption are exceed­
ingly scarce. 
In discussing this subject, the distinction between formal and informal 
zoo education deserves reiteration. Formal education means the classes, 
workshops, guided tours, and other structured activities given by zoo 
staff to schoolchildren, teachers, and other visitors, both at the zoo and 
in other locations. While some evaluation of formal education programs 
has been done at individual zoos, review of these studies was beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, at least some of these education pro­
grams have been successful in their objectives of increasing knowledge 
and understanding (Schildkraut, 1995). Informal education is the learn­
ing that, it is hoped, takes place as the casual visitor views and interacts 
with the exhibits and reads any signs or other informational material 
provided. 
Using the 100 million yearly attendance figure and Conway's figures on 
education programs cited above, formal education accounts for roughly 
15% of yearly zoo visits. The vast majority of zoo visitors, if they learn, 
will be learning informally. 
Kellert and Dunlap (1989) reviewed the sparse literature on informal zoo 
learning and performed an empirical study of it at three zoos. Their 
findings were disturbing, suggesting that the impact of informal educa­
tion may be quite limited. 
In the literature review, Kellert and Dunlap state, "Confident 
conclusions ... are difficult to offer," due to the small number of studies 
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and consequent lack of data. However, certain tendencies can be dis­
cerned across studies. 
1. Being able to see and interact with live animals and "enter partially 
into" their world is one of the most important reasons visitors come 
to zoos (Kellert and Dunlap, 1989). 
2. Exhibits that encourage interaction between different visitors and be­
tween visitors and animals seem to increase visitors' interest. One 
study concluded, "active participation heightens the acquisition and 
retention of information" (Shettel, 1973). 
3. Opportunities for this interaction are rare. Many living animal and 
informational exhibits require the visitor only to look and read, though 
zoos are mounting a growing number of interactive learning exhibits 
(not involving live animals). 
4. Naturalistic exhibits are a double-edged sword. While visitors like to 
see that animals are placed in these settings, this desire arises more 
from feelings of emotional attachment to the animals and concern for 
their welfare than from a desire to learn about their habitat relations. 
Naturalistic exhibits can hinder visitors from fulfilling their wish to 
see many species and see them closely. 
5. Despite the potential effects of seeing living animals, the primary 
motivation of most visitors is recreation, having a pleasant social ex­
perience in a park-like setting, especially for families. 
6. Learning is not a primary motivation for visiting zoos. Learning is 
regarded as work, visiting the zoo as play. Information on wildlife 
conservation "is often regarded as gloomy and depressing," and the 
majority of visitors are not interested in learning more about wildlife 
conservation or even the animals themselves (Kellert and Dunlap, 
1989). One researcher concluded that visitors in her study "did not 
gain a better understanding of wildlife at the larger facilities despite 
the higher degree of naturalness, substantial educational efforts, and 
longer zoo visits" (Swensen, 1980). She studied four kinds of zoos, 
from the roadside menagerie to the large modern zoo. 
7. Signs as an educational tool are not effective; the majority of visitors 
do not read signs, and those who do typically read for one-half minute 
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or less. The sign is still the primary informal education tool at most 
zoos. 
The empirical study performed by Kellert and Dunlap took place at three 
zoos: Philadelphia, Sedgwick County in Kansas, and the Sonoran Desert 
Museum outside Tucson. These zoos were picked to represent a range of 
types: an urban zoo with a mix of naturalistic and traditional exhibits, a 
smaller zoo in a rural area with mostly traditional exhibits, and a com­
pletely naturalistic "living museum," concentrating on species indigenous 
to its locale. They looked at motivations for visiting the zoos, perceived 
benefits, attitudes towards animals, and the amount of learning that took 
place. Learning was assessed from interviews of visitors on entering 
and leaving the zoo; no followup was done to evaluate possible longer­
term learning. 
Their findings tended to confirm many of the findings of the literature 
review. Though substantial fractions of the visitors said they came to 
learn about animals (34-62%) and teach children about animals ( 21-43%), 
the two most important reasons at all three zoos were recreational and 
aesthetic: family enjoyment (69-73%) and seeing beautiful animals ( 56-
72%). Learning about wildlife conservation was near or at the bottom of 
the list for Philadelphia and Sedgwick, and fifth out of nine reasons for 
Sonoran (18-25%; 47% for Sonoran). 
Perceived benefits fell into three categories, with 62-98% of respondents 
agreeing that aesthetic, emotional (affection for animals), and entertain­
ment benefits were the ones they got from the zoo. Three quarters of the 
visitors at all three facilities saw nothing wrong with keeping animals in 
cages as long as they were treated properly. 
Attitudes of visitors towards animals were measured both before and 
after visiting the zoos. Feelings of affection and interest for animals (hu­
manistic) as individuals increased slightly at Philadelphia and Sonoran, 
and declined slightly at Sedgwick. Feeling of interest and affection for 
wildlife and the outdoors (naturalistic) declined slightly at Philadelphia 
and Sedgwick, and slightly increased at Sonoran. Concern for the proper 
treatment of animals (moralistic) declined at Philadelphia and Sonoran, 
and increased at Sedgwick. Concern for the environment as a system 
and relationships between wildlife and natural habitats and interest in 
the biological functioning of animals (ecoscientistic) declined substan­
tially at all three zoos. Knowledge scales also declined at all three zoos. 
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Kellert and Dunlap conclude that the knowledge scale result "suggests 
the zoo visit exerted only a minimal influence on visitor factual knowl­
edge of animals," though frequent, as opposed to one-time visitors did 
show some increase in knowledge. On attitudes, the general results above 
mask increases of some subgroups, such as repeat visitors and those who 
went to the zoo with the purpose of learning about wildlife, who showed 
higher naturalistic and ecoscientistic scores after their zoo visits. 
Judging by the research above and by the 1994 national elections, in which 
Americans made it abundantly clear that while they may support con­
servation, they do not vote on that basis, I conclude that zoo education 
has not produced legions of citizen-conservationists. Although more 
research is clearly needed, it is not too soon for zoos to take a hard look at 
their formal and informal education programs. The analysis above sug­
gests several points that might be confirmed or refuted by such evalua­
tion. 
1. Informal education, at least as presently carried out, is not effective, 
except possibly for people who arrive already motivated to learn about 
wildlife. The few seconds spent reading signs and the few minutes 
or seconds spent in front of individual exhibits do not teach people 
facts about wildlife, and in no way approach the development of con­
servation values. 
2. Zoos are largely regarded as recreational facilities by the public, and 
learning, however attractively presented, may not be compatible with 
this view. 
3. Formal education programs may be more effective vehicles than in­
formal ones. If that is true, then zoos would be more effective spend­
ing their money on formal programs and producing several million 
conservationists a year, rather than trying unsuccessfully to make 100 
million visitors conservationists against their inclinations. 
4. Given the high value zoo visitors place on aesthetics, concentrating 
exhibits on beautiful animals may be the best strategy if informal edu­
cation is to have an impact. One needs to start where people are. 
5. Inexperienced wildlife watchers (probably the majority of zoo visi­
tors) need to see animals close up, for short periods of time, and be­
ing active, in order to increase their interest. Interaction - seeing 
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animals respond to them or being able to look into their eyes - cre­
ates a sense of contact and communication. Whether this can be 
achieved safely and without unduly stressing the animals is an open 
question. Seeing animals in naturalistic exhibits and showing natu­
ral behaviors may help visitors understand them. More sophisticated 
wildlife watchers can be satisfied with animals farther away, and are 
able to concentrate for longer periods ( though they are thrilled with 
closer contact, as many participants in the White Oak Conference 
would testify). 
6 .  Effective education needs to help visitors understand that humans 
must make changes in their lifestyles if wildlife is to survive. Infor­
mation on recycling, reduced water consumption, energy efficiency, 
organic lawn and garden care, not buying wildlife products or pets, 
looking up the conservation voting records of their legislators, and 
other subjects - addressed to changes visitors can adopt in their own 
lives - may help to allay the feeling that information on wildlife 
conservation is "gloomy and depressing" by giving visitors positive 
actions to take. 
7. Traditional cage-and-iron-bar exhibits not only fail to give the visitor 
any insight, however brief, into the lives of animals, they send a mes­
sage that extreme domination and control of wildlife is acceptable, 
and that species can survive in these environments. 
AZA: CHANGES IN POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
For the last several years, the AZA has been engaging in an honest and 
extensive self-evaluation, in terms of the mission and goals of zoos. Two 
major conferences, in Atlanta in 1992 and Florida in 1994, have brought 
together zoo directors and staff, AZA staff, academic and zoo-based sci­
entists, animal protection organizations, philosophers, and public policy 
analysts to discuss the future of zoos, the appropriate recipients of pro­
tection (genes, populations, species, ecosystems), the aims and ethics of 
captive breeding programs, the proper role of zoos and wildlife center in 
endangered species recovery projects, zoo education programs, animal 
welfare in captivity, and disposition of surplus animals. 
The AZA and some of the leading zoos have begun to realize that the 
"Noah's Ark" approach of saving species in captivity for eventual rein­
troduction can have only limited effect. Some of the factors contributing 
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to this change are the limited capacity of zoos to maintain large numbers 
of species, a lack of habitat for reintroduction, the cost and technical dif­
ficulties of reintroduction, and the necessity of support and understand­
ing from residents of habitat countries. Field conservation - preserving 
habitats and species in the wild - appears to extend the best hope of 
saving at least some species and ecosystems from a rising tide of hu­
mans. And field conservation can utilize the existing knowledge, scien­
tific staffs, research, veterinary and technological expertise, and fund­
raising skill of zoos. 
AZA has undertaken a major revision of the overall mission of accred­
ited zoos and is now advocating heavy investment by zoos in field con­
servation projects and strategic redesign and management of ex-situ zoo 
collections and programs, including fund-raising programs, to support 
in-situ efforts (Hutchins, et al., 1995) . The baby is not being thrown out 
with the bathwater, however: AZA still supports the importance of cap­
tive breeding for those species extinct in nature or with such small or 
fragmented populations that they will not survive with human assis­
tance. Another strategy being advocated by AZA is the adoption of flag­
ship taxa, "those that have the ability to excite public attention and help 
preserve habitat and other taxa as well as genetic variation" (Hutchins, 
et al., 1995) .  While this may seem to be a thinly disguised justification of 
the charismatic megavertebrate collection, I believe it is not. Limited 
space, money, and personnel make the Noah's Ark concept untenable. 
Concentrating on flagship species, such as the golden lion tamarin, may 
result in preservation of the systems they inhabit, to the benefit of many 
other species. As Hutchins, et al., state, "there may be no need to have 
more than a few hundred carefully selected flagship SSPs in each re­
gion . . . .  " In addition, such a program might reduce the numbers of spe­
cies and individuals that would need to be kept in captivity. 
If the concept of flagship species could be combined with that of "key­
stone" species (Wilson, 1992), a comprehensive and manageable approach 
to saving the natural world might result. Keystone species are the "big­
gest players" in ecosystems, whose "removal. . .causes a substantial part 
of the community to change drastically . . . .  Put the keystone species back 
in and the community typically, but not invariably, returns to something 
resembling its original state. It has become clear that an elite group of 
species exercises an influence on biological diversity out of all propor­
tion to its numbers" (Wilson, 1992) . Unfortunately, we do not yet have 
the knowledge necessary to identify many keystone species. Those that 
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have been identified, whose existence is endangered in the wild, should 
become flagship species. 
The AZA has adopted guidelines for field conservation programs for 
AZA members, which, among other things, discourage the capture of 
animals from the wild without adequate justification. AZA has also set 
up a variety of inter-zoo coordination groups to assist in captive breed­
ing and to foster field conservation projects. 
Species Survival Plans (SSPs) were established in 1981 to deal with main­
taining small populations over long time periods. Under a recently-de­
veloped mission statement, their focus is shifting to include more in-situ 
work. Several SSPs now integrate captive breeding, reintroduction, re­
search, professional training/ technology transfer/ education in their habi­
tat countries, habitat preservation, and fundraising. There are 69 SSPs 
covering 116 species. 
The AZA Field Conservation Committee, started in 1993, promotes in­
situ projects at AZA member institutions through education, providing 
guidance and assistance, and monitoring successful projects. The FCC 
has also arranged major sessions on field conservation at recent AZA 
annual conferences and is producing an AZA Field Conservation Re­
source Guide. 
Fauna Interest Groups (FIGS) coordinate in-situ projects of AZA mem­
bers in specific regions of the world. Seven groups currently exist: Bra­
zil, Madagascar, Meso-America, Paraguay, Southeast Asia, the West 
Indies, and Zaire. Fauna interest groups concentrate on areas of high 
biological diversity. Membership consists of North American zoos and 
aquaria with interest in the region, academic institutions and other non­
government organizations, and advisors from the region, including gov­
ernment wildlife agencies. 
Taxon Advisory Groups (TAGs) choose new taxa for captive breeding 
programs, organize field programs, and support SSP field projects in their 
area of interest. Their main function is regional strategic collection plan­
ning, assessing all space available for a taxon and how it should be man­
aged. Forty-one Taxon Advisory Groups currently exist. 
The Research Coordinator's Committee, composed of research coordi­
nators from individual zoos, was recently established to share informa-
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tion on the administration of research programs, including the design of 
programs, ethical issues, and other consideration. 
Also recently established, Scientific Advisory Groups (SAGs) give disci­
pline-based support to Fauna Interest Groups, Species Survival Plans, 
and Taxon Advisory Groups on scientific and technical issues. The also 
facilitate communication and working relationships with outside scien­
tists and scientific societies concerned with issues of interest to zoos . Cur­
rent Scientific Advisory Groups include Behavior and Husbandry, Con­
traception, Genome Banking, Reintroduction, Small Population Manage­
ment, Systematics, and Veterinary Science. 
Another potential change, advocated by Michael Robinson, Director of 
the National Zoo, deserves mention - the biopark concept. (Robinson, 
in press) Robinson suggests combining aspects of zoos, aquaria, botanic 
gardens, arboreta, natural history museums, archaeology/ anthropology/ 
ethnology museums, art museums, planetaria, The goal of the biopark 
would be to teach people not only what we know about the adaptations, 
variety, beauty, and utility of the natural world, and its avoidable de­
struction, but also how humans arrived at that knowledge and the his­
tory of our relationships with nature. Robinson feels that bioparks, which 
would present an integrated and holistic view of nature (including hu­
mans),  are essential to the biological education necessary if natural sys­
tems are to be saved. 
How effective these changes will be in shifting the focus of zoos toward 
in-situ conservation, and in the long-term conservation of species and 
habitats remains to be seen. Much credit should go to the AZA for these 
changes and for publicly acknowledging the limited utility of captive 
breeding as a sole strategy and for actively advocating within the ac­
credited zoo community for field conservation and restructured ex-situ 
facilities to support it. These policies are clearly reflective of trends in 
the "best" U.S. zoos, and presently only about 25% of accredited organi­
zations undertake field conservation activities. But this percentage is 
respectable, considering the newness of the programs. Further, the indi­
cations from such projects as the Golden Lion Tamarin Conservation Pro­
gram in Brazil, the Wildlife Conservation Society's programs in a num­
ber of countries, and the Sumatran Tiger SSP's Indonesia program are 
encouraging. The willingness of some zoos to devote money and staff to 
field conservation holds promise for both habitat and species preserva­
tion. 
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A number of challenges remain. First, the AZA is a professional associa­
tion, not a regulatory body. It can suggest changes to its members, and 
use its influence to encourage their adoption, but it cannot force mem­
bers to make them. Second, some zoo directors, municipal park authori­
ties, and boards of directors will resist these changes, because 1) their 
interests are local and they see no justification for using their resources 
outside their communities (Hutchins and Conway, in press); and because 
2) zoos must bring visitors to pay the bills and they may not see incen­
tives for undertaking these expensive new programs. AZA rightly rec­
ognizes that though zoos have an "ethical obligation" to contribute to 
conservation, they must see some benefits as well, such as new funding 
sources, increased media exposure, and enhanced public relations 
(Hutchins and Conway, in press). Third, accredited zoos/aquaria ( 162) 
are only about 10% of the total number of zoos and other facilities in the 
U.S. (1600) that exhibit animals. The value to conservation of these road­
side zoos, bear parks, safari parks, and just plain bad zoos is nil. They 
are not members of AZA and the changes in AZA policies will have no 
effect on them. (See the Recommendations section for further discus­
sion of these exhibitors.) 
Zoos also face other barriers on their route to becoming wildlife conser­
vation centers. The attachment of the public and even of some zoo staff 
to individuai animais can make certain actions difficuit, such as moving 
animals to other zoos for population management reasons, closing sub­
standard exhibits, and the euthanasia of surplus animals for whom no 
good homes can be found. Zoos also must keep visitors coming in the 
doors to pay the bills, which in part drives the kinds of exhibits they 
develop. In addition, local zoo patrons and politicians, especially in zoos 
which receive municipal funds, may be opposed to spending money on 
field conservation or other projects from which they see no immediate 
local benefit. In some cases, zoo patrons who would fail to recognize a 
good zoo if it ambled up and bit them on the leg may oppose closing 
substandard facilities, or fail to support necessary improvements. And 
the issue of educating the one- or two-time casual visitor is by itself an 
enormous challenge. 
CONSERVATION AND CAPTIV E WELFARE OBJECTIV ES: EFFEC­
TIV ENESS OF ANIMAL PROTECTIONISTS 
This section is divided into two topics: effectiveness of animal protec­
tionists in achieving changes in zoos, and their effectiveness in their con-
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servation objectives, both at zoos and elsewhere. 
With regard to progressive zoos, animal protectionists have had a con­
siderable amount of success. Their messages about improving captive 
animal welfare, installing naturalistic exhibits, and undertaking field 
conservation have clearly been heard. Some progress is also being made 
on the issue of surplus animal disposition, including the growth and im­
provement of sanctuaries for retired zoo animals. An association of sanc­
tuaries has been formed and has adopted standards based on the AZ.!'< s 
accreditation requirements for zoos. Five sanctuaries have been approved 
under the program (Pressman, 1995). While progressive members of the 
zoo profession have also called for these changes (REFERENCE), animal 
protection strategies are at least partly responsible. 
Animal protectionists have had much less success with substandard zoos. 
While they have succeeded in improving conditions for some specific 
animals at specific zoos, little has been achieved with standards or laws, 
either on the state or federal level, to improve or close these facilities. 
Federal Animal Welfare Act standards and enforcement are not adequate 
to prevent the suffering of many animals, and state laws are weak or 
non-existent. 
Other Conservation Objectives 
With regard to other conservation objectives, animal protectionists have 
been effective in some areas, less so in others. They have worked suc­
cessfully in the past for reauthorizations of the Endangered Species Act 
and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, though they have not always 
been able to prevent the passage of weakened sections of these laws. 
They worked successfully to help pass the Wild Bird Conservation Act, 
which is putting a dent in the destructiveness of the international bird 
trade. (The AZA has also worked for the passage of these laws.) They 
have achieved increased protection for some species, and maintained 
protection for others, under CITES. The HSUS has strongly supported 
the development and use of immunocontraception as an alternative 
method of controlling wild deer populations, and the application of other 
non-lethal methods to the control of wildlife problems. AWI/SAPL led 
the fight for the Animal Welfare Act. The Fund for Animals has sup­
ported several successful state referenda on wildlife issues. The HSUS 
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has recently set up its own US-wide land trust. Campaigns against furs 
have resulted in decreases in fur purchases and the closure of a number 
of retail and fur-buying establishments. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ANIMAL PROTECTION AND 
ZOO COMMUNITIES 
Introduction 
The most striking feature of the Atlanta and White Oak conferences was 
the degree to which animal protectionists and zoo professionals agree on 
a number of key issues, especially for groups who have been perceived 
as widely at variance. These recommendations are based, in part, on 
that concurrence. 
The Atlanta conference produced a high degree of consensus on the fol­
lowing major topics (Norton, et al., in press): 
1995 
*the imperative of field conservation and habitat preservation; 
*the necessity of ex-situ breeding, maintenance and reintroduc­
tion for species that cannot currently be effectively protected 
in the wild; 
*devoting more ex-situ space to at-risk species and less to com­
mon species; 
*resolution of the surplus animal problem (mentioned by three of 
the six working groups), including putting all species in well­
designed management programs to minimize surpluses, use 
of surplus animals in education and display, and continued 
efforts by the AZA to define the nature and extent of the sur­
plus problem; 
*increased focus on zoo education programs, both formal and in­
formal; use of off-site breeding facilities rather than exhibit­
based ones; 
*the definition of euthanasia as killing only for the benefit of the 
individual animal when it is no longer possible to maintain 
his /her quality of life; 
*need for a frank assessment of speciesism in veterinary care and 
euthanasia; 
*the need to make attempts to identify consensus areas between 
zoos and animal activist groups, followed by mutual public 
endorsement; 
*quality of life as the highest priority for captive animals; 
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*the need for captive management to be knowledge based, includ­
ing research and constant revision of standards for care as re­
sults are reported, and species specific improvements in en­
closures, both exhibit and off-exhibit, with the goal of maxi­
mizing opportunities for animals to express their natural be­
haviors; 
*the need for "higher and more objective standards for captive 
care, maintenance, and welfare within the AZA," and holding 
zoos to these standards through the accreditation process; 
*working with USDA to raise their standards to eliminate infe­
rior, non-AZA facilities (mentioned by three of the six work­
ing groups); 
*formal liaisons between zoos and professional societies, animal 
protection organizations, government organizations, and oth­
ers; 
*stewardship, not ownership, as the appropriate paradigm for our 
relationships with zoo animals; 
*increased awareness by the AZA and its member institutions of 
welfare considerations in zoo-sponsored research; 
*potential appropriateness of both basic and applied research if it 
holds promise for nontrivial benefits for non-human animals, 
species, and/or ecosystems; and 
*pursuit of research on the scientific assessment of animal welfare 
and animal suffering by AZA and its member zoos. 
Near the end of the White Oak conference, an informal questionnaire 
was administered to participants; the questionnaire set up a number of 
hypothetical, but realistic, field and captive situations, and asked par­
ticipants to make choices from among several different actions. The fol­
lowing issues showed a high degree of consensus: strong disapproval of 
breeding infant animals to attract visitors; strong disapproval of un­
planned breeding; support for captive breeding of endangered species; 
support of in-situ conservation for a given species even if it involved 
euthanasia of captive hybrids of that species (when given an either/ or 
choice); removal from the wild to captive breeding of an entire small 
population of rhinos soon to be targets of poachers (no threats to the 
habitat would result from their removal); strong support for the use of 
immunocontraception, rather than hunting or sharpshooting, to control 
a high-density, relatively isolated deer herd in a suburban area; strong 
approval of reintroducing captive-bred tigers to a secure habitat, even 
though 80% would be expected to die (Center for Animals and Public 
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Policy, 1994) .  
An issue o f  total disagreement was using sport/ trophy hunting permits 
to fund preservation of a large African wildlife area, even though the 
hunting would be limited, and the money would go to the local resi­
dents in exchange for being conservators of the area. Zoo/  conservation 
participants approved strongly, and animal protectionists disapproved 
strongly. The economic use of wildlife to justify its existence is an area of 
major difficulty between the two groups; animal protectionists are op­
posed to it because they feel, with some justification, that it is inhumane 
and eventually destructive of the species it purports to protect (Hoyt, 
1994), while zoo professionals and traditional conservationists tend to 
feel that economic use can be a powerful incentive for conservation, es­
pecially in developing countries. 
The zoo profession and the mainstream animal protection community 
(though not radical animal rights groups) agree on some of the most fun­
damental issues facing zoos and conservation today, and even on many 
of the methods of dealing with those issues. Areas of greatest disagree­
ment at the Atlanta conference tended to be on 1) "whether there is a 
strong moral presumption in favor of leaving wild animals free; if there 
is such a case, captive breeding programs are justified only under some 
limited conditions;" and 2) questions of population regulation and sur­
plus animals (Norton, et al., in press) .  The conclusion, however was that 
zoos can and must undertake captive breeding programs in many situa­
tions, as long as they are " (1) carried out in a way that respects indi­
vidual animal welfare, (2) justifiable as part of a broader conservation 
program designed to perpetuate the species in the wild, and (3) based on 
some reasonable hope that the captive breeding program will lead to 
augmentation of wild stocks or to reintroduction into the wild at some 
future time."  (Norton, et al ., 1995) . These conclusions were based in part 
on the agreement of the participants that we must act now to save many 
species, or they will disappear; and that humans, as the cause of the 
biodiversity crisis, have a moral obligation to respond to it. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STRATEGIES 
1. Continue the process of finding common ground. Given the agree­
ment on many key issues, the discussion should shift to a) areas where 
significant disagreement remains, such as the surplus problem, the 
individual/ species conflict, and the economic use of wildlife as an 
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incentive for conservation; b) specific issues of difference under 
broader topics of agreement, for example, the question of predator/ 
prey interactions in mixed species, naturalistic exhibits (both groups 
agree on the desirability of naturalistic, and, where possible and hu­
mane, mixed species exhibits); and c) areas where both functionally 
agree but the issue has not been confronted, such as euthanasia of 
surplus animals; neither group wants to kill, but it may be the only 
humane choice in certain circumstances. In addition, suggestions 
made at the Atlanta and White Oak conferences for formal liaison 
between zoos and animal protection groups, adoption of a flagship 
species approach to both ex-situ and in-situ conservation, and other 
topics could be explored. 
2. Work together on joint projects in areas of agreement. Such projects 
could have significant effects on field conservation, relieve the suf­
fering of many animals, and help the zoo profession deal with the 
substandard zoos which reflect badly on all zoos. 
a. A legislative/regulatory project to address non-accred­
ited, substandard facilities, such as roadside zoos. Nei­
ther the AZA nor the animal protection community can 
impose standards on regressive zoos, but together they 
could have more influence in working with USDA and 
Congress. One elegant, simple solution would be to create 
a regulation or, if necessary, pass a law requiring animal 
exhibitors to be accredited by AZA before USDA permits 
would be granted under the Animal Welfare Act. Such a 
provision would have the effect of either closing substan­
dard exhibitors or forcing them to improve. It could be 
implemented in a variety of ways, ranging from getting 
USDA more money for enforcement (as the animal protec­
tion community has done for the National Institutes of 
Health in the evaluation and approval of alternatives to 
animal testing for medical research and consumer product 
safety), to setting up a quasi-government agency, composed 
of appointees from AZA, animal protection, and USDA. 
Another approach would be to have the zoo profession and 
animal protection groups work with USDA to improve stan­
dards for animal exhibitors under the Animal Welfare Act, 
a process which the AZA has already started (REFER­
ENCE). This approach would need to include getting 
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USDA more money for enforcement to be successful. 
b .  A source book of captive animal welfare. A suggestion of 
the Atlanta conference, AZA and animal protection orga­
nizations should work together to produce a sourcebook 
which compiles existing scientific assessments of animal 
welfare and suffering, and distribute it to AZA members 
and others if appropriate. 
c. Design and implementation of a zoo-based research pro­
gram on the scientific assessment of welfare and suffer­
ing by the AZA, with the advice of animal protection 
groups .  
d. Evaluate existing zoo education programs, and if  neces­
sary and possible, design better ones. Animal protection 
groups could help support, both financially and in an ad­
visory capacity, the development of more effective zoo edu­
cation programs, as they have, with other issues, such as 
immunocontraception of free-roaming wildlife (HSUS) and 
improving literacy in school children (MSPCA) . The HSUS, 
for example, has an education division that could be help­
ful to zoos in designing programs. But the crying need 
here is for research to evaluate both formal and informal 
zoo education, in terms of what messages visitors take away 
and how effective those messages are in generating sup­
port for conservation. A related question to be explored is 
whether zoos can be effective in motivating visitors to sup­
port conservation. After this evaluation, research should 
be conducted on the best ways to design and implement 
education programs to achieve those ends, if the potential 
exists . 
Animal protectionists have a great deal to gain from sup­
porting zoo-based education: accredited zoos attract more 
than 100,000,000 visits each year. If even 10% could be 
reached with an effective conservation message, the politi­
cal outlook for protecting species and ecosystems would 
brighten considerably. 
The zoo profession would also have a great deal to gain: 
some assurance that money spent on education programs 
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is not money thrown away. They could also find out 
whether currently accepted practices ( such as naturalistic 
exhibits) and visionary concepts ( such as the biopark) are 
or could be effective in education, before further investing 
huge sums of money. If education is not effective, and can­
not be designed to be effective, then its funding should be 
redirected, preferably to field conservation. 
e. Explore using education and exhibit design skills in both 
living and nonliving exhibits to raise money for field 
conservation. This approach would capitalize on the ex­
isting entertainment component of zoos and might be easier 
to achieve than teaching conservation values. It may be 
impossible to turn casual visitors into conservationists, but 
it might be comparatively easy to get them to donate money 
to field projects that are directly addressing the problems 
highlighted in the exhibits. 
3. The animal protection community 
a. Animal protection groups need to make a distinction be­
tween productive or progressive zoos and unproductive 
or regressive zoos. Progressive zoos are responsibly and 
professionally managed facilities making contributions to 
field conservation, captive breeding and reintroduction, 
education, and research. Regressive zoos/ exhibitors are 
those making few or no such contributions, and whose 
animals are housed in inhumane and inappropriate dis­
plays, such as roadside zoos, menageries, and bear parks. 
b. Animal protection groups need to acknowledge that mas­
sive changes are taking place in the way progressive zoos 
do business .  Animal protectionists' messages, for what­
ever reasons, are being heard; zoos have stopped talking 
only to themselves, and have entered the wider world of 
conservation. But these changes are recent and not wide­
spread throughout the zoo world. Supporting progressive 
changes and the zoos that make them will go further to­
wards achieving animal protectionists' conservation objec­
tives than anti-zoo campaigns. Another consideration is 
that traditional wildlife management, with its orientation 
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toward producing harvestable surpluses of huntable ani­
mals, is also being exported to habitat countries. The con­
servation biology orientation of the zoo profession is far 
more desirable in implementing field conservation projects. 
I am not suggesting that animal protectionists should with­
hold criticism of progressive zoos or the AZA where it is 
warranted. What I am suggesting is that they first work 
with progressive zoos and the AZA to address problems, 
before deciding to attack. 
c. Animal protection groups need to recognize the limited 
powers of AZA. Rather than criticizing them for not doing 
enough, they should work cooperatively with them in ar­
eas of common interest, such as regulation of substandard 
facilities and promotion of field conservation. 
d. Animal protection organizations have a great deal to gain 
from financially supporting specific zoo-based field con­
servation, captive breeding, and education programs. Be­
sides helping to achieve animal protectionists' conserva­
tion goals, there are other potential benefits. Zoos are enor­
mously popular with North Americans, and progressive 
zoos are trusted by them, both in terms of their expertise 
about and their goals for wildlife. More members of the 
public are probably more willing to support zoo-based field 
conservation, or field conservation supported by a consor­
tium of zoos and animal protection groups, than efforts by 
animal protection groups alone. In some cases, zoos al­
ready have or are acquiring the staff, infrastructure and fi­
nancial resources to carry out field conservation projects; 
some animal protection groups may have the funds, but 
do not have staff and infrastructure. Animal protection 
groups could gain a much broader potential base of sup­
port for their conservation goals, and have a greater chance 
of achieving them, by working with accredited zoos. 
e. Animal protection groups may need a greater recognition 
of the fact that actions taken to benefit a species may not 
always be in the best interests of individuals. Whether in 
capturing wild individuals to create a breeding program, 
or allowing sustainable use of a species to aid its survival, 
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the tension between survival of individual animals and 
survival of a species may never be completely resolved. 
As in issues involving the tension between human liberty 
and its legal restriction for the protection of society, these 
decisions must be made over and over again, on a case-by­
case basis, and may at times move more in the direction of 
individual sacrifice than any of those involved would wish. 
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frain from pointing out ways in which the sacrifice of indi­
viduals could be lessened or avoided, or opposing poorly­
thought-out projects. Conservationists can sometimes take 
the sacrifice of individual animals for granted, without 
enough thought about ways to avoid it. 
4. The zoo community, including AZA 
a. The zoo profession should learn to distinguish between 
animal protectionists who are, in the words of Roger 
Caras, "open to discussion, reason, and compromise," 
(Caras, 1995) and those who are not. The former group 
has scientific expertise and sophistication in wildlife issues, 
and many of their conservation and captive animal v:el­
fare goals are identical or similar to the zoo profession's. I 
would suggest that such organizations would include, but 
not necessarily be limited to, the AHA, HSUS, WSPA, 
ASPCA, AWi, and, on a state level, the MSPCA. The zoo 
profession should continue its dialogue with these groups 
and expand it, if possible, into cooperative projects. 
I believe that the zoo profession also needs to become less 
defensive. Such tactics as refusing to let animal groups have 
access to Animal Exchange, to allow them to make an in­
dependent assessment of the surplus problem, only result 
in distrust and a conviction that zoos have something to 
hide. Such action may also result in wildly inaccurate pub­
lished estimates of the problem based on partial informa­
tion the animal groups get through other channels. (This 
suggestion applies also to animal protection groups; exclud­
ing the AZA from receiving Monitor materials creates the 
same problem.) 
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b. The zoo profession should continue its impressive efforts 
at self-evaluation, and its movement in the direction of 
field conservation and the reorganization of ex-situ pro­
grams and facilities to support field programs. As the 
AZA recognizes, these changes will take a great deal of 
education and promotion within the profession, starting 
with zoo directors, boards, and major donors, regarding 
their urgent necessity. 
c. A critical part of the profession's self-evaluation is an hon­
est and unwavering look at zoo education, formal and 
informal. The scarce empirical data that exist suggest that 
zoo education is not very effective in producing conserva­
tion-minded citizens. A hard look needs to be taken at 
whether zoos can effectively motivate visitors to support 
conservation. If so, then programs almost certainly will 
need redesign and more resources devoted to them. If not, 
zoos should redirect the money elsewhere, preferably to 
field conservation projects. 
d. In cooperation with animal protectionists, zoos need to 
continue their efforts to define the nature and extent of 
the surplus problem, and to resolve it. This process should 
include the issue of euthanasia of surplus animals, and 
possibly include a joint review of AZA guidelines on 
whether and in what circumstances it should be used. Ani­
mal protection organizations and wildlife rehabilitators 
have been dealing with euthanasia of domestic animals and 
native wildlife for many years; their standards, guidelines, 
and expertise might be of considerable use to the zoo pro­
fession in grappling with this issue. 
e. The AZA and progressive zoos must take a public and 
consistent stand against regressive zoos, which they have 
so far failed to do, despite the repugnance which many 
responsible members of the zoo profession feel for these 
facilities. In addition to building trust with animal protec­
tion groups, such an action would allow progressive zoos 
to distance themselves from roadside zoos and menager­
ies, who besmirch the reputation of the zoo profession and 
represent a view of animals characterized by domination, 
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superiority, and control. 
f. The zoo profession needs to realize, if they have not already 
done so, that economic use of wildlife as an incentive to 
preserve it can be destructive. A continuing dialogue with 
animal protection groups should be undertaken on this is­
sue, understanding that the divisions are deep and progress 
will be slow. One area of potential agreement that should 
be exp lo red is promoting tourism. as a economic use of wild­
life. 
g. As the AZA realizes, the zoo profession needs to work m.ore 
closely with conservation groups doing international habi­
tat protection, and to develop ways of coordinating projects 
to avoid duplication of effort and waste of scarce resources. 
h. AZA should continue and expand its contacts with public 
policymakers. The public arena is one where m.any crucial 
decisions are being m.ade about protective laws and regu­
lations and financial support of conservation. A striking 
example of the successes that are possible is the recent sup­
port of the Congressional House Speaker, not heretofore a 
noted conservationist, for biodiversity protection. 
i. Zoos have great potential to raise private funds to support 
field conservation; they should continue and expand this 
effort. As stated above, zoos are popular with and trusted 
by the public; given the current environmental backlash, 
they are probably far m.ore trusted presently than are tra­
ditional conservation organizations. They also have a large, 
ready-made target audience of both individuals and cor­
porations. 
CONCLUSION 
Tim.e is short and the river rises. Greater cooperation can lead to m.ore 
successes in wildlife conservation, a field that needs them. badly, and 
alleviate enormous animal suffering. Failure to do so will confirm. the 
im.m.ortal words of Pogo, "We have m.et the enemy, and he is us." 
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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CONSERVE WILD SPECIES 
John Robinson 
Wildlife Conservation Society 
2300 Southern Boulevard 
Bronx, NY 10460 
Until the development of urban society, the lives and deaths of wild 
animals and people were inextricably intertwined. People killed and 
consumed animals, and vice-versa. This interdependence is reflected 
in the cultural importance given to wild animals, whose symbolism 
reflected the observed characteristics of animals in a range of tradi­
tional cultures. As human beings increasingly buffered themselves, 
both technologically and culturally, from the actions of wild animals, 
and concomitantly were able to control the lives of these animals, the 
relation changed. The evolution of that relationship, as expressed in 
philosophy, literature, and scientific thought, has been explored in this 
conference. This essay addresses this same relationship, but has a 
narrower focus: In the modern, increasingly urban society how should 
we treat wild animals? Most of us personally experience wild animals 
only through cultural lenses such as nature shows on television, or as 
interesting but vaguely threatening presences during vacation forays 
into the rural landscape. A more precise question is what is the ethical 
justification for people living in the urban society to intervene in the 
lives of wild animals? This leads into a final question: What kinds of 
intervention are justifiable? 
I will address these questions from the perspective of a conservationist, 
more precisely one who accepts Aldo Leopold's (1949:224-225) premise 
that " A thing's right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability 
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends other­
wise." This statement can be supported from both the utilitarian 
position - that to do otherwise would endanger the resource base 
upon which human society depends - or from a more biocentric 
position - that wild species, and the natural world in general have an 
inherent right to exist. Conservationists have tended to synonimize 
integrity, stability, and beauty. A biotic community that has "integrity" 
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has the full diversity of species, which allows the system to function 
ecologically in an appropriate way. The "stability" of the community, 
both its resilience to disturbance and its persistence through time, 
depends on that species diversity. And conservationists consider 
"beauty", while the term is not in the scientific lexicon, to be defined 
by that diversity and stability. For Aldo Leopold, people were an 
integral part of this biotic community, and anthropological research 
has documented the role that traditional cultures play in creating and 
maintaining biological diversity in many natural communities. Yet it is 
also clear that in our present world, the actions of both modern and 
traditional cultures generally tend to degrade natural systems and 
reduce biological diversity. The present-day rate of species extinction 
is perhaps higher than at any time in our planet's existence, and the 
actions of human beings are the single largest contributor to this global 
degradation. 
The impact of humans on the rest of the biota is ubiquitous. Terms like 
"primeval", "virgin", "primary", undisturbed", "pristine", even "wil­
derness", all of which connote biological communities uninfluenced by 
humans, refer to a certain ideal unattainable in the modern world. 
From the high deserts of Chang Tang in Tibet to the depths of the 
tropical forest in central Amazonia, the human presence is everywhere 
discernible. This is not to state that all nature is a human construct. It 
is not. Excepting biological communities in urban and agricultural 
settings, the structure and functioning of biological communities is still 
predominately determined by species other than humans. But humans 
do have a pervasive impact on wild species worldwide, and this de­
fines how we must treat wild species. Few truly "wild" species ­
those uninfluenced by humans - exist today on our planet. And thus 
we cannot abnegate all responsibility for the fates of individual ani­
mals or for the continued existence of the species - they cannot be left 
"to do their own thing." We must take responsibility for our influence 
on the lives of wild animals. 
Our primary responsibility, if we accept Aldo Leopold's premise, s to 
ensure the survival of species in nature. The least intrusive action is to 
establish protected areas - parks and reserves for species and the 
biological communities on which they were a part - and then mini­
mize human impact within these areas. Even here, human impact in 
and around reserves is significant, and active management is usually 
necessary to maintain the biological community. Population manage-
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ment, predator restoration, habitat modification, and landscape resto­
ration are necessary tools for protected area managers, and all have an 
impact on wild species. 
More intrusive conservation actions are frequently necessary. If the 
goal is the preservation of biological diversity, protected areas alone 
are insufficient. First it is unlikely that we will be able to protect more 
than a small fraction of the planet's surface in parks and reserves, and 
the long-term persistence of many species and communities requires 
larger areas. Second governments and regulatory agencies are unable 
to protect areas if local human inhabitants and other interested parties 
do not support the park or reserve. Park personnel tend to be inad­
equately funded, supported, and trained. Through political machina­
tions or illegal actions, local peoples can undermine the best efforts of 
park managers - as evidenced by the recent difficulties experienced 
by the U.S. National Park Service and the Forest Service. Accordingly 
conservationists frequently advocate working outside protected areas, 
and enlisting the support of local communities in conservation efforts 
in and around protected areas. Local community involvement requires 
that local people value wildlife species, and frequently this means 
allowing them rights to harvest or otherwise use wild species and wild 
areas. This approach is considerably more intrusive because it in­
volves treating wild animals as resources . It is also controversial 
because the consumptive use of wild species is seemingly in conflict 
with the goal of protecting them. However it is clear that allowing 
local people to exploit a species in certain circumstances can vest them 
in the process of conserving wild species or biological communities .  
Another potentially justifiable intrusion is to bring wild animals into 
captivity. When wild populations are imperiled by habitat conversion, 
when animals cannot be protected from hunters, or when other species 
endanger remnant populations, then bringing animals into captivity 
can be the most responsible action. The removal of the last condors 
from the wild in California was justified using this argument. Zoos in 
particular have assumed the responsibility of maintaining populations 
of endangered species, and have become involved in reintroducing 
animals back into the wild when circumstances are more favorable. 
Successful reintroductions attest to the utility of this approach -
including the efforts of my own institution, when called the New York 
Zoological Society, in reintroducing bison to the American west at the 
beginning of this century. Zoos have also brought animals into captiv-
1995 Wildlife Conservation, Zoos and Animal Protection 
231 
ity with the expressed aim of introducing living animals to a generally 
urban public and educating them on the need for conservation, in 
effect using individuals as "ambassadors" for their species. And in the 
United States, some 100 million people annually visit zoos, and some 
14 million participate in formal zoo education programs. 
In this essay, I have not addressed our responsibility to the welfare of 
the individual animals of a species. If the goal is to preserve the bio­
logical community, then the survival of a species takes precedence over 
the welfare of selected individuals of the species. Human actions 
which promote the conservation of a species or a population at the 
expense of individuals are justified. The welfare of the collective as a 
whole is more important than the welfare of any one individual. How­
ever even from this perspective, there are circumstances in which the 
individual welfare of an animal attains importance. As animals be­
come rarer, we value individual animals more, and thus the mecha­
nism to conserve species increasingly depends on protecting individu­
als. For instance, consider the proposed establishment of tiger farms in 
China to provide bones for the traditional medicine trade, or the pro­
posed harvest of black rhinos in southern Africa for the horn trade. In 
both cases, arguments have been made that these actions would pro­
mote conservation of the species. Yet populations of these species are 
now so tiny, and the risks to the population of harvesting are so great. 
Our efforts to conserve these species depend on our success with 
protecting each individual, and such proposals have received little 
support within the conservation community. 
I have argued that human beings are ethically justified in intervening 
in the lives of animals if it promotes the conservation of populations or 
species. Are all kinds of interventions justifiable? From a conservation 
perspective, the answer is yes. But this answer is incomplete. There 
are humane considerations that in practice are included. If wild ani­
mals are to be harvested then the humaneness of their killing must be 
considered. The conservation perspective also does not consider the 
extent to which a wild species is sentient, yet the actions of conserva­
tionists frequently reflect a sensitivity to this issue. For instance, no 
proposal to bring the mountain gorillas into captivity has been ad­
vanced, not even during the recent human tragedy and political unrest 
in Rwanda. The agonized debates about whether to support harvests 
of elephants and whales within the conservation community also 
reflect deep concerns about animal sentience. 
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The reality that human beings significantly influence the natural 
world, either directly or indirectly, means that we must take responsi­
bility for the survival of wild species. The inescapable consequence of 
this is the active management of individual animals, populations, and 
communities. The more humans intervene, the more responsibility 
they must assume, and as wild population dwindle, the more responsi­
bility we must take for individual animals. And this creates the para­
dox. The ultimate goal is to preserve the natural world, and the wild­
ness that defines it. Yet the methods we use to conserve species, and 
care for individual animals, can rob animals of the wildness that we 
value in them. But to do otherwise is irresponsible. 
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